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[HUMANITIES]

Edited by Siraj-ud-Din

UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB
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THE LEGEND OF THE EPICUREAN PATER

SIRAJ-UD-DIN

(1)

"To be forcibly impressed, in the first place; and in the next, to find the means of making visible to others that which was vividly apparent, delightful, of lively interest to himself, to the exclusion of all that was but middling, tame, or only half-true, even to him:"[1] this is an apt description of Pater's own practice in the literary art, the chief effort of which is, for himself and for others, to discover the art of "so relieving the ideal or poetic traits, the elements of distinction, in our everyday life—of so exclusively living in them—that the unadorned remainder of it, the mere drift or debris of our days comes to be as though it were not."[2] This is Pater's life-long vocation: to feel, to capture, to express the beautiful—in art and in literature, in life and in thought. Living entirely in an inner world of intellectual and aesthetic emotions, he passes through life without any striking incidents, without taking part in any public affairs or even literary controversies, without notice except for a growing fame among the more discerning but never reaching the larger public, almost a literary recluse, the only events in whose career were the publication of a certain number of books. When we seek to penetrate the secret of this quiet existence, we are baffled by an epicurean pose, expressed with much intransigeance in the most famous passage of his best-known book; and accepting what he says there for a complete philosophy of the writer's life, we perhaps feel inclined to think of him as a curious and somewhat unhealthy sensation seeker, who spent his life in the quest of mysterious, perhaps suspicious, thrills. And thus the legend of the epicurean Pater goes on propagating itself, only partially checked by sounder criticism. But if we have the patience to study his mind carefully, if we persist in our search and try to discover his outlook on life as a whole, not resting content with a few well-known utterances of his which have obtained disproportionate notoriety, we shall find, not a

sensation-loving hedonist, but a deep and serious humanist. As our acquaintance grows, we shall discover in this writer a rare sensibility to the finer things of the spirit, an earnest and strenuous pursuit of culture, a powerful and disinterested intellectual fervour. More than this, we shall discover a tender and delicate sympathy for human suffering, a genuine and touching pitifulness of heart, a wide and sensitive understanding. Penetrating deeper into the secret of his mind, we shall discover a significant and lovable personality, with which it is stimulating to come into contact. And learning to understand this strange and somewhat enigmatic figure, we shall realise what a help to fine and earnest thinking on aesthetic life, what a stimulus to efforts at self-culture, what a refuge from the vulgarities of the common-place, is provided in his works—not numerous, indeed, but full of delicate and penetrating humanism. These works, the fruit of a life-time of meditation on the finer things of art and of literature, and also on the wider world of humanity as seen through the eyes of a literary recluse, are the objects of the present study, which is an effort to bring out the mind of Pater as reflected in his writings generally, and more specially as shown in his literary criticism.

Before embarking upon a detailed study of Pater's works, we shall find it profitable to devote some attention to his development as a writer, and to a study of those influences which progressively moulded his thought. Independent as Pater is, he does not escape the influences, literary and artistic, that surround him, altogether; but he shows his originality in modifying them to suit his own mind; and it may be said that there are very few opinions which he has expressed which are not the result of deep meditation on his part. But there is an atmosphere of thought and feeling surrounding us all, and it is only under its stimulus that we learn to realise ourselves. While criticism consists essentially in the intellectual realisation and analysis of these influences, first of all the mind must learn to submit itself to them; and there is always an interest in watching how a powerful and sensitive intellect reacts to, and then selects and synthesises among the various elements which are presented to its choice in an "opulent age". Pater shows from the first a rare self-knowledge, and an intuitive feeling for what is

sympathetic to his own mind in the thought of others. And though he makes a few mistakes, and occasionally betrays exaggeration and unbalanced enthusiasm, on the whole he is unusually self-consistent, and is well-rewarded for knowing from the first what he could do.

(2)

Like Matthew Arnold, Pater takes an "aristocratic" view of literature; and like Arnold his life-long aim is the achievement of a perfect "culture", though the ideal of culture is very different for the two minds. As Wright remarks, "the aims of Pater, henceforward, bore some resemblance to those of Arnold, but while Arnold stood for "sweetness and light", Pater advocated 'sweetness and shade'—the dim, the dusky, the subdued."[3] Of Ruskin's influence it is more difficult to speak, for curiously enough Pater never even mentions him in his writings; and though we are assured that he read this writer and was influenced by him,[4] and also that he admired his genius,[5] we cannot directly trace his influence over Pater. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that this high-priest of Italian art was neglected by Pater, or had no influence over his tastes. A serious devotion to art is common to both, but while Ruskin seeks in it for an interpretation of moral problems, Pater primarily considers it as an object of disinterested enjoyment. Ruskin showed strong likes and dislikes, and is often guided in aesthetic appreciation by moral preference; Pater is eclectic, and demands of art nothing more than that it should please. Ruskin's dogmatism and vagaries may have repelled Pater, and their points of view in art are often radically different, but there certainly is something of a common aim in the case of these two writers; both are concerned with enlarging the influence of the beautiful in life, and both are ardent art-lovers. Benson even traces the influence of Ruskin in Pater's style[6]; and though the latter's silence on the subject makes it difficult to come to a perfectly positive conclusion in this matter, the remarkable resemblances between these two authors cannot but lead one to think of a strong influence exerted by the older over the younger writer.

Among the English poets, none exercised a greater influence over Pater

at this time than Wordsworth of whom, like Arnold, he was a constant admirer.[7] He also read Keats, whose ardent love of beauty has so much in common with his own; Carlyle, who inflamed his love of German thought; Thackeray, who was his favourite novelist, and others whose influence on him is not so deep.[8] Coleridge also attracted him early as a "subtle-souled psychologist" and a disciple of the German transcendentalists, though his formlessness repelled Pater. Through Carlyle and Coleridge, and also through Jowett and Green, he was at this time led to the German transcendentalists and mystics—specially Hegel and Schelling, whose spiritual philosophy of nature fascinated and stimulated him. From them there was but a step to Goethe, who during his early life seems to have been his literary idol—"the true illustration of the speculative temper", one to whom "every moment of life brought its contribution of experimental, individual knowledge; by whom no touch of the world of form, colour, and passion was neglected."[9] Matthew Arnold's admiration for Goethe is well-known, and possibly guided Pater, but he was bound sooner or later to discover the great German humanist: and there is no doubt that at this time "he had made Goethe his guiding star."[10]

Such are the influences under which Pater grew up during his undergraduate years at Oxford, and in 1862 he gained his degree, obtaining a second-class in the school of *Litterae Humaniores*. This was a great disappointment to him, and abandoning all ideas of the church, which he first contemplated entering, he now resolved upon a literary and academic career. For a couple of years he subsisted by taking private pupils, but an election to a Fellowship at Bransenose College in February 1864 put an end to his pecuniary anxieties, and from this time he found himself placed in "precisely the niche that was most suited for his peculiar genius."[11] Taking up his residence in his new College, he resumed his favourite studies; and his first essay belongs to these years. This is the short paper called *Diaphaneite*,[12] in which Pater expresses his ideal of inner perfection, and which is remarkable as an unusually clear enunciation of his early philosophy of life. His enthusiasm is already for an ideal of culture and inner harmony, in which the

chief place is occupied by an intellectual simplicity and a rigid elimination of all conflicting outward interests. The emphasis is on the life of culture, discovering by an innate power the elements which are capable of ministering to it, and breeding an utter truthfulness of vision, open to all the rays of intellectual light. The German influence is visible in the involved turn of expression, and in the mystical tone of the essay, echoing as it does Goethe's cry for "more light." As Benson says, "the value of the paper is that, in the first place, it shows a power of acute and subtle psychological analysis, and in the second place it expresses with difficult wistfulness the ideal with which the young student meant to approach the world."[13] The germs of Pater's later philosophy are already present here; and in fact this paper shows more clearly than the celebrated "Conclusion" to the *Renaissance* the inward and earnest character of Pater's doctrine, in spite of all its show of hedonism.

The years between 1864 and 1873, between his election to a Fellowship and the publication of the *Renaissance*, are the seed-time of his intellectual life and saw many important developments in his mind. He was now writing, slowly and gradually, at the rate of an essay a year, and was building up that original philosophy of art by which he is so largely known. In 1866 came out his article on Coleridge, an unsigned contribution to the *Westminister Review* which shows a still immature style, moving rather stiffly with its philosophical terminology, but containing one of Pater's most characteristic sayings, where he expresses his preference for concrete beauty over the most splendid abstraction of the human mind. "Who would change the colour or curve of a rose-leaf for that colourless, formless, intangible, being—Plato put so high ?"[14] The enthusiasm for Goethe is strongly shown, and the essence of the writer's concrete, sensuous, form-loving philosophy of art is clearly outlined. But it is in the next paper, that on Winckelmann,[15] that Pater for the first time finds himself. Characteristically, he utters his own deepest thoughts in discussing those of another, and in Winckelmann's impassioned Hellenism he sees a reflection of his own enthusiasm for that "Hellenic ideal, in which man is at unity with himself, with his physical nature, with the outward world."[16] Full of a passionate enthusiasm for the "visible beauty" of Greek art, and its reflections in

modern literature, the essay is a paean on the artistic ideal of life, conceived by a mind of unusual delicacy. The inspiration of the subject is strong upon Pater, and gives the essay a tone of real exaltation.

Up to this time the main influences in Pater's intellectual life had been Ruskin, Arnold, Goethe, Winckelmann, Coleridge, Plato, and some of the German philosophers, especially Kant, Schiller, Hegel and Schelling. Now a new influence enters with the French writers whose acquaintance he seems to have made about this time, and whose growing ascendancy gradually transforms his mental and artistic outlook. This is first seen in his essay on *Aesthetic Poetry* with its deliberate imitation of Baudelaire; and the same influence is visible in his celebrated passage on the "Mona Lisa" in the *Notes on Leonardo da Vinci*.[17] From this time the influence of French literature is clearly pronounced in Pater's writings, and rapidly develops into a philosophy of "art for art's sake." Edmund Gosse tells us that about this time Pater became intimate with Swinburne,[18] who was the man most deeply in touch with contemporary French literature then living in England, and the result of the friendship is seen in a growing enthusiasm for French models in style, and for a theory of artistic autonomy in philosophy. Gautier, whom Swinburne admired greatly, had set the ball rolling with his declaration in the *Avant-propos* to his Mademoiselle *de Maupin*: "Il n'y a de vraiement beau que ce qui ne peut servir a rien; tout ce qui est utile est laid, car c'est l'expression de quelque besoin;"[19] and this new ideal in art had been caught up by the Pre-Raphaelites with enthusiasm, its most celebrated exponents being Swinburne himself and J.M. Whistler. The former, in his *William Blake* (1868), had made a powerful plea for the emancipation of art from the restraints of subject matter and morality, declaring that for an artist the only rule or law was that of his art. For Blake, he says, "all faith, all virtue, all moral duty or religious necessity, was not so much abrogated or superseded as summed up, included and involved, by the one matter of art."[20] From the imaginative independence of Blake he draws the lesson of the autonomy of the artistic faculty, and claims for it an entire emancipation from service to any other end. "Art is not like fire or water, a good servant and a bad master; rather

the reverse. She will help in nothing, of her own knowledge or free will; upon terms of service you will get worse than nothing out of her. Handmaid of religion, exponent of duty, servant of fact, pioneer of morality, she cannot in any way become; she would be none of these things though you were to bray her in a mortar."[21] And he exhorts the artists to be true to their vocation. "Art for art's sake, first of all, and afterwards we may suppose all the rest shall be added to her (or if not she need hardly be overmuch concerned); but from the man who falls to artistic work with a moral purpose, shall be taken away even that which he has—whatever of capacity for doing well in either way he may have at starting."[22] This is the clearest enunciation of the theory of art for art's sake in England so far, and in a few years the phrase was destined to become famous. Whistler, after long residence in France, was now living in London as a member of the Pre-Raphaelite group, and by his talk and example was doing much to spread the ideas of French writers and artists in England. Swinburne, in *Some Pictures of* 1868, declares that the supreme quality of Whistler's art lay in his "love of beauty for the very beauty's sake." It is true that Whistler did not bring out his *Ten O'Clock* till 1885, but he was already an influence of the first importance in contemporary art.

Closely bound up with this movement of art for art's sake was the influence of French literature, in which this tendency was most strongly expressed. Gautier and Baudelaire were still alive, and Swinburne was an active interpreter of their art in England. Like Gautier he loved to rail against the hypocrisy of critics and the stupidity of the bourgeois, and like the French writer he detested middle class morality. As Sir Edmund Gosse says, there was a malicious spirit of revolt in Swinburne that delighted in shocking orthodox opinion, and for which all the symbols of prudish Victorian virtues seemed fit only to be ridiculed.[23] With his hatred of bourgeois virtues, with his intransigeant enthusiasm for art, with his intense love of French literature, Swinburne became a leading influence in Pater's life after 1869, and during this period in Pater's writings we find an increasing note of aesthetic hedonism, accompanied by a growing appreciation of French literature and French literary ideals. But Pater lacks the energy necessary

for making a rebel, and his whole point of view is too inwardly to have allowed him to become an active exponent of the theory of art for art's sake like Gautier or Swinburne. With a mystical temperament and a metaphysical training, Pater espouses the point of view indicated by this theory, but in a more philosophic sense than is the case with its active exponents, and he never directly attacks the prudery or moral narrowness of Victorian society in the manner of Swinburne. But, with a reality of inner belief in beauty shared by few, Pater develops a doctrine of its supreme importance in life, borrowed as to theory from the German writers on aesthetics, but really an exaggerated expression of his own inner experience.

In the meanwhile he was becoming well-known and his articles on Italian art between 1869 and 1873 had earned for him the position of a leading critic. He was now a member of a circle of writers and artist and his reputation had travelled beyond the confines of Oxford. "He was henceforth no longer a provincial philosopher, but a critic linked to London and the modern arts."[24] He frequented the company of Swinburne, John Payne, Simeon Solomon and other "advanced" artists and poets, and was coming into touch with the pre-Raphaelite circle itself. At Oxford also he now had a large circle of acquaintances, and was a prominent member of its academic and social circles. But the most important event in his inner life was the growing love of the Renaissance, in which he had become interested since his first visit to Italy in 1869.[25] He had contributed, beginning with *Leonardo da Vinci*, four papers on Italian subjects to the *Fortnightly Review*, then under the editorship of John Morley; and in 1873 Pater published his first book, *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, incorporating in it these articles after some revision and adding three more now published for the first time, besides the "Preface" and the "Conclusion". With the publication of this book Pater became definitely famous, and its appearance rightly marks an epoch in the life of its author.

(3)

The publication of the *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* in February 1873 was an event in the literary and critical world. The merit of the book

is that it concentrates and gives consummate expression to a number of dispersed literary and aesthetic tendencies, and by its bold enunciation of a philosophy of aesthetic hedonism, makes articulate the thoughts of many who were marching towards similar conclusions. Never before had the philosophy of "aestheticism"—that art and life are meant to minister to delight alone—been expounded so completely; never before had the epicurean frame of mind, which looks upon life as a series of "moments", to be prized for the sake of the rare and exquisite experiences that they bring, been expressed with so much vigour. Pater throws overboard all the religious and moral fervours of Ruskin (then Professor of Art at Oxford), and the high seriousness of Matthew Arnold and recommends art frankly for its own sake. "For art comes to you, proposing to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake."[26] The curiously involved, rich rhythmical prose in which the book is written, its obvious enthusiasm for art, its bold hedonism, all combined to make for a strong appeal to the young among whom its success was instantaneous, and many who read the book when it first came out have borne witness to its influence. The book "stirred most deeply the waters of the "seventies",[27] producing something like sensational excitement; and setting a part of young Oxford burning "with a hard gem-like flame."[28]

"The publication of the *Renaissance* was to be attended by important consequences. It gave Pater a definite place in the literary and artistic world. But it had a still deeper effect.... The younger generation was thrilled by a sense of high artistic possibilities; it realised that there was a hidden treasure of accumulated art, ancient and mediaeval, which remained as a living monument of certain brilliant and glowing forces that seemed to have become quiescent. It became aware that it was existing under cramped conditions, in a comfortable barbarism, encompassed by strict and respectable traditions, living a bourgeois kind of life, fettered by a certain stupid grossness, a life that checked the free development of the soul."[29] One result of the book for Pater was that he lost the proctorship which had

been promised him, when the turn came to Brasenose to nominate for one in 1874.

The years between 1873 and 1880, when he resigned his tutorship in order to devote himself more fully to literature, were mainly occupied with English and Greek studies. Hard upon the *Renaissance* followed the two remarkable papers on *Wordsworth* and on *Measure for Mesasure*,[30] studies in which the fine temper of Pater comes out, showing how thin his epicurean disguise was. From the first there is an intellectual seriousness about Pater's ideal that differentiates it from sheer sensation-seeking hedonism : for him the life of culture aims at attaining "not only as intense but as complete a life as possible", and its main problem is to find "balance, unity with one's self."[31] He looks to art for the power it has of "satisfying the spirit", and of giving "a sense of freedom."[32] But still Pater had betrayed himself into an exaggerated statement of the doctrine of "moments" in his "Conclusion";[33] and he perhaps realises this and tries to show the more serious side of the cult of beauty in these papers of 1874. For *Wordsworth* is a powerful plea for "contemplation" as a sobering element in life, and insists upon the principle of a higher morality in works of art than the morality of everyday life. And the paper on *Measure for Measure*, with its fine ethical note, is full of a tender humanity and a delicate sense of justice. Even at this time, when Pater seems to have believed in the cult of beauty most intensely, he is by no means blind to the claims of the soberer elements in life and to the demands of humanity. As Elton says, "Pater did himself some wrong in the sentences, afterwards cancelled, in which he seemed to reduce the quest to a series of disconnected moments of pleasure. Apart from any false psychology involved, his own creed implies a strict perception of the difference of spiritual or artistic quality between pleasures."[34] But "he is always proclaiming his cult, and always rising well above it, so that it does not do him much harm ; in its cruder shape it was by no means good for every-body."[35]

The influence of French literature, which has already been noticed, and which is to some extent responsible for Pater's exaggerated cult of art, is seen clearly in his essay on "Romanticism"[36] which appeared in 1870.

Here he is completely under the spell of the French romantics, especially Victor Hugo and Gautier, and sees in French literature the finest illustrations of the romantic temper. The essay also betrays a love of the sensational, even the *macabre*, in art, and in spite of the fine things it contains, shows an unpleasant leaning towards a morbid type of writing—a "longing for *le frisson*, a shudder, to which the 'romantic' school in Germany, and its derivations in England and France, directly ministered." One feels that there is something not quite healthy about a mind that delights in such art, which is calculated to satisfy "a deep thirst for intellectual excitement, after a long ennui, or in reaction against the strain of outward, practical things."[37] Romanticism has "an eager excited spirit" that demands "strength, the grotesque first of all", and which delights in "flowers of the yew".[38] Its spirit is "antinomian" and there is something "malign" in its beauty.[39] The essay betrays a side of Pater's mind which it is not altogether pleasant to contemplate.

About this time begin also the Greek studies to which some of Pater's finest criticism is devoted. The first in this series is *Demeter and Persephone*, a lecture delivered in 1875, which Pater considered "the most laborious and difficult piece of work he had ever done." Something of the same love of the curious, the sensational, which we have noticed in "Romanticism", is present here also; and it contains a passage of overwrought beauty reminding one of the celebrated *poeme* on *Mona Lisa*. A study of *Dionysus* continues the same sort of half-poetical, half-scholarly treatment of Greek legends, the "romantic" interest again being present in the terrible significance of Zagreus—the hunter of men's souls. Its sequel—*The Bacchanals of Euripides*—written in 1878, though published only in 1889, shows the same preoccupation with the terrible and the mysterious, and the whole conception of the play, in Pater's mind, is highly sensational. The papers on *Greek Art*, *The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture* and *The Marbles of Aegina*, are much quieter in tone, and deal with the soberer side of the Greek mind. Here also Pater points out an element of passion : "Greek sculpture could not have been precisely a cold thing" and possesses an "unsuspected fund of passion and energy in form";[40] but he claims for it the power of dealing

"with the deepest elements of man's nature and destiny."[41] The next paper is remarkable for its praise of the Dorian spirit, the tendency of which is "towards the impression of an order, a sanity, a proportion in all work, which shall reflect the inward order of human reason."[42] The more serious and healthy view of art, which Pater ultimately regains, is foreshadowed here.

In the meanwhile Pater had brought out a second edition of the *Renaissance* in 1877, which is remarkable for several changes. The famous "Conclusion" was suppressed, and several significant changes were made in other parts of the book, testifying to a fear of public opinion. In fact, Pater seems to have been rather alarmed at the influence that his book was having, and the kind of reputation that it was procuring for him. An indication of it is to be found in the *New Republic*, a satirical novel that was published in the same year, in which Pater is depicted, under the guise of a Mr. Rose, as an affected and languorous aesthete, with a decided tendency towards the improper, and suggesting a suspiciously epicurean character. This probably did pain Pater; and anyhow he was feeling that he had gone too far in his hedonistic philosophy. The withdrawal of the "Conclusion", he says, was due to his fear that the ideas expressed there "might possibly mislead some of those youngmen into whose hand it might fall", but there are other signs also that Pater was in a state of moral panic at this time, and was anxious to conciliate sober opinion, which had been somewhat scandalised by his writings. But in spite of this recantation, during this period Pater shows a strong attraction towards the curious and the sensational in art, and his mind seems to be occupied with rather unhealthy thoughts. Some instances of this have already been seen, and many more will be found in the detailed discussions of the papers referred to above.

Another noticeable development during this period is the beginning of original creative work by Pater. He published his first "Imaginary Portrait" in 1878—this being the highly autobiographical sketch called *The Child in the House*. Benson calls it "the sweetest and tenderest of all Pater's fancies"; and certainly it is highly characteristic of its author. Pater shows a high degree of originality in this novel kind of writing, and the "Imaginary Portrait" is a special creation of his. Here he interweaves fancies and

reminiscence, inserting also sometimes quite significant criticism, and in any case his reflections upon life and art; and *The Child in the House*, as the first of these, is specially interesting.

(4)

It is not known when Pater first conceived the idea of his *Marius*, and under what crircumstances he began writing it, but undoubtedly the work occupied several years of his life at a time when his powers were at their highest. Shadwell tells us that he began it in 1880, and his resignation of his tutorship at this time makes it evident that he felt the strain imposed upon him by this new literary task. He published little during these six years—from 1880 to 1885; and ultimately in February 1885 the work came out in two volumes. This is the most interesting document for a study of Pater's mind during his central period, and it gives a carefully considered resume of his philosophy of life.

The aesthetic position is completely reconsidered and presented in a more thoughtful way in this book. The fundamental point of view, that life has to be lived for the sake of the experiences that it brings, here and now, is not abandoned; but the more strenuous side of this ideal, the need for self-control and intellectual culture, and even the ennoblement brought about by religion, are given their due place. The qualifications that the hedonistic theory of life demanded are made here; and the opinions that Pater expresses in this book do not give the impression of being one-sided and exaggerated, as his pronouncements in the "Conclusion" do. The epicureanism here expounded is of the very essence of Pater's thought, and is never abandoned, though certain other sides of his mind come into greater prominence later.

The ideal of life, as conceived by Marius, is that of a complete culture, a wide education, directed negatively towards ascertaining the true limits of man's capacities, but positively towards the refinement of the senses and the mind, making them capable of receiving all noble impressions. In such an education the arts would necessarily play a large part, because the products of the imagination present the most perfect forms of life. These supreme

products of art must, therefore, be held to be the true objects of "impassioned contemplation" ; and by the beauty of mind and life that such an ideal would produce, it might come to count even as a sort of religion. "In this way, the true aesthetic culture would be realisable as a new form of the contemplative life, founding its claim on the intrinsic blessedness of the 'vision'—the vision of perfect men and things."[43] And the essentially sceptical basis of this ideal is seen in its unwillingness to recognize any certainty outside the visible exterior of things. "Here at least is a vision, a theory, which reposes on no basis of unverified hypothesis, which makes no call upon a future after all somewhat problematic."

Pater recognises the limitations of this ideal, but is unable to see anything certain beyond it. He realises that "Cyrenaicism is ever the characteristic philosophy of youth, ardent, but narrow in its survey—sincere, but apt to become one-sided, or even fanatical." He even admits that it is only one side of life that it expresses : "It is one of those subjective and partial ideals, based on vivid, because limited, apprehension of the truth of one aspect of experience (in this case, the beauty of the world and the brevity of man's life there) which it may be said to be the special vocation of the young to express." And yet it is the most beautiful ideal that the world can show and in its seriousness it comes very near to religion itself. "If it starts with considerations opposed to the religious temper, which the religious temper holds it a duty to repress, it is like it, nevertheless, and very unlike any lower development of temper, in its stress and earnestness, its serious application to the pursuit of a very unwordly type of perfection. The saint, and the Cyrenaic lover of beauty, it may be thought, would at least understand each other better than either would understand the man of the world."[44] In *Marius* Pater makes an effort to weight the claims of all the ideals that he can conceive of, even the Christian ; and it is significant that he remains faithful to Cyrenaicism, though he depicts the beauty of the Christian ideal and life with great sympathy. In fact, Pater never entirely abandons this position ; and though he feels the attraction of the religious and the mystical ideal, he is unable to sacrifice the world of sense which entire submission to these ideals demands.

It has been found necessary to discuss the aesthetic philosophy of life that *Marius* expresses thus at length, because this book is the most significant and most detailed exposition of Pater's point of view. We have seen that there is a certain amont of exaggeration in his utterances, a certain recklessness in his attitude, during the previous period, when he is rather carried off his feet by the French theories of art and its relation to life. During these intervening years Pater has meditated much, specially on ancient philosophies, and what he says now is the deliberate and considered expression of his opinion. There is a truth in the legend of a pagan Pater, for a religious believer in the ordinary sense he never became. To the last his mind toys with various passibilities in man's inner life, and he is strangly fascinated by mystical theories, but he never seems to be able to make up his mind finally about these questions. But from now onwards there is no exaggeration, no recklessness ; on the other hand there is a haunting sense of man's ignorance, a wistful search for wisdom. The early fever of the senses cools down, and Pater seeks more and more for the higher aspects of aesthetic experience for a more intellectual and vigorous type of art. There is a striking gain in earnestness and seriousness of temperament, and the occasionally unhealthy note of the earlier writings now seldom recurs.

In another way too the completion of *Marius* marks an epoch in Pater's life. His position as a writer of the very first rank was now established, and having finished his most important book, he was freed for lighter work. The labours of composition, which he found so terrific in the beginning, had now been greatly lessened ; and he could write almost easily. From this time he begins a certain amount of book-reviewing too, a kind of work which does not add anything to his reputation, and which has hardly any interest for us today. Externally the change was marked by Pater's taking up a house in London, where he lived for eight years ; though during term he still resided at Oxford. In town he saw a good deal of company, and entered freely into the literary and artistic circles of the metropolis.

The literary publications of the succeeding few years include mostly "Imaginary Portraits". These express various sides of the writer's mind,

and some of them are of great psychological interest. *In Sebastian van Storck*[45] he expresses the mystical attraction of the Infinite with such power and reality that one cannot but feel that Pater himself had experienced something of the sort; and in *Denys L'Auxerrois*[46] he gives a story modelled upon Heine, of a return of the pagan god Dionysus to a mediaeval French town. It has a weird charm, and shows how the imagination of Pater dwelt with a kind of horrified fascination upon some of the remoter possibilities of experience. For the influence of the god amidst human beings, just as it stimulates their joy of life and vital energies, also arouses the latent ferocity and cruelty of their nature. It almost seems like an allegory, wherein Pater symbolizes the intoxications as well as the dangers of the full life of the senses—of the unrestrained cult of beauty. The way in which the author's imagination dwells upon the theme shows his fascination for such ideas; and the piece is exceedingly significant of Pater's mentality.

The unfinished romance of *Gaston de Latour*, five chapters of which appeared in successive months in 1888, resumes the earlier theme of *Marius*. The same kind of problem is studied, but in a different environment and from a slightly changed point of view. The youthful Gaston has much the same kind of temperament as Marius, and is thrown into a similarly perplexed world, with the task of mastering its currents and realising himself in it. The various encounters he has, with spirits like Ronsard and Montaigne, reveal the various sides of the youth's life, who, like Marius, is religious, susceptible, sensitive to beauty and perplexed with doubts. The self-revelation is less intimate and less direct than in Marius, and Gaston himself is more shadowy than his earlier prototype. But the earlier themes are repeated—the influences of beauty, of sorrow, of religion. The unfinished character of the romance prevents us from realising the writer's final intention, or seeing what course the mental progress of Gaston was intended to take, but the "Cyrenaicism" of Gaston is less pronounced than that of Marius. The great portrait of Montaigne in *Gaston* stands as the symbol of scepticism, but a scepticism less fierce and more humane than that of Flavian in *Marius*. The style is quieter, and contains few of those impassioned passages that

make *Marius* so memorable. On the whole it is impossible not to notice that in *Gaston* the mental attitude depicted is quieter, though essentially unchanged.

At the time that these writings appeared, Pater had only six years more to live, but he was now at the height of his powers. The earlier hedonism had been lived through, as we have seen, and had been succeeded by a more earnest and wistful frame of mind, but still with the emphasis on the sensuous and concrete side of experience. Within the few remaining years there is a great development of the more thoughtful and earnest side of Pater's mind, and he dwells more on religious and mystical problems. His view of art also become more serious, and in general he shows a maturity and wisdom in his utterances, and a thoughtful serenity in his mood, very different from the aesthetic fervours of the 'seventies.'

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The year 1888 saw the third edition of the *Renaissance* in which the "Conclusion" was restored with modifications. But the most important event of the year is the publication of his essay on *Style* in which Pater gives us his maturest theory of art, and the emphasis is seen to be now all on the intellectual qualities—on "structure", on "the necessity of mind in style". The change in the manner is quite striking, and bears witness to close thinking and a thorough reconsideration of the artistic problem. The frame of mind visible through this essay is much healthier than that seen in the essay on Romanticism; but curiously enough, there is the same preoccupation with French models in this later essay as in the earlier one. In Romanticism the heroes were Hugo and Gautier: now it is Flaubert, for whom Pater shows an admiration that cannot but appear exaggerated to us. Still, it is the care for art, the conscientious workmanship, which now draws Pater, and not the romantic thrill. There is some advance in that.

The remaining years are mostly taken up with Greek studies, and the most important publication of Pater's life is his *Plato and Platonism*. Before discussing this, however, we have to notice a few smaller studies, nearly all of them devoted to Greek or French subjects. *Hippolytus Veiled* is a very

original kind of "Imaginary Portrait", in which Greek myth and mediaeval legend are woven together with pure fancy, resulting in a story of great though bewildering charm. *Giordano Bruno* is a stimulating sketch of the Neapolitan monk's philosophy, and betrays Pater's strong interest in mysticism. The essay on Prosper Merimee is a powerful and well-planned study, and constitutes one of Pater's finest bits of criticism. Then there are one or two essays on art, the most important being a study of Raphael, and an "Imaginary Portrait"—*Emerald Uthwart*. There are also a number of reviews and journalistic writings which need not detain us.

The two most important writings of these years, however, are *Plato and Platonism* and the essay on *Pascal*. The first was published during the author's life-time but the second came out only after his death. Both are full of deep and serious thought, and bear witness to a growing austerity of temper, but it is also noteworthy that in both the sceptical frame of mind comes out strongly. There is no final gain of faith ; and though Pater dwells on ultimate problems with an earnestness and depth of understanding reached by few writers, the doubts are never entirely quelled. *Plato and Platonism*, containing so many of his last reflections, still bears witness to his love of concrete beauty ; and there is nothing that he praises in Plato more heartily than the Grecian master's "impress of visible reality". He shows a great unwillingness to recognise the ascetic element in Plato, and tries to explain it away by all sorts of means. But, while strongly repelled by asceticism, and still in love with sensuous beauty, Pater now shows interest in the more serious side of Platonic philosophy, and praises it for its service in redeeming the world of matter and sense. In the same strain he glorifies the "Dorian spirit" of reasonable order, and manifests a preference for an ideal of "musical unity" among human beings. The most important "note" in the book is that of "harmony", a "musical accord in the soul", guiding and governing all human activities. His treatment of Plato's aesthetics shows how much nobler, and severer his conception of art has become; and in its constant elevation of temper the book is truly indicative of a great change in Pater. Still, the sceptical frame of mind persists, and Pater is unable to reconcile himself to the more spiritual parts of Plato's philosophy, and

is still unconvinced as to the reality of any supreme "Vision".

The same earnest, wistful frame of mind, the same scepticism, the same seriousness of temper, are exhibited in the essay on *Pascal*. Though ostensibly concerned with the disputes of Jansenists and Jesuits, Pater shows his attitude of mind in the way he looks upon these opposed tendencies in theology as two eternally conflicting tendencies of the human mind, each expressing a certain psychological need. The power with which he describes Pascal's mind shows his capacity to enter into these difficult regions of thought and his understanding of spiritual problems. He recognises that "achieved faith" is only possible by a kind of "entirety of submission ... immense sincerity ... heroic grandeur."[47] He contrasts "the gently pleasantly undulating, sunny, earthly prospect of poor loveable humanity" in Montaigne with Pascal's vision of "a scene of harsh precipices, of threaening heights and depths"—the depths of man's nothingness.[48] The problems with which Pascal deals were real enough to Pater's soul now.

From an examination of his writings we learn that Pater's love of visible beauty, his longing for concrete, sensuous loveliness, which is deeply temperamental with him, never deserts him ; and to the last he is capable of an intense absorption in its manifestations, whether in art or in life. But this enjoyment is always attended with a feeling of regret for the passing away of things, for the transitoriness of beauty ; and in his earlier writings he betrays a feverish feeling which arises from the difficulty that he finds in reconciling himself to this spectacle of beauty and its decay. Again, from the first he is alive to the beauty of holiness, of *ascesis*, but this does not suffice to bring peace to his soul. However, as time passes, he begins to feel more and more the power of this more enduring beauty—the beauty of great thoughts and the intellect, and the loveliness of charity. Under these influences his thought grows less troubled and his mood more serene, though the old love of external beauty breaks in from time to time. His writings illustrate this conflict in his mind, and furnish the "dramatic contrast" of his career.

Similarly, the mystical element, always present in Pater's temperament, gradually grows stronger. His sensuousness, such as it is, is not the mere heat of an ungoverned temperament but of the very essence of his artistic

mind. For him art and beauty are imbued with a mystical quality, and his disquiet at the beginning arises from his failure to link them on to the more permanent things of life. Later, to some extent under the influence of Plato, he rises to a more spiritual conception of beauty ; and though he always feels a difficulty about resigning the sensible world for the realm of mere ideas, still his imagination dwells fondly on the "transcendental, the non-experienced beauty" which is not for "the bodily eye".[49] Even though the idea may have been held only half-seriously, its presence quietens Pater's soul and chastens his mind. He speaks with sympathy of the claims of of Platonic philosophy. It provides a satisfacton not for the intelligence only, but for the whole nature of man, his imagination and faith, his affections, his capacity for religious devotion, and for some still unimagined development of the capacities of sense. It is true that Pater does not hold these opinions quite seriously, but still they provide a poetic and restraining background to his mind, and he dwells wistfully on such ideas.

Correspondent with this mystical growth is his increasing sympathy with and understanding of the religion around him, with a growing interest in Christianity as a practical and ethical system. From a kind of dramatic interest in the ceremonies and ritual of the church, he develops an ever fuller understanding of the mystical side of religion, as an agency for the redemption of matter. The position seems to have been somewhat unorthodox to the last, and he felt the attraction of beauty and the onslaughts of doubt with extraordinary keenness, but on the whole he grows in serenity and peace of mind.

He died rather suddenly on July 30, 1894, leaving some unfinished manuscripts, the most important being his essay on *Pascal*, which was published after his death. His friend, C.L. Shadwell of Oriel College, was his literary executer, and brought out three volumes of his writings posthumously. When he died he was already famous ; and his influence, stealing out from a narrow circle, had firmly established itself with true connoisseurs in literature. It did not reach the larger public, and never will ; but his place among English writers is secure.

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PERSON

C.A. QADIR

The question, 'who is a person?' ultimately resolves itself into, 'who is a man?'; for to me both the terms, that is to say, man and person, have the same significance and consequently the same field of applicability. I do not think that a gnat which worries me on a summer evening can legitimately be called a person, nor do I think angels and gods can be called persons, in the technical sense of the word person. For it seems to me that if I as a human being can be called a person, then no body who is not a human being, despite his greatness in some other respects, can be called a person. From this it would be clear that I am wedded to some sort of a dualistic theory in my conception of a person and would reject all such theories as are mentalistic or materialistic in their import.

At one time the Logical Positivists, in their zeal to bring about unity in the language of sciences, advocated reduction of all types of language into the language of Physics. It was maintained that all kinds of languages, no matter what their syntax was, could be ultimately resolved to one standard language and that was the language of Physics. Consequently an effort was made to analyse sociological sentences, in the first instance, into the sentences of Psychology, and the claim was made, which in fact was made in the case of every reductive sentence or sentences, that no remainder was left. In other words, the connotation and the denotation, to speak in Aristotelean language, of the original sentence was equivalent to that of the reduction sentence or sentences whatever the case be. The language of Psychology was then reduced to the language of Physiology. The Behaviorists of the Watsonian group have worked on this hypothesis. Human behavior has been analysed by them into reflexes and reflexes into tropisms which are physical tendencies explainable on mechanical basis. Physiological sentences were reduced, in turn, to physical sentences, for whatever takes place within the organism

was regarded to be explicable in terms of energies which are measurable and this was mechanical in the final analysis.

This programme has been criticised on the ground that reduction sentences, no matter how many they are, can never exhaust the connotation of the original sentence. Let there be a sentence like 'the snow is white'. No amount of reduction sentences can collectively or severally analyse completely and thoroughly the sense of the given sentence. Consequently the programme of the unity of sciences, despite its pious intentions, has failed to convince anybody. There is uniqueness in the case of every sentence which cannot be grasped through reduction sentences. For instance the sentence 'the mob was turbulent' cannot be reduced to sentences in which individuals of the mob, figure as subjects. If supposing four persons constitute a mob, it cannot be said that the sentence 'the mob was turbulent' is equivalent to four sentences *viz*. A was turbulent, B was turbulent, C was turbulent and D was turbulent. The mob is not a sum of A, B, C & D ; it is an entity by itself and statement about it cannot be analysed, without remainder, into statement about the individuals composing it.

The same is true of psychological sentences. By no amount of verbal jugglery can psychological sentences be reduced completely to those of physiology. This does not amount to denying the importance of physiological study for the understanding and the interpretation of mental processes; what is denied is that a physiological study of a mental happening can be regarded as a thorough analysis of the situation. In other words an explanation which purports to be physiological cannot be regarded as psychological. Professor Strawson holds that if there are two types of vocabularies, one mechancial and the other psychical, the first being called M language and the second P language, then M language can never replace the P language. The M language may be essential for the understanding of the P language, but it can never exhaust the connotation of the P language.

Accordingly it seems obvious that a human being is inexplicable on a single unitary basis. In the past, attempts have been made to reduce either body to mind or mind to body. In the first case there is mentalism, in the second it is materialism. Now-a-days the complexion of both materialism

and mentalism has changed, for the old conceptions of body and matter have disappeared in face of the continuing progress of scientific knowledge. Matter is not matter in the old sense, nor is mind mind in the old sense. Consequently there is much rubbing of shoulders by mind and body. The rubbing may not be so complete as is presupposed by Neutral Monism of Russell, still there is no denying the fact that the sharp division which the ancients drew between body and mind cannot be maintained. Gilbert Ryle supposes that belief in mind is comparable to belief in ghosts. In *The Physical Basis of Mind*, a series of broadcast talks by eminent scientists and philosophers, Gilbert Ryle recites a story. He says, "The story is told of some peasants who were horrified at the sight of their first railway train. Their pastor therefore gave them a lecture explaining how a steam engine works. One of the peasants then said: 'Yes, pastor, we quite understand what you say about the steam engine. But there is really a horse, inside, is not it ?'" So used were they to horse-drawn carts that they could not take in the idea that some vehicle propel themselves. To complete the story Ryle invents a sequel. He says the peasants examined and peeped into every crevice of it. They then said, "Certainly we cannot see, feel, or hear a horse there. We are foiled. But we know that there is a horse there. So it must be a ghost horse, which like the fairies hides from mortal eyes." The pastor replied, "But after all horses are themselves made of moving parts, just as the steam engine is made of moving parts. You know what their muscles, joints and blood-vessels do. So why is there a mystery in the self-propulsion of a steam-engine, if there is none in that of a horse. What do you think makes the horses hooves go to and fro ?" After a pause a peasant replied, "What makes the horses hooves go is four extra little ghost horses inside." Ryle concludes the story by saying "Poor-minded peasants" and then adds that just such a story has been the official theory of the mind for the last three scientific centuries.

Ryle is anxious to show that from this story it should not be understood that he is obliterating the differences that may and do exist between body and mind. All that he is denying is that there are two theatres, A and B. In theatre A there go on incidents which we can explore by eye and instru-

ments, while in theatre B there go on incidents which are completely unlike, though synchronized with those that go on in theatre A. Ryle denies that there is a second theatre B, though he has no objection to holding that people are not like clocks, they get angry, feel depressed, scan the heavens, and have likes and dislikes. He simply holds that people go wrong when in explaining the so-called conscious processes, they think that these are the operations of a secondary set of secret works. In saying that a person is not to be described as a mind coupled with a body, Ryle is not saying that people are just machines. Nor are engines just wagons or live bodies just corpses. What is wrong with the story of the two theatres is not that it reports differences which are not there, but it misrepresents differences which are there. What prevents us from examining theatre B, says Ryle, is not that it has no windows or doors, but that there is no such theatre.

Gilbert Ryle's theory seems to be an echo of Epiphenomenalism. Huxley once compared mind or consciousness to the whistle of a passing train or the smoke rising from a chimney. He also held that just as it was the function of the liver to secrete bile so it was the function of the brain to secrete ideas and feelings. Huxley put his theory in the diction prevailing at his time and gave the impression as if he was denying mind or consciousness and defending pure unalloyed materialism. Hence his critics were quick in finding faults with his assumptions. But it seems to me that Huxley never denied the existence of feelings, ideas and resolutions which constitute a separate realm and so require categories different from that of body to explain themselves. He believed like Ryle that there was no second theatre, and that the brain was enough to generate the so-called conscious processes. This amounts to saying that though conscious processes belonged to a category different from that of bodily processes, yet there was no mind, in the sense that there was a body. As a matter of fact, body exists in the commonly accepted sense of the word 'existence', while mind does not exist. That there were conscious processes, nobody ever denied, but that they existed in the sense that bodily processes did, is denied both by Huxley and Gilbert Ryle.

It may be recalled that the British tradition to deny Mind or Self—call it by whatever name you like—goes back to Hume who has said that whenever

he tried to find Self, he always stumbled against some mental process, may be feeling, idea or resolution. Hume denied Self or Mind as constituting or providing a permanent substratum to the ever-changing processes of conscious life. The consequence of this approach is phenomenalism and the British philosophy has been enamoured of it since then. Not only Hume but the earlier British thinkers and the later ones too, have been phenomenalists in one way or the other.

Not having an ontological base, the Anglo-American philosophy has got enmeshed in linguistic and grammatical distinctions which, though useful in their own way, do not go deep enough. It is said about a Chinese scholar that, after having heard a lot about the philosophical acumen of the British thinkers, he decided to come to England and got himself enrolled as a student in one of its universities. One day he attended a philosophical discourse of some eminent British philosopher and after hearing it patiently for about an hour said regretfully to himself, "Did I come all the way from China to listen to a lesson on Grammar?" What the Chinese student felt after listening to the lecture is a general feature of the British philosophy and this is the result of their empiricism and phenomenalism. Even in the discussion of the problems connected with Person, one finds pronouns of every type being mentioned and their use being determined. There is an elaborate mention of I, you and he and the meaning of statement with pronouns of first, second or third person. For instance, the British philosophers seem to be very keen in finding out the difference between 'I see a tree' and 'You see a tree'. Do the two sentences mean one and the same thing ? is a question which seems to worry them a lot. The statement 'I see a tree' is a statement with the pronoun of the first person, but when I say about you that you see a tree, my statement is about pronoun of the second person. The question is whether both the statements connote the same thing or not ? Superficially the statements look different because of different pronouns, but does the remaining part of the sentence 'see a tree' has the same sense in both the sentences or not ? This is denied because when I say, I see a tree, I say it on the basis of direct incontrovertible experience, while when I say that you see a tree, my statement has not the personal, immediate and direct experience to vouch-

safe for its veracity. My knowledge in the second case is indirect—may be inferential or analogical. Consequently the logical status of both the sentences is not identical. In the first case, there is indubitable knowledge, while in the second case there is probable knowledge.

A word may be said about the certitude of the immediate knowledge, that is to say, of the introspective knowledge. Very often its authenticity is not questioned. It is said if I say, I am feeling pain, my statement should be accepted as true, provided I am not telling a lie. This is the case, it is held, about every introspective statement. But this seems to me to be false. In some cases a person may feel what may be called pseudo pain. A person who has his real foot amputated and a wooden foot fixed in its place may feel as if his wooden foot is giving pain. As far as his introspective experience goes he has the direct and immediate experience of pain and if directness and immediacy be taken as grounds for indubitable and inconvertible knowledge, then the pain in the wooden foot should be taken genuine, though this is not the case. Thus not all introspective experience can be taken as indubitable.

If introspective experience can be doubted, then statements with pronouns of the first person have the same logical status as statements with pronouns of the second and third persons. When I say that I see a table or that you see a table, there is logically speaking no difference in spite of the fact that the pronouns are different.

As against the above approach, it may be said that the problem is not so easy as is supposed. The problem is really of 'Other Minds' and unless it is settled that other minds exist in the same manner in which the mind of the user of I exists, the first person pronouns and the second or third person pronouns cannot be held at par. The problem whether there are minds other than the one of the first person pronoun, has already been debated in one of the sessions of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress and I do not want to enter into the controversy again. I maintained in that symposium that our knowledge of other minds is non-inferential and consequently not the outcome of analogical reasoning. I still stick to the same opinion, and find Existentialist thinking very helpful on the point. But in order to benefit from Existentialism one shall have to change one's angle. For Existentialism is not an essay in epistomology, it is concerned with the ontic reality of man. When an Existentialist talks of 'being in the world', the phrase cannot be understood by those who are entangled in linguistic and logical distinctions. But before dealing with the Existentialist point of view, let me discuss the contribution of the Philosophers of Language on this issue.

The pronoun I in reference to the first person is, like a logical name, purely demonstrative in its import and therefore has no connotation whatsoever. The term 'I', in sense and implication, resembles the terms 'this' or 'that' where their function is to demonstrate, to point out or to single out some object lying somewhere in the world of sensory experience. A proper name in contra-distinction to a logical name may have a demonstrative as well as an attributive function, but a logical name is simply demonstrative. In using the term 'I' for myself, I may direct the attention of somebody towards myself, or make myself the object of study or reference, or give information about my body, my mental life, my inter-personal relationships etc. It is because of this fact that every body can use the term 'I' or its equivalent in his own language about himself.

How is it that one continues using the term 'I' about one's self ? For on the surface of it the term 'I' implies continuity and stability. When I use the term 'I' about myself, I consciously or unconsciously imply that in spite of changes in my physique and mental experiences I continue to remain the same. The Linguistic Philosophers give several reasons to explain this fact, not one of which seems cogent to me. The first reason is the use of the term 'I' . This term, I have used since my infancy, and the mere use of this word lures me into thinking that I continue to remain the same despite changes on all levels of existence. In this respect the term 'I' is assisted by the proper name by which a person is addressed or spoken to or discussed or made the subject or object of talk. The proper name of a person remains his permanent fixture and is not ordinarily changed. But if it changes it does signify some major incident in one's life. For instance, the name of a person changes at the time of conversion. In Pakistan in some families, girls are given different names after their marriage. It is not the addition of the

husband's names as is the case in the West, but a totally different name, meaning thereby that a major change has occurred and the girl is no longer what she was before her marriage. Henceforth she is addressed, at least in her in-laws' home, with the new name that she has acquired. With the acquirement of this name, her conception of herself also changes, for she feels that her older self is dead and she has taken a new birth in her husband's home. The feeling may not be so acute in all cases. But I am not bothered about the intensity of the feeling. All that I want to bring out is the fact that the possession of a logical or a proper name is no guarantee of the continuance or stability of the person. Persons may go under false names or pen names and retain their identity. It should be noted that I am not denying the magic of the term 'I' or that of the proper name ; all that I am denying is that these terms can be regarded as fool-proof excuses for personal identity.

Another reason brought forward in support of personal stability is memory. A person carries his own memories in a way in which none else carries his memories. This argument is an offshoot of what Sidgwick said in regard to the Dualism of Practical Reason, which is that dualism in this case arises because of the fact that I am concerned with myself in a way in which I am not concerned with anybody else. Consequently it is maintained that my relation with myself is unique. The phrase 'my relation with myself' involves circularity, for it means the relation of 'I' with 'I'. Further the term 'unique' is a sort of a blanket term with English philosophers, to cover their ignorance. The relation that I bear to my memories may be unique, but I do not suppose that this uniqueness is going to affect the nature of memories in any way. In some cases other people's memories about me may be more significant and relevant. For instance, Mrs Roosevelt has written a biography of her husband under the title 'This I Remember'. The impression that one gets after reading the book is that even Roosevelt would not have such meaningful and significant memories about himself. Likewise people have written biographies of Iqbal and Quaid-i-Azam from their own memories about them. But it may be said that what I remember about my self is characterised by privacy and personal factor. This I am prepared to concede, but nevertheless I hold that personal factors and privacy are not important, rather they are

trivial from the epistomological point of view.

Another thing about memories is that very often memories are forgotten. Of course Freud would differ here. He maintains that no experience can ever be forgotten. What happens is that experiences forgotten on the conscious level become part and parcel of the Unconscious. Apart from the fact that Freud's theory no longer holds the field, I feel that most memories die out for all practical purposes, and do not remain a part of the conscious reportoire of an individual's make-up. Freud was a great man, besides being a great psychologist, and like all great men had weaknesses of his own. One great weakness of his was that he believed in shock tactics. By saying that no memory is ever forgotten, he was preparing the world through shock tactics to the acceptance of his Unconscious hypothesis. There are, however, cases on record where a person forgets his memories altogether. Such cases are known as Amnesia. Because of some shock, people forget their past and do not remain the same, to all intents and purposes. Then there are serious major personality difficulties. A person may have a split personality and may become a victim of double or multiple personality. When a patient is under the control of one personality, he forgets about the other and also the memories connected with it. In mental hospitals one meets with severe abnormal cases. There are schizophrenics who lose all contact with reality, they forget their kith and kin, forget their own names and fail to recognize even their wives, their children, their parents and their other dear and near ones. They are dead so far as their old self is concerned. People address them by their old names, try to remind them of their past, but they are unresponsive ; they live in a world which is totally different from their past one. These cases show that the question of Personal Identity cannot be decided on the basis of memory, since memory is elusive and can be changed or obliterated through physiological or psychological causes.

As against the above it may be said that I am building my arguments on exceptions. I do admit the force of the charge. But my contention is that an argument taking its stand on the fact of memory alone has really no

leg to stand upon. Exceptions do cast a doubt and have a right to be considered.

Another argument for Personal Identity is drawn from the body, a person possesses. The body, it is said, continues to remain the same, for all practical purposes. But this is hardly the case. On the other hand, it develops and as it develops, it changes significantly and materially. There are persons who see the same person growing or declining in body, let us say the parents or the wife or the children or the officers or subordinates, and so the person as well as the onlookers believe that the identity of the person concerned remains in tact, unsullied by extraneous influences. Accordingly there is, what may be called, identity in difference, for in spite of numerous changes in size, complexion, colour and general body build-up, the person retains his original design or pattern. But in some cases the changes may be so acute that the person may become unrecognizable. These changes may be due to violent diseases or accidents. The person may come to acquire characteristics which leave him absolutely different from what he used to be in the past.

A serious complication arises in the case of change of sex. Not only do the secondary sex characteristics change, but also the primary ones, leaving the person fundamentally different from what he was in the past. In this case the body undergoes a major change, its biological functions change and its role in society suffers a complete reversal. The physical aspect is so changed that it is difficult to imagine that the same person is continuing.

It therefore seems to me that none of the criteria suggested as a basis for Personal Identity are of unexceptionable character. This may be due to the fact that the Philosophy of Language is primarily concerned with words and their correct use in the context of a living language. It may be recalled that the word 'person' etymologically has its affiliation with the word 'persona' which signifies the mask worn by actors on the stage. The philosophy of person so far discussed, though not a philosophy of persona, is in reality a philosophy which touches the periphery and not the hard core of being as is the case in Existentialist thinking. To discuss whether pronouns of different categories have the same epistomological status and whether statements made with different pronouns as subjects affect the nature of predicates

appear to me no significant problems at all. They look like essays in Grammar.

For an Existentialist the primary reality is not the person but being or individual. Accordingly Existentialists do not raise the question, 'what is a person', but 'what is man'. The shift from person to man is very significant. Instead of dealing with persons like an objective psychologist or a Linguistic Philosopher, the Existentialist deals with the plight and the predicament of a modern man. In so doing he breaks the persona and reaches, what he supposes, the bedrock of Being. He is consequently interested in existence rather than in essence, for existence is particularity and subjectivity. Essence being the connotation of a term represents in Existentialist thought the universal and the eternal. But what is universal can never reveal the existence of the individual. The individual qua individual is not the Idea of Plato, nor is he the conceptualised thought of any other philosopher. What an individual is, can be known through his subjectivity. Consequently all statistical methods which purport to be objective, fail to register that inwardness which characterises a person when he is himself and not a tool or a mouthpiece of somebody else.

It is extremely difficult to define what existence is. Existentialists abhor the idea of definition. For definition is a statement of the essence of a thing and it is not with essence that the Existentialist deals. Existence is not a concept, to be discussed and defined. It is a condition of one's being. It can be felt, perhaps caught in moments of crisis or creativity, but to define it is simply preposterous—an act of sacrilege. Some people call existence as restlessness, some call it as anguish and some call it as care. Heideggar supposes that care creates time. Our care for what is going to happen creates the future for us, our care for our present involvements creates the present for us and our care for having been thrown into this world creates the past for us.

The phenomenon of care, anguish, and restlessness have been noted by mystics all over the ages. Maulana Rumi, in the opening of his world-renowned *Mathnavi*, called in English the "Song of the Reed", starts by depicting man in a situation of supreme crisis and loneliness. The

soul is described as lamenting on its separation and consequent loneliness. It yearns for its return to the primal source. The whole of the *Mathnavi* is an attempt to suggest ways and means through which this loneliness and estrangement can be overcome. This lamentation also suggests the fact that man has been thrown into this world and so his plight is deplorable and distressing. Man has to be rescued. This is the problem of religions and also of Existentialism. The answers are not the same and indeed it would be nothing short of foolishness to expect different experts offering the same solution. Existentialism is born of European conditions and deals with the experience of those people who have gone through the hell of two world wars. But the crisis and predicament in which the modern man finds himself, is a universal phenomenon and has been experienced by people at different ages and in different manners. Hence the Existentialists in stressing the anguish and care of existence which by the way is existence itself have spotted a characteristic of fundamental importance.

The fact of having been thrown into this world has also been recognized by Omar Khayyam in his *Rubaiyat*. As a matter of fact Omar Khayyam appears to be an Existentialist of the first order in his treatment of human problems and human predicament. In dealing with problems of birth, death and destiny of man, he comes close to Camus' idea of absurdity, though there is absent in him 'the idea of courage to live' which one finds in Camus. This idea *viz.* the courage to live is present in all great religions of the world and is the source of inspiration as well as of values. That all values ultimately matter to man and help in rescuing him from the deplorable plight in which he finds himself as a result of the alien world and purposeless environments, is the faith of all great sages of the world.

Accordingly 'what is man', and not 'what is person', is the great question of today and on its answer depends the survival of the human race.

THE ROLE OF THE ORTHODOX MUSLIMS IN THE ACCESSION OF AURANGZEB

MUHAMMAD ASLAM

The succession of Shahjahan was certain to be disputed, and the candidates to the throne looked round for help and support. The real struggle was not between Aurangzeb and Dara Shukoh, but it was a war between orthodoxy and liberalism, between the Shari'a and mysticism, between the Apparentism and Pantheism, between the orthodox Naqshbandis and the liberal Sufis, between Taqlid-i-Salaf and Ijtihād-i-Zāti, between the ideas of Mujaddid Alf Thāni and Hirdey Ram. If Aurangzeb was the champion of the first groups, Dara was the standard-bearer of the rival parties. The Battle of Samugarh was fought to shape the religious policy of the future Emperor of Hindustan.

"The Hindus wanted an Akbar," says Mr. Faruki, "while the Muslamans were anxious to avoid such a misfortune."[1] Obviously, the Hindus helped Dara and the orthodox Muslims and the religious circles supported his rival Aurangzeb, who was a "strict Muslim" and "acted upto his religion."[2] "Aurangzeb," writes Lane Poole, "stands for Islam rigid and uncompromising, sternly moral in violent reaction against the eclectic pantheism of Akbar or Dara, and the debauchery and hedonism of Jahangir and Shahjahan".[3]

When the news of Dara's heresy spread among the masses, obviously it gave benefit to his rival Aurangzeb, who won the favour of the orthodox Sunni nobles of Shahjahan's court.[4] Sa'd Ullah Khan, the Prime Minister of Shahjahan, was also in his favour, and many times he had disputed with Dara over state affairs. On various occasions he had supported Aurangzeb at court, and after his sudden death Dara was suspected of poisoning him.[5]

1. Faruki, D.Z., *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p. 28.
2. Lane Poole, S., *A Short History of India in the Middle Ages*, p. 111.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Faruki, Z.D., *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p. 6.
5. Khan, Y.M., *The Political Relations of the Mughals with the Deccan States*, p. 251.

Aurangzeb was a disciple of Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum and had a great regard for his brothers and sons.[6] As soon as Aurangzeb ascended the throne, he received Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum and his elder brother Muhammad Sa'id at his court, where he granted them 300 gold mohars.[7] Many times Aurangzeb invited Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum to his court and always showed him great respect.[8] His sons, too, enjoyed special respect at court.[9] According to the authority of *Mira't-ul-'Alam*, in the 4th years of his reign, Aurangzeb once again received Muhammad Sa'id and showed him great respect.[10] Soon after this audience, his sons, Shaikh Abdul Ahad and Muhammad Farrukh, were also received by the Emperor, who gave them handsome presents.[11] Shaikh Muhammad Yahya, the younger son of Mujaddid Alf Thāni, was repeatedly received by Aurangzeb and on each occasion he was given large amounts of money and other gifts.[12]

Aurangzeb himself used to pay visits to Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum and other members of his family at Sirhind, while passing through that town on his way to Lahore or Kabul. Isher Das has given an account of Aurangzeb's stay at Naulakha Bagh (close to the Khānqāh of Mujaddid Alf Thāni) where he spent some time on his way back to the capital, in the 18th year of his reign.[13]

Aurangzeb requested Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum to keep him company, which he refused,[14] but sent his son, Saif-ud-Din, to the capital to stay with

6. (*i*) Yusuf Husain, *Glimpses of the Medieval Indian Culture*, p. 59.
   (*ii*) Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, p. 640.
7. (*i*) Abul-Fath, *Adab-i-'Alamgiri*, fol. 431 b.
   (*ii*) Muhammad Kazim, *'Alamgir Nameh*, p. 293.
8. Muhammad Baqa, *Mira't-ul-'Alam*, fol. 545 b.
   ''بنا بر استدعا بادشاه دین پناه بیارگاه عظمت و جاه رسیده باقسام بتحیل و تکریم مخصوص گشته ـ''
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. Isher Das, *Fatuhat-i-'Alamgiri*, fol. 72 a.
14. (*i*) Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, p. 640.
    (*ii*) Muhammad Murad, *Manaqib-ul-Hadrat*, fol. 178 a.

the Emperor. When in the 12th year of his reign, Aurangzeb married his son Muhammad A'zam, Saif-ud-Din was among those notable 'Ulama who were present at the wedding party.[15] It is quite clear from the pages of the *Ma'athir-i-'Alamgiri* that Saif-ud-Din used to live close to the royal palace, and it was the habit of the Emperor to visit him late at night.[16] Muhammad Saqi has given the details of one of these meetings in the *Ma'athir-i-'Alamgiri*.[17]

In these interviews the Emperor used to receive "Tawajjuh" from Saif-ud-Din, who was guiding the Emperor in the mystic path. Soon the Emperor made progress and Saif-ud-Din joyfully wrote to his father, Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum, who in reply sent a letter to Saif-ud-Din, which is preserved in his *Maktubat*.[18] In his letter the Khwaja thanked God for having shown the mystic path to the Emperor.

The Emperor had also a special regard for Saif-ud-Din's elder brother, Muhammad Naqshband, who succeeded Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum in 1079 A.H. We find him with the Emperor in 1097 A.H. in the 29th year of Aurangzeb's reign.[19]

For his services to the cause of the Shari'a, Saif-ud-Din is known as Muhi-us-Sunnat.[20] In my humble opinion he was the man who made Aurangzeb "Muhyi-ud-Din."

As we have mentioned before, Mujaddid Alf Thāni was succeeded by his third son, Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum, who was well-known among the masses for his righteousness, piety and scholarship. Like his father, he tried his best to restore the Shari'a and re-introduced the discarded traditions of the Prophet, urging his followers and other Muslims to follow in the

15. Muhammad Saqi, *Ma'athir-i-'Alamgiri*, p. 78.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
18. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum* (Urdu Trans.), Letter No. 220.
19. Muhammad Saqi, *Ma'athir-i-'Alamgiri*, p. 276.
20. (*i*) Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, 646.
    (*ii*) Vakil Ahmad, *Hadiya-i-Mujaddid*, p. 332.
    (*iii*) Sayyid Imam-ud-Din, *Barakat-i-Auliya*, p. 122.

footsteps of the Prophet.[21] In one of his letters to Maulana Muhammad Hanif, he boldly told him that it was impossible for a Sufi to achieve his goal without following the Traditions of the Prophet.[22] Similarly, he wrote to Muhammad Sadiq that whoever restores or re-introduces a Tradition of the Prophet will receive from God reward of 100 martyrs.[23] Like his father's *Maktubāt*, his *Maktubāt*, too, are full of zeal for restoring the Shari'a.

When Dara Shukoh translated the religious books of the Hindus and accepted a number of their beliefs, the religious circles took it as their duty to put an end to his influence. At that time Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum wrote to Hasan Ali, "My brother! you have witnessed yourself that during these days innovations are flourishing and the Sunna is discarded. In this dark age the most urgent and important thing is to learn the religious sciences and to spread these among the masses. Similarly it is of no less importance to re-introduce the Traditions of the Prophet; therefore, you must make an effort to spread the religious sciences and to restore the Sunna.[24]

In another letter to Mulla Jamal-ud-Din he advised him to work for the cause of the Shari'a and further asked him to work for the restoration of the discarded Traditions of the Prophet.[25]

From these examples it is easy to surmise how much regard he had for the Shari'a and how anxious he was to restore the discarded Traditions of the Prophet. He had also sent his disciples to work among the army for that purpose.[26] According to the authority of the *Manaqib-ul-Hadrat*, hundreds

21. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum*, Nos. 22, 60, 89, 177, 178, 228, etc.
22. *Ibid.*, No. 22.
23. *Ibid.*, No. 228.

''مضمون حدیث ست کسی که احیا کنند سنت مرا که متروکةالعمل گشته است مر او را ثواب صد شهید ست -''

24. *Ibid.*, No. 178.

''کمر همت در کسب علوم شرعی و نشر آن و احیائے سنت مصطفوی چست بر بندند -''

25. *Ibid.*, No. 177.

''کمر همت را در ایتان احکام شرعیه چست بندند و امر معروف و نهی منکر را شیوهٔ خود سازند و احیائے سنن متروکه را از اهم امور دانند -''

26. Muhammad A'zam, *Tarikh-i-Kashmir A'zami*, p. 163.

of Amirs and Khans were among his followers, who used to meet him occasionally.[27] A large number of 'Ulama, pious men and students were among his regular attendants.[28]

According to reliable sources, Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum had about 900,000 disciples and more than 7,000 of them received the Khilafat.[29] Muhammad Baqa tells us that, during the reign of Aurangzeb, the Khwaja had numerous disciples all over the country.[30] Outside the Mughal Empire, he had also a number of followers in Arabia, who joined his order during his pilgrimage to Mecca.[31] He had also sent one of his Khalifas, Muhammad Sadiq Bukhari, to Medina to promote the Naqshbandiya order in the holy sanctuary.[32]

It is not surprising that Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum and Shaikh Adam Banuri had a large following. It seems that the teachings of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi were spreading like fire all over the Mughal Empire. The Mughal Emperors had lost their grip upon Central Asia, but a Dervish from his seat at Sirhind was ruling over the hearts of the Central Asians.

Aurangzeb was influenced by the teachings of Mujaddid Alf Thāni in his early age and had great regard for his successor as we have just mentioned. He had established relations with Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum long before his accession to the throne and kept up regular correspondance with him. The Khwaja used to address him as "Shahzada Din Panah",[33] and it seems that he was satisfied with his policy.[34] According to the authority of the *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum had prayed for Aurangzeb's

27. Muhammad Murad, *Manaqib- ul-Hadrat*, fol. 178 a.
28. *Ibid.*
29. (*i*) Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, p. 640.
    (*ii*) Rahman Ali, *Tadhkira-i-'Ulama-i-Hind*, p. 212.
30. Muhammad Baqa, *Mira't-ul-'Alam*, fol. 545 b.
31. Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, p. 640.
32. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum* (Urdu Trans.), No. 64, p. 227.
33. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum*, No. 64, p. 113.
34. (*i*) Yasin, Dr. M., *A Social History of Islamic India*, p. 170.
    (*ii*) *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum* (Urdu Trans.), No. 6, p. 200.

success against his brothers at the Shrine of the Prophet at Medina during his pilgrimage.[35]

In one of his letters to "Shahzada Din Panah", the Khwaja has urged him to start a Jihad, saying that one hour's Jihad for the cause of God is far better than spending a "Laila't-ul-Qadr" in the holy sanctuary of Mecca near the Black Stone.[36]

When Aurangzeb set out from Burhanpur against Dara Shukoh, the Khwaja sent him a letter, praising his march on the capital.[37] In this letter he has also mentioned a Hadith of the Prophet that God will give great reward to the Mujahids who fight for His cause. Now there is no doubt that Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's family and followers fully supported Aurangzeb in his march against Dara Shukoh.

Before starting his campaign against Dara Shukoh, who in the words of Aurangzeb was a "Ra'is-ul-Mulahida", "Mulhid-i-Nāmaqbūl" and "Mulhid-i-Nikosideh Fa'āl",[38] he spent a month in Burhanpur.[39] It was one of the flourishing towns of the Empire and well-known as Dār-us-Surūr.[40] We have already mentioned that it was a centre of the activities of the Naqshbandis, and Mujaddid Alf Thāni has sent Mir Muhammad Nu'mān[41] and Khwaja Muhammad Hashim to Burhanpur to promote the Naqshbandiya order.[42] The latter was a poet and a scholar of distinction and kept close relations with "the royal princes" on whose request he composed a number of poems.[43] Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum had also despatched one of his distinguished Khalifahs, Shaikh Abul-Muzaffar Sufi, to Burhanpur to promote

35. Mufti Ghulam Sarvar, *Khazina't-ul-Asfiya*, Vol. I, p. 640.
36. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum*, No. 64, p. 113.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Inayat Khan, *Inayat Nameh*, fol. 26 a, 26 b, 27 a.
39. Muhammad Kazim, *'Alamgir Nameh*, p. 48.
40. Bhim Sen, *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, fol. 6 a, 7 b.
41. Muhammad Hashim, *Zubda't-ul-Maqamat*, p. 331.
42. See my article on Khwaja Muhammad Hashim in the Monthly *al-Ma'arif*, May 1968.
43. Ikram, Dr. Sh. Muhammad, *Armaghan-i-Pak*, p. 63.

the Naqshbandiya order among the masses in that region.[44] It is said that he was very popular among the masses and had a large following.[45] Other Sufis of Burhanpur, too, were in Aurangzeb's favour.[46]

Aurangzeb had studied at the feet of the most Orthodox 'Ulama of his age, who had been very popular among the masses. Naturally, they helped him against his brother who was considered as a heretic, and Manucci tells us that one of the tutors of Aurangzeb, Shaikh Mir Khwafi, was killed in a campaign against Dara near Ajmar in 1659 A.D.[47] Shaikh Adam Banuri had also advised his followers to support the claim of Aurangzeb to the throne, long before he started action against Dara.[48] Khalil Ullah Khan, a descendant of Shah Ni'mat Ullah Vali, helped Aurangzeb with his companions against Dara.[49] The Afghans of Qasur were in Aurangzeb's favour and on their request Shaikh Abdul Khaliq, a Khalifah of Shaikh Adam Banuri, prayed for his success.[50] These examples show that general trend of the Naqshbandis was towards Aurangzeb.

Shaikh-ul-Islam Khwaja 'Abid, a descendant of Shaikh Shihab-ud-Din Umar Suhrawardi, who was a well-known scholar in Transoxiana, helped Aurangzeb in the war of succession. Immediately after the defeat of Dara Shukoh, Aurangzeb granted him a Mansab of 3,000 Zat and 500 Sawar,[51] with the title of Khan. Once again he fought vigorously with Raja Jaswant Singh and was promoted to the Mansab of 4,000 Zat and 700 Sawar. In the 4th year of his reign, Aurangzeb bestowed the Sadarat-i-Kul upon him and six years latter he was appointed governor of Ajmer and after a few years he was transferred to Multan as governor.[52] In the 24th year of Aurangzeb's

44. Sayyid Imam-ud-Din, *Barakat-i-Auliya*, p. 138.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Yusuf Husain, *Glimpses of the Medieval Indian Culture*, p. 59-60.
47. Manucci, N., *Storia Do Mogor*, p. 230
48. Muhammad Murad, *Manaqib-ul-Hadrat*, fol. 202 a.
49. Muhammad Shafi Warid, *Mira't-ul-Wardat*, fol. 86 b.
50. Muhammad Murad, *Manaqib-ul-Hadrat*, Vol. III, p. 120.
51. Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'athir-ul-Umara*, Vol. III, P, 120
52. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

reign, Khwaja 'Abid succeeded Rizvi Khan as Sadr-i-Kul Hindustan.[53]

Abdul Wahhab, the grandson of the illustrious Traditionist (Muḥaddiṯh) Shaikh Tahir Bohra, had met Aurangzeb at Burhanpur during his governorship.[54] When Aurangzeb started his campaign and set out for the capital, Abdul Wahhab issued a Fatwa, saying that as Shahjahan was physically unfit to assume his office as Emperor, Aurangzeb's march towards the capital was lawful according to the Shari'a.[55] Soon after his accession Aurangzeb made him Qaḍi of his army.[56]

Similarly Mulla Quṭb Hāns of Burhanpur had established his relations with Aurangzeb and helped him in the war of succession. Aurangzeb granted him 400,000 dams in cash and a village soon after his coronation, in recognition of his services.[57]

The majority of the orthodox Muslims helped Aurangzeb in this war, as he was their representative. In Roy Choudhry's view, "he utilized the cry of *religion in danger* to suit his political purpose, and he obtained his desired result."[58] "Aurangzeb", writes Faruki, "was hailed by the orthodox section of the Muslim community as a deliverer, because in their opinion Dara was bound to develop into a replica of Akbar".[59]

After his accession to the throne Aurangzeb maintained a regular correspondance with Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum.[60] He consulted him on important points of Muslim theology and sought his advice.[61] The *Maktubāt* of Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum support the above statement of Dr. Muhammad Yasin. Moreover, Aurangzeb's reign is throughout dominated by a feeling of reaction against the indiscretion of Akbar and Dara.[62]

53. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
54. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 235
55. Saran, Dr. P., *The Provincial Government of the Mughals*, p. 345.
56. Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'athir-ul-Umara*, Vol. I, p. 236.
57. Muhammad Baqa, *Mira't-i-Jahan Numa*, fol. 244 a.
58. Roy Choudhry, M.L., *The State and Religion in Mughal India*, p. 219.
59. Faruki, Z.D., *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p. 564.
60. *Maktubat-i-Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum*, Nos. 6, 64, 221, 277.
61. Yasin, Dr. M., *A Social History of Islamic India*, p. 170.
62. Faruki, Z. D., *Aurangzeb and His Times*, p. 564.

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تجارتی سود اور 'الربوا'

محمد یحییٰ

قدیم ترین معاشرے میں تجارتی سود :

تجارتی سود انسانی معاشرے میں بہت پرانے زمانے سے مروج چلا آ رہا ہے ۔ دنیا کا قدیم ترین مجموعۂ قوانین جو تقریباً مکمل حالات میں ہم تک پہنچا وہ بابل کے حکمران حمورابی کا مجموعۂ قوانین (The Code of Hammurabi) ہے۔ اس میں تجارتی سود کے بارے میں باقاعدہ قانون موجود ہے ۔ اس قانون کے مطابق یہ بات تجارتی گماشتے کے فرائض میں شامل ہے کہ وہ حاصل کردہ رقم کے سود کا باقاعدہ حساب رکھے، پھر اس کی واپسی پر مدت کا شمار کیا جائے اور پوری رقم مع سود تاجر کو لوٹا دی جائے ۔ قانون کے اصل الفاظ (متعلقہ حصہ) کی 'Translitration' یہ ہے:

"Sibut kaspim mala ilkuu"[1]

ڈاکٹر آر۔ایف۔ہارپر نے اس کا ترجمہ ان الفاظ میں کیا ہے :

"He shall write down the interest on the money, as much as he has obtained."[2]

1. The Code of Hammurabi, V. 100—3.

2. R. F. Harper, The Code of Hammurabi 1904, 35————

G. R. Driver اور *J. C. Miles* نے اپنی کتاب The Babylonian Laws میں اس کا ترجمہ ذرا مختلف کیا ہے ۔ ان کے الفاظ میں ترجمہ یوں ہے :-

" He shall enter up so much increments on the money as he has taken."

(V. 2 : 43) - وہ کہتے ہیں کہ اگرچہ Sibat سود ہی کو کہا جاتا تھا لیکن قانون کے اس حصے میں اس لفظ کا لغوی معنٰی اصطلاحی معنٰی کی نسبت زیادہ موزوں رہے گا - لغوی معنٰی Increment (اضافہ) ہے - تاہم وہ اس بات کا انکار نہیں کرتے کہ گماشتہ تاجر کو رقم کا سود بھی ادا کیا کرتا تھا (V.I. p. 190) -

(بقیہ حاشیہ اگلے صفحہ پر)

علاوہ ازیں اہل بابل کے مختلف وثائق بھی ہیں جن سے تجارتی سود کی مزید تفصیلات سامنے آتی ہیں ۔ ایک تو یہی صورت ہے جس پر قانون حمورابی کے الفاظ دلالت کرتے ہیں ۔ یعنی تاجر 'Tamkarum' کچھ رقم اپنے گماشتے 'Samalum' کو دیتا تھا اور گماشتہ اس رقم سے تجارت کرتا تھا ۔ جب تجارت ختم ہوتی اور گماشتہ واپس آتا تو دن شمار کر کے ان کا سود تاجر کو ادا کر دیتا تھا ۔ اس کے بعد اصل منافع میں سے تاجر کا حصہ اس کو ادا کرتا تھا ۔ اگر وہ مقررہ مدت سے پہلے لوٹ آتا تھا تو کل سفر خرچ میں سے باقی دنوں کا سفر خرچ بھی اسے تاجر کو واپس کرنا ہوتا تھا[1]۔

دوسری صورت اس سے مختلف ہے ، اور اس کا سراغ ہمیں اہل بابل کے مختلف وثائق میں ملتا ہے ۔ اس صورت میں رقم مہیا کرنے والا تاجر 'Tamkarum' نہیں تھا جو اپنے گماشتے کو تجارت کے لیے بھیجتا تھا بلکہ وہ واضح الفاظ میں ساہوکار یا سرمایہ‌دار 'Ummeiānum'

انہوں نے یہاں لغوی معنٰی کو ترجیح دینے کی وجہ یہ بتائی ہے کہ سود کا حساب کرنا قرض دار کے ذمے نہیں ہوا کرتا ۔ میرے نزدیک صرف یہ وجہ 'Sibat' کا مروج اصطلاحی معنٰی بدلنے کے لیے کافی نہیں ہو سکتی ۔ یہ بات پیش نظر رہنی چاہیے کہ اس صورت میں قرض دار کی حیثیت ایک آزاد تاجر کی نہیں بلکہ ایک گماشتے کی ہے ۔ تجارت کا فائدہ اسی بات میں ہے کہ وہ سود کا باقاعدہ حساب رکھے کیونکہ یہ سود اس نے بہر حال ادا کرنا ہے ۔ اس حساب کے ذریعے ایک تو وہ اصل منافع کی صحیح صورت حال سے با خبر رہ سکے گا دوسرے یہ کہ واپسی پر حساب میں کوئی الجھاؤ نہیں پڑے گا ۔ پھر 'Sibat' کا ترجمہ سارے Code میں 'Interest' کیا گیا ہے اور یہ تسلیم شدہ بات ہے کہ قانون کی عبارت میں الفاظ کے متعینہ مفہوم کی پابندی ہر حالت میں کی جاتی ہے نیز اسی عبارت کے آخری حصے کو سامنے رکھا جائے تو واضح ہو جاتا ہے کہ یہاں 'Sibat' کا ترجمہ صرف 'Interest' ہی کیا جا سکتا ہے ۔

1. G. R. Driver & J. C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, 1: 190.

تھا اور جو سرمایہ وہ مہیا کرتا تھا وہ بھی واضح الفاظ میں قرض تھا ۔ پھر اس ساہوکار کی ایک حیثیت اور بھی ہوتی تھی ۔ وہ اس تجارت میں خود بھی ایک حصہ‌دار بن جاتا تھا اور تجارت کی تکمیل پر وہ نفع یا نقصان ہر حالت میں اپنے سرمائے کا سود وصول کر لیتا تھا ۔ اگر منافع ہوتا تھا تو مقررشدہ شرح سے منافع 'Mitharis' میں سے بھی اسے اپنا حصہ مل جاتا تھا[1]۔

تجارتی سود یہود کے ابتدائی دور میں :

بابل اور اشوریا انسانی تہذیب کے اولین مرکز تھے ۔ یہیں سے تہذیب کی روشنی نے چار دانگ عالم کو منور کیا ۔ بنو اسرائیل کا قدیم وطن فلسطین اور شام ان تہذیبی مرکزوں کے بالکل جوار میں واقع تھا ۔ دوسری طرف (مغربی سمت میں) اس کی سرحدیں انسانی تہذیب کے دوسرے قدیم ترین مرکز مصر کے ساتھ ملتی تھیں ۔ اس لئے یہ علاقہ خود بھی تہذیبی اور تمدنی طور پر بے حد ترقی یافتہ تھا ۔ بنو اسرائیل کی تاریخ کے بالکل ابتدائی عہد میں یہ علاقہ باقاعدہ طور پر بابلی یا اشوری سلطنت کے زیرنگیں نہیں تھا ۔ لیکن یہ بھی ایک تاریخی حقیقت ہے کہ تہذیبی طور پر یہ علاقہ پوری طرح بابلی اشوری تہذیب کے زیر اثر تھا ۔ اس قریبی ہمسائیگی کی وجہ سے ایسا ہونا ایک فطری امر تھا ۔ یہ علاقہ اپنے محل وقوع کی وجہ سے ہمیشہ تاریخ عالم کی ان تحریکوں کا مرکز رہا جن کے زیر اثر انسانی تہذیب و تمدن نے نشو و نما پائی[2]۔ اقتصادی خصوصاً تجارتی معاملات میں ان مراکز تہذیب سے اس علاقے کی اثر پذیری اور بھی زیادہ تھی اور اس کی وجہ یہ تھی کہ نامعلوم زمانے

1. G. R. Driver & J. C. Miles, 1: 187.
2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13 : 4213.

سے استعمال کی جانے والی قدیم ترین تجارتی شاہراہیں اسی علاقے سے ہو کر گزرتی تھیں ۔ خلیج عقبہ اور بحیرہ روم کے کنارے پر واقع حیفہ اور جافہ وغیرہ انتہائی اہم بندرگاہیں اسی علاقے میں واقع تھیں ۔ اس لیے یہ علاقہ صحیح معنی میں ''تمدن، تجارت اور جنگی کاروائیوں کی شاہراہ اور مختلف مذاہب کا مقام اتصال تھا''[1]۔ اس علاقے پر بابلی تہذیب کے گہرے اور دور رس اثرات کا اندازہ اسی بات سے ہو جاتا ہے کہ یہاں رسمی خط و کتابت کے لئے بابلی زبان اور رسم الخط رائج تھے ۔ مشہور خطوط امارنا 'Amorna letters' کی نہ صرف زبان بابلی ہے بلکہ اسلوب نگارش اور رسم الخط بھی بابل ہی کا ہے[2] ۔

ان تمام حقائق سے یہ نتیجہ اخذ کرنا خلاف قیاس نہیں کہ تجارتی سود کے جس پرانے اور عام مروج طریقے کو حمورابی نے قانون کے ذریعے منضبط کیا وہ بابل کے ساتھ ساتھ اس کے زیر اثر علاقوں خصوصاً بنو اسرائیل کے وطن شام اور فلسطین میں بھی رائج ہوا ہوگا، جو کہ ایک طرف تو بابلی تہذیب سے متاثر تھے اور دوسری طرف ان کا محل وقوع ایسا تھا کہ وہاں تجارتی سرگرمیاں بہت ترقی یافتہ صورت میں موجود تھیں ۔ ان تجارتی سرگرمیوں کا اندازہ اسی ایک بات سے لگا لیجیے کہ شام اور فلسطین میں ایک پوری نسل ایسی موجود تھی جس کا سب سے بڑا پیشہ تجارت تھا ۔ چنانچہ بنو اسرائیل کے زمانے میں لفظ 'کنعانی' (جس طرح موجود دور میں جرمنی میں لفظ 'یہودی') تاجر کے معنی میں استعمال ہوتا تھا[3] ۔ مندرجہ بالا نقطۂ نظر کو اس بات سے بھی تقویت ملتی ہے کہ مطلقاً سود بنو اسرائیل کے ہاں بہت قدیم زمانے سے مروج تھا ۔ حضرت

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica 13 : 4213.
2. The Cambridge Ancient History, ii : 333.
3. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13 : 408.

موسیٰ علیہ السلام کے احکام میں سود خوار کا جس طرح ذکر کیا گیا ہے اس سے پتہ چلتا ہے کہ سود خوار ان کے زمانے میں ایک نمایاں قسم کے کردار کا مالک تھا ۔ اس کی عادات و اطوار، لوگوں کے ساتھ اس کا برتاؤ اور اپنے قرضداروں پر اس کا ظلم و ستم بنو اسرائیل کے ہاں جانی پہچانی حقیقتیں تھیں ۔ متعلقہ حکم کے الفاظ یہ ہیں :

"If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury."[1]

سود خوا ری نے اسرائیلی معاشرے میں اس طرح جڑ پکڑی تھی کہ غریبوں اور مسافروں تک کو عام استعمال کی اشیا بھی سود کے بغیر نہ دی جاتی تھیں ۔

"And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee then thou shalt relieve him ; you, thou he be a stranger, or sojourner, that he may live with thee. Take thou no usury of him, or increase ; but fear thy God that thy brother may live with thee.

That thou shall not give him thy money upon increase nor lend him thy victuals for increase.[2]

کسی ایسی سوسائٹی میں جہاں تجارتی سرگرمیاں عروج پر ہوں اور سود کا رواج بھی انتہائی عام ہو، قرین قیاس یہی ہے کہ وہاں دیگر ضروریات کے ساتھ تجارتی ضروریات کے لیے بھی سود پر قرض کا لین دین رائج ہوگا ۔ لیکن فی الحال جس دور کی ہم بات کر رہے ہیں یعنی بنو اسرائیل کی تاریخ کا بالکل ابتدائی دور، اس میں مذکورہ قیاسات سے ہٹ کر بنو اسرائیل میں تجارتی سود کی موجودگی کی کوئی واضح اور

1. usury کے لفظ سے یہاں موجودہ دور کا ایسا سود مراد نہیں جس کی شرح سود بہت زیادہ ہوتی ہے ۔ بلکہ مطلق سود مراد ہے ۔ تفصیلی بحث آخر میں آئے گی—Ex. xxii : 25

2. Leviticus, xxv : 35—37.

قطعی شہادت موجود نہیں۔ اس لیے اس دور میں تجارتی سود کے مروج ہونے کے نقطۂ نظر پر زیادہ اصرار نہ کرنا ہی قرین احتیاط ہے، اگرچہ قرائن کی رو سے اس کی موجودگی کی یکسر تردید بھی ناممکن ہے۔ بہرحال جوں جوں زمانہ آگے بڑھتا ہے اور تاریخ کی روشنی وسیع پیمانے پر حقیقتوں کو سامنے لاتی ہے تجارتی سود کی موجودگی کے شواہد زیادہ نمایاں ہوتے جاتے ہیں۔

تجارتی سود شہنشاہی دور میں :

بنو اسرائیل کی ہمہ جہت ترقی اور انکے معاشرے میں ارتقائی رجحانات کے عروج کا زمانہ ان کا شہنشاہی دور ہے۔ اس دور کی اقتصادی اور تجارتی سرگرمیوں کو سامنے رکھا جائے (جن کے متعلق چند سطور کے بعد کچھ حقائق سامنے آئیں گے) تو اس میں تجارتی سود کی موجودگی کے امکانات نمایاں معلوم ہوتے ہیں۔ لیکن 'ڈکشنری آف دی بائیبل' میں اس کے خلاف رائے دی گئی ہے۔ اس رائے کے مطابق اس دور میں بنو اسرائیل ایک تجارتی قوم نہ تھے۔ ان کی تجارت زیادہ تر فنیقیوں کے ہاتھ میں تھی۔ اس لئے ان کے ہاں تجارتی سود کا کوئی رواج نہ تھا[1]۔ شہنشاہی دور میں تجارتی سود کی موجودگی کے خلاف جو دلیل دی گئی ہے اس میں کئی اسقام ہیں۔ پہلا سقم تو یہی ہے کہ اس دور میں بنو اسرائیل کو بالکل غیر تجارتی قوم قرار دینا درست نہیں۔ پہلے بیان ہو چکا ہے کہ بنو اسرائیل قدیم سے اس علاقے کے باشندے تھے جو ہمیشہ سے تجارتی سرگرمیوں کی آماجگاہ اور مشہور عالم تجارتی راستوں کی گزرگاہ تھا۔ تجارتی راستوں پر رہنے کی وجہ سے زمانۂ جاہلیت کے عربوں جیسی غیر متمدن قوم تاجر بن سکتی تھی تو بنو اسرائیل

1. Dictionary of the Bible, 1: 579.

کیونکر تجارت کے منافع سے بیگانہ رہے ہونگے جن کی اپنی شہنشاہی بھی قائم ہو چکی تھی۔ بنو اسرائیل کی تاریخ سے پتہ چلتا ہے کہ وہ ابتدا سے تجارت کے ساتھ مانوس رہے۔ خود اسرائیل (یعقوب علیہ السلام) سر زمین کنعان میں ایک تجارتی راستے پر رہتے تھے۔ جس پر سے مدائنی 'Midianites' اور اسماعیلی تاجر مصالحہ‌جات اور خوشبوئیں وغیرہ لیکر گزارا کرتے تھے۔ انہی تاجروں کے ہاتھ یوسف علیہ السلام کے بھائیوں نے انھیں غلام بنا کر فروخت کر دیا تھا[1]۔ یعقوب علیہ السلام نے جب دوسری بار اپنے بیٹوں کو مصر سے غلہ لینے کے لئے بھیجا تو ان کے ہاتھ مصر کے گورنر کے لئے جو تحائف روانہ کئے وہ روغن بلسان، گرم مصالحہ، فر، پستہ اور بادام وغیرہ پر مشتمل تھے اور یہ سب جیزیں اس علاقے کی بہترین اشیائے تجارت تھیں[2]۔ انہی اشیا کو اسماعیلی تاجر یہاں سے لیکر گزرا کرتے تھے[3]۔ پھر یوسف علیہ السلام جب مصر کے گورنر ہوئے تو انہوں نے بڑی مہارت سے پہلے تو غلہ محفوظ رکھنے کے انتظامات کیے اور پھر اس قابلیت سے اس کی تجارت کی کہ سارے مصر کی زمینوں اور ان پر بسنے والے انسانوں کو مصر کے بادشاہ کے لیے خرید لیا۔ بیرون مصر دیگر ممالک کو بھی غلہ فروخت کیا اور اس طرح مصر کے خزانے کو مالا مال کر دیا[4]۔ یہ ان کی اعلیٰ انتظامی اور تجارتی قابلیت کی واضح دلیل ہے۔

بائیبل نے بنو اسرائیل کے معاشرے کا جو نقشہ پیش کیا ہے اس سے ضرور یہ ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ یہ معاشرہ عمومی صورت میں زرعی تھا۔ اس

1. Gen., xxxxii : 57; xxxxvii : 14—26.
2. Gen., xxxxiii : 43.
3. Hoet, History of the Commerce and Trade of the Ancients, 1717 , 9.
4. Gen., xxxxii : 57; xxxxvii : 14, 26.

کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ بنو اسرائیل میں واضح اکثریت زراعت پیشہ لوگوں کی تھی ۔ لیکن اس سے یہ ثابت نہیں ہوتا کہ تجارت وغیرہ کی قسم کا اور کوئی پیشہ ان کے ہاں مروج نہ تھا ۔ ہر زراعت پیشہ قوم کے تمدنی ارتقا کا اولین تقاضا یہی ہوتا ہے کہ لوگ آہستہ آہستہ زراعت کو چھوڑ کر زیادہ نفع بخش کاموں کی طرف متوجہ ہوتے چلے جاتے ہیں، اور یہی لوگ حقیقت میں پوری قوم کے تمدنی ارتقا کا ہراول دستہ ہوتے ہیں ۔ بنواسرائیل کے ہاں بھی تمدنی ارتقا کے یہ تمام مرحلے طے ہوئے ۔ شام اور فلسطین میں تجارت ایک انتہائی نفع بخش پیشہ تھا ۔ ان علاقوں میں جب بنو اسرائیل کی سلطنت قائم ہوئی تو انہیں اس پیشہ میں حصہ لینے کے مواقع میسر آئے ۔ سلطنت اسرائیل کا سب سے زرین دور حضرت سلیمان علیہ السلام کا دور تھا ۔ ان کی بے مثال شان و شوکت انکی دولت کی مرہون منت تھی اور ان کے لیے حصول دولت کا سب سے بڑا ذریعہ اندرون و بیرون ملک انکی وسیع تجارت تھی ۔ انہوں نے اندرون و بیرون ملک تجارت کے لیے ایک نہایت عمدہ نظام وضع کیا تھا ۔ انکی خارجی تجارت دو بحری بیڑوں کے ذریعے ہوتی تھی ، ایک ترسیسی بحری بیڑا (Navy of Tarshish) اور دوسرا حیرام کا بحری بیڑہ (Navy of Hiram) ۔ موخرالذکر بیڑا صومالیہ (Ophire) سے سونا ، قیمتی پتھر اور چندن کے درخت (almug trees) لایا کرتا تھا ۔ اول الذکر بیڑے کا تجارتی چکر تین سال میں پورا ہوتا تھا اور یہ سونا ، چاندی ، ہاتھی دانت ، بوزنے (ape) اور مور لایا کرتا تھا ۔ خشکی کے راستے رتھوں اور گھوڑوں کی تجارت ہوتی تھی ۔ مصر سے ایک رتھ چھ سو مثقال (Shakels) میں اور ایک گھوڑا ایک سو پچاس مثقال میں آتا تھا ۔ مصر سے اس کے علاوہ ریشمی تاگہ بھی درآمد ہوتا تھا ۔ جب مال تجارت پہنچتا تھا

تو ایک قیمت مقرر کرکے اسے اندرون ملک بادشاہ کے تاجروں کے سپرد کر دیا جاتا تھا[1] ۔ جس سلطنت کی تجارت اس قدر وسیع اور اتنی منظم بنیادوں پر قائم ہو اس کے متعلق ہم یہ سمجھنے میں حق بجانب ہونگے کہ اس کے شہریوں کی تجارتی سرگرمیاں ترقی یافتہ اور وسیع تھیں ۔ وہاں دیہات میں نہیں تو شہروں میں ایک تجارت پیشہ طبقہ موجود تھا ۔ بائیبل ہمیں بتاتی ہے کہ تاجروں کا یہ طبقہ بہت امیر تھا ۔ خزانۂ شاہی کی آمدنی کے ذرائع میں سر فہرست ملکی تاجروں سے وصول کردہ محصولات تھے ۔ ان کے بعد مصالحے کے غیر ملکی تاجروں سے وصول کردہ محاصل اور عرب بادشاہوں اور صوبائی گورنروں کے خراج کا نمبر آتا تھا[2] ۔ یہاں ایک بات خصوصی طور پر غور کے قابل ہے ۔ آمدنی کے ذرائع میں زرعی محاصل کا ذکر نہیں ملتا ۔ اس سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ گورنروں کے خراج کا غالب حصہ زرعی محصولات پر مشتمل ہوگا ۔ اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ تجارتی محصولات آمدنی کی مد میں زرعی محصولات کی نسبت زیادہ ہوا کرتے تھے ۔ گویا اس زمانے میں تجارت سب سے بڑا یا کم از کم سب سے زیادہ منافع بخش پیشہ تھا ۔ اس صورت حال میں اگر یہ دعوی کیا جائے کہ بنو اسرائیل سب کے سب زراعت سے وابستہ تھے تو پھر ساتھ ہی ان امور کی تصدیق بھی کرنی پڑے گی :

(الف) بنو اسرائیل کو اپنی تجارتی ترقی اور انفرادی اور اجتماعی طور پر دولت کمانے سے کوئی دلچسپی نہیں تھی ۔

(ب) بنو اسرائیل کے بادشاہ حضرت داؤد اور حضرت سلیمان علیہما السلام سمیت اپنی قوم کے مفادات کی نگہبانی سے اس

1. 1 Kings, x : 11—20
2. 1 Kings, xii : 15.

قدر غافل تھے کہ انھوں نے نہ صرف تجارت غیروں کے ھاتھ میں رھنے دی بلکہ شاھی تاجر بھی غیروں میں سے مقرر کئے۔

(ج) بنو اسرائیل اس قدر کند ذھن تھے کہ صدیوں تہذیب و تمدن کے مراکز میں رہ کر بھی یہ تمدن کے عمومی ارتقائی مراحل طے کرنے سے قاصر رھے اور ھمیشہ کسانوں کی حیثیت سے رھنے پر اکتفا کیا۔

یہ تینوں باتیں عقل اور تاریخی حقائق کے خلاف ھیں۔ تجارت اور مالیات میں دنیا کی زیرک ترین قوم کی طرف ان امور کی نسبت ھی ناقابل تصور ھے۔ حقیقت یہ ھے کہ بنو اسرائیل نے بڑی تیزی سے تمدنی ارتقا کے تمام مراحل طے کئے۔ وہ ابتدا میں حرواھے تھے[1]۔ پھر آھستہ آھستہ زراعت کی طرف منتقل ھو گئے۔ پھر تیسرا مرحلہ وہ تھا جس میں بنو اسرائیل دوسرے پیشوں کی طرف متوجہ ھوئے، تجارت کی، شہر بسائے اور دولت اور تعیش سے لذت اندوز ھوئے[2]۔ اس لئے ان کو محض زراعت پیشہ قرار دیکر یہ دعویٰ کرنا کہ وہ تجارت اور کاروباری سرگرمیوں سے ناآشنا تھے، اس لئے ان کے ھاں تجارتی سود کا رواج نہیں تھا، درست نہیں۔

تجارتی سود کی عام ترویج کا دور:

ھم تعین اور تیقن سے اس زمانے کی نشاندھی نہیں کر سکتے جب بنو اسرائیل میں تجارتی سود کا آغاز ھوا تھا لیکن یہ بات پورے وثوق سے کہہ سکتے ھیں کہ تجارتی سود ان کے ھاں بہت قدیم سے موجود تھا۔ غالباً اس کا رواج شہنشاھی دور سے تھا۔ کیونکہ جب ھم ساتویں

1. Gen., 45 : 32, 34. 47 : 3
2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13 : 408.

صدی قبل مسیح میں بنو اسرائیل کی تاریخ کا جائزہ لیتے ھیں تو واضح طور پر یہ بات سامنے آ جاتی ھے کہ اس زمانے میں وہ تجارتی سود اور بنکاری میں تمام ھمسایہ اقوام سے آگے تھے۔ بیرن کے قول کے مطابق یہ محض اتفاق نہیں کہ ساماریا (Samaria) سے جب بنو اسرائیل کے اولین جلا وطن اشوری سلطنت میں پہنچے تو ان کی آمد سے محض تین نسلیں بعد اشوری سلطنت کا ''معبدوں سے اجرائے قرض کا نظام'' پرائیویٹ بنکاری کے لئے جگہ خالی کر کے رخصت ھو گیا[1]۔ بنو اسرائیل معاملات زر کے ایسے ماھر اور بنکاری کے سلسلے میں اتنے تجربہ کار تھے کہ انھوں نے اتنی کم مدت میں نہ صرف وھاں کی زر کی مارکیٹ پر قبضہ کر لیا بلکہ اپنی مرضی کا نظام بھی رائج کر دیا۔ بخت نصر (Nebuchad Nezzer) کے یروشلم فتح کر لینے کے بعد بنو اسرائیل کی جلاوطنی کا دور شروع ھوا تو وہ کالدیا (Chaldea) میں پھیل گئے[2] پھر جوں جوں موقع ملا وہ شہروں میں مرتکز ھوتے گئے اور وھاں بڑے بڑے ساھوکارہ ادارے (Banks) قائم کئے۔ وھاں کی سب سے بڑی پرائیویٹ بنکنگ فرم 'Egibi' بھی اسرائیلی نام سے خالی نہیں[3]۔

فلسطین اور شام پر بابلی اور اشوری تسلط کا سلسلہ ۳۳۲ق م میں سکندر اعظم کے فلسطین اور شام پر قبضہ کرنے سے ختم ھو گیا[4] اور یہ علاقے تہذیب و تمدن کے دوسرے لیکن اس دور میں سب سے بڑے مرکز یونان کے زیر اثر آ گئے۔ یونان کا اقتصادی اور تجارتی نظام انتہائی ترقی یافتہ تھا۔ سرمایہ کاری کے سلسلے میں قدیم یونانیوں کا مقولہ:

1. Baron, History of the Jews, 13 : 108.
2. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13 : 417
3. Baron, History of the Jews, 1: 109
4. Encyclopaedia Britannica 13: 52

''سود پر دیا ہوا سرمایہ ہی عامل سرمایہ ہے'' صرف یہی ظاہر نہیں کرتا کہ سود سرمایہ کی پیداوار ہے بلکہ اس کا مفہوم یہ بھی ہے کہ سرمایہ، اس کی گردش اور تجارت اور صنعت میں اس کی شمولیت کے بغیر یونان کا اقتصادی ڈھانچہ اتنا وسیع اور دولت کی فراوانی سے اس قدر ترقی یافتہ نہ ہوتا[1] ۔ یونان میں سرمایہ کاری کا سلسلہ باقاعدہ بنکاروں کے توسط سے چلتا تھا ۔ ایتھنز میں پہلے بنکار 'Trapezitai' تھے ۔ یہ منڈی میں چھوٹی چھوٹی میزیں یا کاؤنٹر سامنے رکھے بیٹھے ہوتے تھے ۔ وہ سرمایہ بہم پہنچانے والوں اور سرمایہ حاصل کرنے والوں کے درمیان رابطہ کا کام دیتے تھے ۔ علاوہ ازیں ان کا کام جاری حساب (Current Account) کھولنا، 'Letter of Credit' جاری کرنا اور کبھی کبھی شہروں کو سرمایہ بہم پہنچانا ہوتا تھا ۔ یونانی تجارتی نظام کی یہ خصوصیات پانچویں صدی قبل مسیح سے نمایاں ہونے لگی تھیں، اور سرمایہ اقتصادی معاملات میں ممتاز کردار ادا کرنے لگا تھا ۔ یہاں تک کہ اس زمانے میں بڑے بڑے یونانی فصحا ہمیں تجارتی قوانین سے متعلقہ مقدمات کی پیروی کرتے نظر آتے ہیں[2] ۔

یونانی مشرق (Hellenistic East) کے اہم تجارتی مراکز اسکندریہ (مصر)، انطاکیہ (شام) اور دجلہ کے کنارے 'Selcuceia' تھے[3] ۔ یہ سب مراکز آپس میں اس قدر فاصلے پر واقع تھے کہ یہاں ایک انتہائی ترقی یافتہ نظام بنکاری کے بغیر بڑے پیمانے پر تجارتی سرگرمیاں ناممکن تھیں ۔ اور ہم دیکھتے ہیں کہ اس علاقے کا نظام

1. Toutan, Jules, The Economic Life of the Ancient World, 75.
2. Ibid., 75—76.
3. Ibid., 157.

بڑے سے بڑے پیمانے پر ہونے والی تجارت کا پورا ساتھ دے سکتا تھا ۔ اس نظام میں زر کاغذی کا استعمال روز افزوں تھا ۔ 'Letters of Credit' اور ادائیگی کے لئے چیک سسٹم اور ہر شہر بلکہ ارد گرد کے ملکوں میں بنکوں کے باہمی روابط کی وجہ سے اس جدید طرز کے نظام بنکاری نے صنعتی اور تجارتی ترقی کی رفتار کو تیز تر کر دیا ۔ اس نظام کا ایک خاص پہلو یہ بھی تھا کہ اس میں 'قرض' کو بہت ترقی ہوئی اور مختلف ساہوکاروں نے کاروبار میں شراکت کر کے بڑی بڑی بنکنگ فرموں کی بنیاد رکھی[1] ۔

اس علاقے میں یونان کی جانشینی رومنوں کے حصے میں آئی ۔ شام اور فلسطین پر ان کے تسلط سے تقریباً نصف صدی بعد[2] حضرت عیسیٰ علیہ السلام کی پیدائش ہوئی ۔ حضرت عیسیٰ علیہ السلام کے واسطے سے ہمیں اس وقت کے نظام بنکاری اور اس میں قرض برائے پیداوار کی ناقابل تردید شہادت میسر ہوئی ۔ انہوں نے دو بار ایک تمثیل میں بنک کا ذکر کیا ۔ اس تمثیل سے اس بات کی وضاحت ہو جاتی ہے کہ اس دور میں اپنی بچت کو بنک میں جمع کر دیا جاتا تھا جہاں اسے پیدا آور کاموں میں لگایا جاتا اور بچت پر باقاعدہ سود ملتا تھا ۔ یہ بات اتنی عام تھی کہ ہر آدمی سے اپنی بچت اسی طریق پر محفوظ کرنے کی توقع کی جاتی تھی ۔ تمثیل کے مطابق ایک شخص سفر پر کسی اجنبی ملک جانا چاہتا تھا ۔ اس نے اپنے تین نوکروں کو بلایا اور ایک کو پانچ توڑے، دوسرے کو تین توڑے اور تیسرے کو ایک توڑا سپرد کیا اور خود سفر پر روانہ ہو گیا ۔ پہلے دو نے تو تجارت کے ذریعے رقم کو دگنا کر دیا لیکن

1. Ibid., 168
2. W. D. Marrison, Laws under the Romans, 36.
رومن 45 ق م میں یروشلم پر قابض ہو گئے تھے ۔

تیسرے نے جسے ایک توڑا دیا گیا تھا زمین کھود کر رقم اس میں دبا دی ۔ مالک کی واپسی پر پہلے دو نے انعام اور ستائش حاصل کی لیکن تیسرے پر مالک سخت ناراض ہوا ۔ ناراضگی کا اظہار کرتے ہوئے مالک کہتا ہے :

Wherefore then gavest not thou my money into the bank, that on my coming I might have required mine own with usury.[1]

ایک شبہہ کا ازالہ :

یہ واضح شہادت اور باقی تمام عہدوار شہادتیں اس بات کو ثابت کرنے کے لئے کافی ہیں کہ بنو اسرائیل کے معاشرے میں پیدا آور مقاصد کے لئے سودی قرضوں کا نظام بہت پرانے زمانے سے رائج رہا ہے ۔ لیکن اس سلسلے میں ایک شبہہ کسی حد تک باقی رہ جاتا ہے اور وہ یہ کہ حضرت عیسیٰ[4] کی پیش کردہ اس تمثیل سے پہلے بائیبل میں کہیں یہ تصریح نہیں ملتی کہ اسرائیلی معاشرے میں پیدا آور مقاصد کے لئے سودی قرضے کا لین دین ہوتا تھا ۔ جہاں بھی سود کا ذکر آیا ہے وہاں یہی محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ سود ضرورتمند لوگوں سے روز مرہ ضروریات زندگی کے لئے حاصل کردہ قرض پر لیا جاتا تھا ۔ لیکن اگر غور کیا جائے اور بائیبل کے متعلقہ مقامات کا توجہ سے مطالعہ کیا جائے تو یہ شبہہ بالکل زائل ہو جاتا ہے ۔ حقیقت یہ ہے کہ بنو اسرائیل کے معاشرے میں اکثریت زراعت پیشہ لوگوں کی تھی ۔ اور جب اس قسم کے معاشرے میں غریب کسانوں سے سود وصول کیا جاتا تھا تو یہ ایک ایسا بڑا انسانی مسئلہ بن جاتا تھا کہ اس کے ذریعے آسانی سے جذبات کو برانگیختہ کیا جا سکتا تھا اور اس کے ذریعے سود کے خلاف لوگوں کے دلوں میں نفرت پیدا کی جا سکتی تھی ۔ یہ سود کا بدترین پہلو تھا اور اس کو بار بار سامنے

1. St. Luke, xix : 23.

لانا اصلاحی دعوت کی تقویت کا باعث تھا ۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ پانچویں صدی قبل مسیح میں عین اس وقت جب بنو اسرائیل نے کالدیا میں بڑے بڑے بنک قائم کر رکھے تھے نحمیاہ نے سود کے خلاف مہم چلائی تو انہی غربا کا حوالہ دیا جو زرعی ضرورتوں کے لئے ، روٹی کے لئے یا بادشاہ کا خراج ادا کرنے کے لئے سود پر قرض لیتے تھے[1] ۔ اس کے علاوہ الاحبار (Leviticus) میں بھی سود کی ممانعت پر زور دیتے ہوئے غریبوں کا ہی حوالہ دیا گیا[2] ۔ دعوت اصلاح کے اس انداز سے یہ ثابت نہیں ہوتا کہ سود محض احتیاج کے بوجھ کے نیچے پستے ہوئے ضرورتمندوں کی پناہ گاہ اور لوگوں کی ضروریات سے فائدہ اٹھا کر ہاتھ رنگنے والے سنگدلوں کے لئے ہاتھ رنگنے کا زرین موقع تھا ۔ اس کے علاوہ سود کا لین دین کسی اور غرض سے نہ ہوتا تھا ۔ حقیقت حال اس کے برعکس ہے ۔ کتاب یسعیاہ (Isaiah) میں سود لینے والے اور دینے والے دونوں کو ایک ہی سطح پر رکھا گیا ہے[3] ۔ کتاب یرمیاہ (Jeremiah) میں سود لینا اور دینا یکساں طور پر لوگوں کی نفرت کا نشانہ بنے ہوئے نظر آتے ہیں[4] ۔ اگر سود پر قرض لینے والے محض ضرورت کے ہاتھوں مجبور ہو کر قرض حاصل کرتے تھے تو ان کو قرض دینے والوں کے شانہ بشانہ لوگوں کی نفرت کا نشانہ سمجھنا ناقابل فہم بات ہے ۔

سود کے لئے استعمال ہونے والی اصطلاحیں اور ان کا دائرۂ اطلاق :

قدیم ترین زمانے سے تجارتی اور غیر تجارتی ہر قسم کے سود کے لئے ایک ہی اصطلاح استعمال ہوتی رہی ہے ۔ ہر عہد میں سود کا تصور

1. Neh., v : 10, 11
2. Leviticus, xxv : 35, 36.
3. Isaiah, xxiv : 2.
4. Jeremiah, xv : 10.

محض اس اضافے سے پیدا ہوا جو قرض پر لیا یا دیا جاتا ہے ۔ یہ اضافہ کس غرض سے تھا اور کتنا تھا اس کا تصورِ سود سے کوئی تعلق نہیں رہا ۔ ہم نے ابتدا میں بابل کے تجارتی سود کا حوالہ دیا ہے ۔ سود کے لئے ان کی اصطلاح (Sibat, Sibtum) بعینہ عربی اصطلاح 'الربا' کی طرح محض اضافہ کا معنی دیتی تھی ۔ ان کے ہاں جو بھی اضافہ قرض کی چیز پر ہوتا ہے (Sibtum) تھا[1]۔ تجارتی سود کے لئے بھی انکے ہاں بعینہ یہی اصطلاح استعمال ہوتی تھی[2] ۔

بائیبل میں سود کے لئے لفظ (Neshekh) استعمال ہوتا ہے جس کا معنیٰ محض سود ہے ۔ جب پرانی زبان (Ancient Vernacular) سے بائیبل کا ترجمہ کیا گیا تو اس وقت تک (Neshekh) سے مطلقاً (Usury) ہی مراد لیا جاتا تھا ۔ ترجمہ کرتے ہوئے (Interest) اور (Interest) کا فرق سامنے آیا تو (Usury) کا لفظ (Neshakh) کے ترجمے کے لئے منتخب کر لیا گیا ۔ اس لفظ سے زیادہ شرح سود کا جو تصور پیدا ہوتا ہے وہ گمراہ کن ہے [3] ۔ خود پرانے عہد نامے کے ترجمے میں ایک فیصد ماہانہ یا ۱۲ فیصد سالانہ شرح سود کا ذکر ہے اور اس کے لئے لفظ (Usury) ہی مستعمل ہے[4] ۔ بنک سے حاصل ہونے والے سود کے لئے بھی (Usury) ہی کا لفظ مستعمل ہے [5]۔ مشخ (Mishnah) میں سود کی جو تعریف کی گئی ہے اس سے واضح ہو جاتا ہے کہ سود اصل پر اضافے کا نام ہے ۔ قرض کس غرض سے ہے اور وہ اضافہ کس نے ادا کیا

1. J. C. Miles & G. R. Oriver, Thc Babylonian Laws, 1 : 174.
2. The Code of Hammurabi, v : 100—103.
3. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 12 : 555.
4. Neh., v : 11.
5. St. Mathew, xxv : 27; St. Luke, xix : 23.

ضرورتمند غریب نے یا تجارت کرنے والے امیر نے، اس سے سود کی حقیقت میں کوئی تبدیلی پیدا نہیں ہوتی ۔ مشخ کے الفاظ یہ ہیں :-

What is usury (neshekh) and what is increase (torbith) ? It is usury (neshekh) when a man lends a sela for five dinars, or two reahs of wheat for three; because he is a usurer (neshekh). And what is increase ? When a man increases [his gains] in [trafficking with] produce.[1]

قرآن نے سود کے لئے 'الربا' کی اصطلاح استعمال کی ہے ۔ اوپر کی بحث 'الربا' کے دائرہ اطلاق کے تعین کے لئے دو طرح سے ہماری مدد کرتی ہے ۔ ایک یہ کہ 'الربا' کا لغوی پہلو بعینہ بیان شدہ قدیم اصطلاحوں سے مشابہ ہے اور دوسرے یہ کہ قرآن نے (Neshekh) کو 'الربا' کہا ہے ۔ پہلے 'الربا' کے لغوی مفہوم اور اصطلاحی حیثیت سے اس کی فقہی تعبیر و تشریح کی بحث زیادہ مناسب ہے ۔

لسان العرب میں ربا کا معنی یوں درج ہے ''ربا الشیٔ'' چیز زیادہ ہوگئی یا بڑھ گئی ، اربتیہ : میں نے اسے بڑھایا ۔ قرآن میں ہے ''و یُربی الصدقات'' (اللہ صدقات کو بڑھاتا ہے) ربائے حرام اسی سے لیا گیا ہے[2]'' ۔ تمام مفسرین نے 'ربا' کی لغوی بحث کرتے ہوئے اس بات کی تشریح کی ہے کہ لغت کے اعتبار سے 'ربا' کا معنی بڑھنا ہے ۔ مثلاً قرطبی کہتے ہیں : ''والربا فی اللغته الزیاده مطلقاً''[3] (ربا لغت میں مطلقاً اضافے کو کہتے ہیں) ۔ الجصاص کا قول ہے ''اصل الربا فی اللغته هو الزیادة''[4] (لغت میں ربا کی حقیقت زیادتی ہے) ۔ گویا 'ربا' کے لغوی پہلو کو دیکھا جائے تو اس سے مطلقاً اضافہ مراد ہے ۔ اضافہ کتنا ہے یا قرض کس

1. The Mashneh (1954), 355.
2- ابن المنظور : لسان العرب، 14 : 3040 (بیروت ۱۹۵۶)
3- القرطبی : احکام القرآن، 3 : 348 ،
4- الجصاص : احکام القرآن 1 : 464

غرض سے لیا گیا ہے 'ربا' سے اسے کوئی سروکار نہیں -

'ربا' کی فقہی تعریف بھی اس کی واضح طور پر تائید کرتی ہے - ابن منظور نے 'ربا' کی تعریف یہ لکھی ہے : ''الربا ربوان الحرام کل قرض یوخذبه اکثر منه او تجرّبه منفعة فحرام''[1] (ربا دو قسم کے ہیں - ربائے حرام ہر وہ قرض ہے جس کے بدلے میں اصل سے زیادہ وصول کیا جائے یا اس سے کوئی منفعت حاصل کی جائے) - قرطبی احکام القرآن میں لکھتے ہیں : ''والربا الذی علیه عرف الشرع شیئان : تحریم النساء والتفاضل فی العقود''[2] (عرف شرعی میں 'ربا' دو ہیں - نساء کی حرمت اور سودوں میں زیادتی) - عربوں کے ہاں جو 'ربا' مروج تھا اس کے بارے میں بھی مفسرین اس بات پر متفق ہیں کہ ان کے ہاں درہم یا دینار قرض پر دیے جاتے تھے اور ایک مدت تک اس کی ادائیگی کی تاخیر کے عوض اصل زر میں اضافہ کر دیا جاتا تھا[3] - ان حقائق سے یہ بات واضح ہو جاتی ہے کہ جہاں تک 'ربا' کی حقیقت کا تعلق ہے وہ اصل زر پر زیادتی ہے - ہر دور میں 'ربا' کے بارے میں یہی تصور رہا - جاہلیت میں اسی کو 'ربا' کہا جاتا تھا پھر فقہا نے بھی 'ربا' کی یہی تعریف کی -

یہود کے تصور سود اور اسکی فقہی تشریح سے اسلامی اصطلاح اور تعریف کی مشابہت بہت نمایاں ہے - پھر قرآن مجید میں یہود کی سود خواری کا ذکر بھی کیا گیا ہے - قرآن مجید کے اس مقام کو سامنے

1- ابن المنظور : لسان، 14 : 3040.
2- القرطبی، 3 : 348.
3- الشوکانی: فتح القدیر، 1: 267 ؛ القُمّی: غرائب القرآن، 1: 280 ؛ الجصاص: احکام القرآن، 3 : 848 - علاوہ ازیں ابن جریر نے مجاهد اور قتاده سے اور ابن ابی حاتم نے سعید بن جبیر سے اسی معنی کی روایات نقل کی ہیں -

رکھ لینے سے اسلامی اصطلاح 'الربا' کے مفہوم کے تعین کے لئے ہمیں بہت رہنمائی مل سکتی ہے -

قرآن میں چار مقامات پر 'الربا' کا ذکر آیا ہے -

(۱) ''جو لوگ سود (الربا) کھاتے ہیں وہ (قبروں سے) اس طرح (حواس باختہ) اٹھیں گے جیسے کسی کو جن نے لپیٹ کر دیوانہ بنا دیا ہو - یہ اس لیے کہ وہ کہتے ہیں کہ سودا بیچنا بھی تو (نفع کے لحاظ سے) ویسا ہی ہے جیسے سود (ربا) - حالانکہ سودے کو اللہ نے حلال کیا ہے اور سود کو حرام ، تو جس شخص کے پاس خدائی نصیحت پہنچی اور وہ (ربا لینے سے) باز آ گیا تو جو پہلے ہو چکا وہ اس کا - اور (قیامت میں) اس کا معاملہ خدا کے سپرد ، اور جو پھر لینے لگا تو ایسے لوگ دوزخی ہیں کہ ہمیشہ دوزخ میں جلتے رہیں گے -''

''خدا سود (ربا) کو نابود (یعنی بے برکت) کرتا ہے اور خیرات (کی برکت) کو بڑھاتا ہے اور خدا کسی ناشکرے گنہگار کو دوست نہیں رکھتا -''

''جو لوگ ایمان لائے اور نیک عمل کرتے اور نماز پڑھتے اور زکواۃ دیتے رہے ان کو ان کے کاموں کا صلہ خدا کے ہاں ملیگا اور (قیامت کے دن) ان کو کچھ خوف نہ ہوگا اور وہ غمناک نہ ہوں گے -''

''مومنو ! اللہ سے ڈرو اور اگر ایمان رکھتے ہو تو جتنا سود (ربا) باقی رہ گیا اس کو چھوڑ دو -''

''اگر ایسا نہ کرو گے تو خبردار ہو جاؤ (کہ تم) خدا اور رسول سے جنگ کرنے کے لیے (تیار ہوتے ہو) اور اگر توبہ کر لو گے (اور ربا چھوڑ دو گے) تو تم کو اپنی اصلی رقم لینے کا حق ہے جس میں نہ اوروں

پہلی تین آیات میں روئے سخن عام مخاطبین قرآن کی طرف ہے ۔ متعین طور پر مخاطبین میں سے کسی خاص گروہ یا امت کی طرف اشارہ نہیں کیا گیا ۔ عام مخاطبین میں غالب اکثریت عربوں کی تھی اور ان کے بعد یہود کی ۔ عربوں کے ہاں جاہلی زمانے میں سود کی مروجہ صورتیں فی الحال متنازعہ فیہا ہیں ۔ لیکن آخری آیت میں تعین سے یہود کی سود خواری کا ذکر ہے ۔ یہ آیت 'الربا' کے مفہوم کے تعین کے سلسلے میں دو پہلوؤں سے ہماری رہنمائی کرتی ہے :

۱ ۔ یہ ایک مسلمہ امر ہے کہ قرآن مجید میں امم سابقہ کے احوال اور خصوصیت سے ان کی غلطیوں کا ذکر اس لیے کیا گیا ہے تاکہ مخاطبین پر واضح ہو جائے کہ ان امتوں کی کونسی غلطیاں ان کی تباہی کا باعث بنیں اور اگر ان غلطیوں کا اعادہ کیا گیا تو نتائج حسب سابق تباہی اور انجام بد کی صورت میں ظاہر ہوں گے ۔ مسلمانوں کو پورا زور دیکر 'الربا' سے روکا گیا ہے ۔ اور اس آیت میں بتایا گیا ہے کہ یہودیوں کو بھی اس سے روکا گیا تھا لیکن وہ باز نہ آئے اس لئے تعزیر الہی کے سزاوار ہوگئے ۔ دونوں موقعوں پر محض یکساں نوعیت کی برائی کی طرف مختلف عبارتوں سے اشارہ نہیں کر دیا گیا بلکہ پورے تعین سے ایک ہی اصطلاح 'الربا' استعمال کی گئی ہے اور اس سے صاف ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ جس 'الربا' سے مسلمانوں کو باز رکھنا مقصود ہے وہی 'الربا' یہودیوں میں مروج رہا ۔ انکو بھی اس سے روکا گیا لیکن وہ اس سے باز نہ آئے اور سزا وار تعزیر ہوئے ۔

۲ ۔ یہودیوں کے ہاں ہر قسم کے سود کے لئے لفظ (Neshekh) استعمال ہوتا تھا ۔ ان کے ہاں تجارتی اور غیر تجارتی سود پر دلالت کرنے کے لیے الگ الگ اصطلاحیں موجود نہیں جو اس بات کا ثبوت

پر ظلم کروگے نہ تم پر ظلم کیا جائے گا ۔"[1]

(۲) "اے ایمان والو دگنا چوگنا سود (ربا) نہ کھاؤ اور خدا سے ڈرتے رہو تاکہ نجات حاصل کرو ۔"[2]

(۳) "اور تم جو سود (ربا) دیتے کہ لوگوں کے مال میں افزائش ہو تو خدا کے نزدیک اس میں افزائش نہیں ہوتی اور جو تم زکوۃ دیتے ہو اور اس سے خدا کی رضامندی طلب کرتے ہو تو (وہ موجب برکت ہے اور) ایسے ہی لوگ (اپنے مال کو) دو چند سہ چند کرنے والے ہیں ۔"[3]

(۴) یہود کی سود خواری کا ذکر ان الفاظ میں کیا گیا :

"فَبِظُلْمٍ مِّنَ الَّذِينَ هَادُوا حَرَّمْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ طَيِّبَاتٍ أُحِلَّتْ لَهُمْ وَبِصَدِّهِمْ عَن سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ كَثِيرًا ۝ وَأَخْذِهِمُ الرِّبَا وَقَدْ نُهُوا عَنْهُ وَأَكْلِهِمْ أَمْوَالَ النَّاسِ بِالْبَاطِلِ ۚ وَأَعْتَدْنَا لِلْكَافِرِينَ مِنْهُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا ۔[4]

"تو ہم نے یہودیوں کے ظلموں کے سبب (بہت سی) پاکیزہ چیزیں جو ان کے لیے حلال تھیں حرام کر دیں اور اس سبب سے بھی کہ وہ اکثر خدا کے راستے سے لوگوں کو روکتے تھے اور اس سبب سے بھی کہ وہ باوجود منع کئے جانے کے سود لیتے تھے اور اس سبب سے بھی کہ وہ لوگوں کا مال ناحق کھاتے تھے ۔ اور ان میں سے جو کافر ہیں ان کے لیے ہم نے درد دینے والا عذاب تیار کر رکھا ہے ۔"[4]

1- البقرہ : 175—179.
2- الروم : 140
3- النسا : 160-161
4- آل عمران : 130

ہے کہ وہ ان کو سرے سے دو جدا جدا قسمیں تصور ہی نہیں کرتے تھے۔
ظاہر ہے کہ قرآن کی اصطلاح 'الربا' (Neshekh) کی مترادف ہے۔
قرآن جس طرح جاہلی عربوں کے سود کو 'الربا' کہتا ہے اس طرح یہود
کے سود کو بھی 'الربا' کہتا ہے۔ قرآن نے 'الربا' کی اصطلاح استعمال
کرتے ہوئے کسی طرح سے یہ تصور نہیں دیا کہ اس سے (Neshekh)
کی کوئی مخصوص قسم مراد ہے۔ اس سے ثابت ہوتا ہے کہ (Neshekh)
کے دائرہ اطلاق میں جو چیزیں شامل ہیں 'الربا' بھی انہی تمام چیزوں
پر مخصوص ہے۔ قرآن 'الربا' کی اصطلاح کے ساتھ (Neshekh) کی حرمت
قدیمہ اور اس کے برے نتائج سے مسلمانوں کو خبردار کر رہا ہے۔ اس
لیے اس بات سے انکار کی کوئی گنجائش باقی نہیں رہتی کہ قرآن کی
اصطلاح 'الربا' کے دائرہ اطلاق میں بھی تجارتی اور غیر تجارتی ہر قسم
کا سود ہے۔

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