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CONTRIBUTORS

1. Dr. Riffat Rashid, Professor, Department of Social Work, Punjab University, Lahore.

2. Dr. A. R. Jafri, Chairman, Department of Administrative Science, University of the Punjab, New Campus, Lahore.

3. Dr. Absar Ahmad, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Punjab University, Lahore.

4. Dr. Sardar Muhammad, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore.

5. Miskeen Ali Hijazi, Department of Journalism, Punjab University, Lahore.

WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

DR. RIFFAT RASHID

Professor, Department of Social Work,
Punjab University, Lahore.

I. The Philosophy and Concept of IRD Projects

The basic assumption in IRD programme is that all aspects of rural life are interrelated and that no lasting results can be achieved until all the socio-economic and cultural services generated by the Government and non-government agencies are extended and made available to the entire rural population.

Thus, the term integration in this context implies pooling of services and resources of various agencies—private and/or public and utilizing them for rural development. The various agencies taking part in the IRD projects are encouraged to identify their own roles, the role of other agencies and how these various roles and functions can be channelized and coordinated so that each one supplements and compliments others' role and work towards the achievements of set goals. "The goals of development must include : satisfaction of the elementary needs of food, shelter, clothing and health and improvement in the way of life of the more than 60 percent of the world's population living in rural areas, establishment of social justice through distribution of goods and services, freeing the individual from the uncertainties of nature through education and self-fulfilment, breaking the marginality of rural masses, through participation in all the activities and at all levels of command. This is an exacting task and calls for the mobilization of all human resources, both men and women, to carry it out,[1]

All this emphasises voluntary aspects of cooperation, self-support, self-reliance and accountability for all.

IRD integration is four-fold :—

1. The people and their organizations or NGOs.

2. Government Departments

3. Local Government Institutions as and when formed

4. Business and professional classes

This four-fold approach makes conscious and planned efforts to improve the quality of rural life. This mutually harmonised effort is known as Integrated Rural Development Programme. This brings us to the objectives of the programme. They are :

II. Objectives of the Project

1. To provide a framework of effective and noble rural institutions so that the village people are able to benefit from the new technology ;

2. To maximise agricultural production particularly of food grains to make the country self-sufficient ; and

3. To increase employment opportunities and provide more facilities and amenities of life to improve the quality of life and thus to bridge the gap between the urban and rural population.[2]

To achieve the above mentioned objectives, the following priorities have been laid down in the IRD framework :

1. Establishment of well-coordinated institutional framework ;

2. Development of Markaz with technical, commercial and civic amenities ;

3. Formation of farmer cooperatives leading to production cooperatives and cooperative farms ;

4. Creation of job opportunities through capital formulation and industrial investment ; and

5. Provision of technological training facilities.

IRD programmes has developed a structure which provides linkage at the national level. It has a "production area comprising 50 to 60 villages, mostly with small and medium size farmers with a view to improve their socio-economic status by intensive rural development programmes with an initial thrust to increase productivity, by providing technical guidance, supervised credit, supply of inputs, machinery on hire, storage and marketing facilities etc. based on sound physical organizational and institutional infrastructure, by intensification, diversification and commercialization of agriculture through a social cooperative system under a total approach".[3]

In the IRD Project areas, a focal point Markazes is selected where all facilities and services like agricultural inputs, health, education, transport, banks, markets, welfare centres, consumer stores, women's industrial homes, medical and family planning services etc. are made available, through the various government departments and/or through specialized agencies, to the rural community. There are 130 such 'markazes' all over Pakistan. The objectives of the Markazes are :

1. Formation of farmer organization ;

2. Development of infrastructures such as roads, drainage and electricity, etc.

3. Supervised inputs and mechanized support and storage and marketing.

Conscious efforts are made to provide facilities and opportunities to develop leadership among the rural people through participation in various activities.

III. Role of Women in IRD Programme for Developing Women's Leadership

Within the above mentioned content let us examine the role of women in rural development.

Women constitute more than 47 percent of the total population of which about 80 percent live in the rural areas. Thus any programme of social development and for the advancement of women must take into account the needs and problems of these women. My focus here is rural women.

IV. Observations and Suggestions

A. *Observations*

It is recognized that despite some progress towards equality between men and women, considerable discrimination against women still exists. Apart from achievement of legal equality the greatest difficulties are encountered in attempting to change discriminatory attitudes, beliefs and practices, especially those rooted in tradition. It can be said that women have the greater impact because of the socializing influence they have on their children and hence on the nation's potential. Yet strangely enough women (specially rural women) are the neglected resource in development. They lag far behind men in education, work participation and performance. They do not belong to groups in which decisions about their own future or that of their children of village life as such are taken.

It is not necessary to justify either the role or contribution of women in overall economic and social development. The reality of the situation is that most rural women are not able to make full contribution to the developmental activities. It is in most cases an accepted way of life in the rural societies of Pakistan. However, things can be improved through planned and concerted efforts of all.

2. It is further recognized that the success of the women's role in IRD programme depends on the interest and political will that it stimulates at

national, provincial and local levels, on the interest it can enlist in the form of funds, personnel, voluntary involvement and organizational structure. In this regard IRD programme has the support of the government and the people, thus efforts should be made to demonstrate its utility.

3. The key to elevating the role of women in economic development will largely depend upon their increasing participation in economic activities and in economic independence.

4. Very few women are at present available at various levels in general and at high level of decision-making in particular. Very often, even this scarce available resource is not utilized to its full capacity. IRD programme has recognized its needs and efforts are being made to recruit more suitable women at various levels. However IRD planners must take into consideration the estimates of manpower requirements in terms of numbers, levels and categories. It will be necessary to identify what are the positions which need to be manned by women and for what purposes.

5. There is a wide gap between professed values and operating values and in the statements of plans and in the implementation of plans. The various plans and policy statements are very impressive and an effective beginning has been made. What we need is to look into the reality of the situation as it exists today. To what extent these plans and programmes have been implemented and have been able to bring about effective change in the life of our rural people, specially of rural women ? How far IRD programmes have been able to meet the recognized needs of our people, society and our country and have achieved the set objectives ? What is needed to be done to improve the situation ? We recognize that there are still many unmet needs of the rural women. What should be done about it ? Who should do it ? What steps be taken to improve the contribution of women to social development ? All these questions point towards the leadership role of women at various levels. These are difficult and delicate questions which need to be answered if we are serious about our commitments.

B. *Suggestions*

On the basis of these observations I offer the following suggestions :

1. Women, both in Government IRD projects and NGOs, need to organize themselves at various levels i.e., from national to grassroot, to influence the decision-making process.

2. I RD Programmes should have women's programme as an integral part of its project where women are able to contribute to their own plans and have a say in its programme which affects their lives.

3. There has been relatively little done in the way of deliberate attempt to collect information on or about women. Efforts should be made to encourage and assist IRD projects, government departments, and NGOs to collect the needed information and data on the needs and status of women, to enable the development of long range plans.

   This may include action-oriented research projects, demonstrations and studies. Here I would like to mention the integration of theory and practice on scientific line and not "Ivory Tower People" writing about village women.

4. In order to work towards social development it is essential to have the right people for the right job. Therefore women, to take up their new roles, need to acquire specific knowledge, skills and attitudes. They need *training programmes*, to train women leaders and workers corresponding to the programmes developed by national plans, through establishing new training courses, upgrading or strengthening existing ones at national or local level institutions. There is a need for more facts, experimentations and training to meet the specific needs of our country and women. In other words developing indigenous training. "Mobile training Project sponsored by ESCAP in an effective example of developing training of national character aimed at the

improvement of the quality of service. Such experiments should be attempted.

These may be in-service or pre-service courses, or general courses on citizenship, leadership, community organization, social and political awareness, or directed towards imparting and developing specific skills. All these should be related to the women's specific needs, helping them to become contributing members of the society.

5. Attention should particularly be given to ways of increasing the income earning possibilities of women, both in paid employment and in *non-account* activities. There should be emphasis on providing additional opportunities and facilities not on substitution of women employment for that of men. Such opportunities might be found in food processing and agro-industries located in rural areas, in improving the efficiency of women's agricultural efforts and in assisting the establishment of small business industries, etc.

In addition, village based social service delivery system be encouraged to improve the quality of life in the villages, specially of women.

All these efforts will help women to gain self-reliance and develop self-confidence which are essential elements for any developmental activities and leadership roles.

V. Conclusion

It may be said that the quality of services depends upon the quality of leadership, personnel and resources available and the political will of the people to plan and implement the plans through programmes. IRD project has the needed acceptance and support. Thus there is need to develop further strategies that will take into account the factors and elements which would promote planned change.

FOOTNOTES

1. *The Role of Women in Rural Development*, WS/W6910 Rome 1975, p. 2.

2. Aims and Objectives of IRD, p. 2.

3. Report of the International Semnar on Integrated Rural Development, Lahore 3-10 November 1973, p. 68-69.

4. The Role of Women in Rural Development, WS/F6910, Rome 1975, pp. 2-3.

CULT OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Can it be curbed ?

DR. A. R. JAFRI

Chairman, Department of Administrative Science, University of the Punjab, New Campus, Lahore

Introduction

It is sometimes argued that corruption in public administration of developing countries cannot be wiped out due, among other reasons, to the placement of large amounts of funds at the disposal of public officials for expenditure in a short time, thus creating easy opportunities for graft. The situation tends to become rationalized in the idea that corruption like inflation is an unavoidable appendage of development. The effect of this cult is to spread cynicism and to weaken resistance against corruption. Corruption widens the credibility gap between the stated objectives and real intentions of people in power. Carried to the extreme, it may result in violent upheavals threatening the very fabric of society. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the causes and to identify the measures of curbing the cult of corruption from a realistic and rational point of view so that the society is saved from its evil effects. The basic purpose of an intensive study of corruption in public administration is to explore this problem from a multi-dimensional perspective both in terms of causes and cures. The focus of the study will be on the past and present situations in Pakistan in order to draw a definite plan of action for eradication of this evil in future. The causes of corruption will be analyzed in relation to such factors as characteristics of Pakistani society, the nature of our bureaucracy, the level of our development as a nation, the aspects of our political process and the awareness of the rights and obligations on the part of the citizens to effectively participate in the affairs of the state. The measures of cures

can be categorised according to legislative, legal, administrative and religious considerations. With these parameters set for the study we may now discuss the dimensions of corruption in public administration.

Dimensions of Corruption

The Oxford English Dictionary defines corruption as :

"pervision or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour, the use or existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state, public corporation, etc."

The prevention of corruption Act 1947 (Pakistan) calls any gratification, valuable thing or pecuniary advantage and misappropriation of any property by abuse of official position by a public servant as a criminal misconduct. An act of corruption by a public servant always results in misdirecting or wrong allocation of public funds to individuals or groups. Any system of public order exalting common interest over special interest and disregard of the common interest in favour of an individual's interest amounts to corruption.

Corruption literally means moral deterioration, depravity in thought and action, deviation from the path of righteousness and rules and regulations, or to do something for personal considerations at the cost of truth and justice. Corruption is incarnated in society in such evils as nepotism, misappropriation and more specifically bribery and red-tapism.

The historical facts reveal that whenever a society becomes corrupt, it falls down like a house of cards. Great empires like Greeks, Romans and Muslims have fallen from the peak of their glory to the ashes of their destruction because corruption became rampant in many forms and had eaten away the vitals of their very existence. In Pakistan we are breathing in corruption and its adverse consequences are hanging over our heads. Therefore our survival as a nation demands that measures to eradicate corruption be adopted with full force and in every sphere of human activity.

Corruption is not confined to public officials, the whole society is responsible for it, because in a just society every individual apprehends of accountability. There is no doubt that poverty is the mother of all social evils and it forces the individual to kneel down at the altar of corruption. Economic insecurity creates fear, fed by uncertainty. The idea of honesty becomes fake and vague in such conditions. Instead of swimming against the tide, the public servant seeks shelter under the umbrella of corruption.

A historical study of corruption in Pakistan will reveal that in the beginning we emerged and survived as a nation because among the leaders and the people there was a spirit of dedication, and corruption had almost disappeared. Then the politicians led the way in a cynical scramble for personal gains, public officials and the public followed them. Probably the most demoralising factor was that of rehabilitation of refugees. Politicians and public officials established the practice of corruption by making allotments of lands and houses left by non-Muslim migrants to the unscrupulous people after receiving personal benefits in terms of kind and cash. Having made their haul, they used every possible device to retain this loot. The beneficiaries from evacuee property released a wave of corruption throughout the country. Within five years of independence, almost all the idealism and dedication among the leaders and the public had evaporated and it was replaced by an aggressive assertiveness to acquire more and more material possessions in the shortest period of time. The welded alliance between the public officials and the politicians turned into mutual friendships and favouritism and there started the rot of rampant corruption. While the officials and the politicians wedded and condoned the malpractices of one another, the people at large were deprived of their due share in the benefits resulting from political independence. Revolution of rising expectations and loss of faith in the standards of fair play and justice among the masses are the factors responsible for gradually converting them into the devotees of the cult of corruption in public life. It may, however, be recognised that the level of corruption has not

reached the point which is beyond control and we still have a chance of stopping the spread of this epidemic to catastrophic limits. The necessary measures to achieve this end will be discussed in the later part of this study.

Dimensions of Public Administration

Public Administration is the study of public policy formulation and decision-making. Its function is also to implement the policies, to ensure cooperation of government in its working with the legislature and private organizations, with a view to eliciting their support and to secure funds and finances for the execution of governmental plans and projects. At the same time, public administration is intimately concerned with the establishment of Administrative organizations and their review and revision in the light of changing conditions and with the direction and the supervision of employees, providing leadership, communicating with the people and receiving information about their demands and needs through the prescribed channels of communications, determining the proper methods and procedures of work, evaluating the performance of the members of an administrative organization, exercising control over them and performing other functions assigned to the executive branch of the government.

It is now almost universally recognized that public administration plays a vital role in socio-economic development of a country. Since Government of Pakistan is committed to rapid socio-economic development with the objective of fulfilling the rising expectations of the people, there is a pressing need for changing the existing *status quo*-based law and order-oriented and corruption-ridden administrative set up to an achievement-based, development-oriented and morally committed system of administration. Government direction of industrial and commercial enterprises, the increasing power of workers and trade unions, the focus on the development of backward and rural areas, all these are adding new dimensions to the already expanded responsibilities of public bureaucracy. It thus necessitates a widening of responsibilities and reshaping

of the role of public administrators. The traditional style of administration which allows opportunities for corruption should be modified and new concepts of management be introduced to improve administrative efficiency and effectiveness enabling the public officials to fulfil their aspirations and meet the expectations of the people without resorting to the means of corruption. The quality of administration acquires a special significance in the context of the needs of a country, particularly one deficient in economic resources like Pakistan, for an honest administration can make limited resources go a long way. Moreover, whereas the material resources can be begged, borrowed or brought from elsewhere, the human resources have to spring from within the country. A corruption free administrative management only can meet the challenge of social and economic development at the minimum cost of time and money. Unfortunately corruption has seeped into all levels of hierarchy of our administrative set up. Since corruption permeates in every sphere of public life, it has spread suspicion, tension, fear and insecurity. Administrative corruption besides lowering respect for sources of authority and under-cutting popular faith in the government, tends to involve the subversion of government's economic policies and impedes development by colossal leakage of revenue.

Corruption and Public Administration in Pakistan

Let us now discuss the relationship of corruption and public administration in Pakistan with respect to the parameters set in the earlier part of this paper. We may begin this discussion by analyzing the sources of corruption in a society. For this purpose it is necessary to know the characteristics of the particular society being examined from the point of view of corruption. Taking Pakistani society as the focus of our study we observe that it is transitional in character and suffers from many disadvantages peculiar to such societies. The imitation of western culture and ways of living induces the public servant to fall prey to corruption. Pakistani society is basically feudal, poverty stricken, ritualistic and lacks

well-organized political and social institutions. Majority of the people in Pakistan can hardly earn enough to keep their body and soul together. Poverty is one of the factors responsible for breeding corruption in the society. People in general do not put up strong social sanctions against the corrupt officials. They aspire to secure opportunities of getting rich over-night. Social stratification of Pakistani society is based on material possessions rather than service to the nation and as a result there is a mad race to excel each other in possessing means of ostentatious living through legal or illegal means.

The spiritual bond has weakened by the constant blows of materialism. The society has deviated from the traditional values and has succumbed to the desire for selfish and material gains. The public servant wants the wordly comforts at the heavy cost of justice and morality. Inspite of the fact that the Pakistani society is an ideology-oriented social system where corruption should have been least in terms of size and volume yet corruption is rampant in all spheres of social life. The high rate of illiteracy in society has opened the flood gate of corruption and the pursuit of money has shaken the foundation of the moral values.

The economic system failed to bridge the gulf between the poor and the rich. Prevalance of double standards in social and political affairs encouraged corruption. A kind of hypocricy has settled deep in the social system which has marked a divergence between what people say and what they do. Even corruption itself, which we profess to denounce, is not held in contempt by the public at large. Legacy of the colonial rule, gross economic disparities, ostentatious living, illiteracy and ignorance are some of the characteristics of Pakistani society which help the spread of corruption.

Considering another factor which impinges upon the spread of corruption in a society is the level of development as a nation. The essential factors which contribute to the establishment of a nation and give it substance are : common language, common culture, common historical

experiences, common roles etc. However, the crucial factor in this regard is the psychological feeling of being one. This is the single most important variable which integrates a community in achieving a particular set of objectives. It is therefore of utmost importance to analyze whether these factors are present in Pakistani society. We must find out whether people from different social and political backgrounds have evolved a feeling of being a part of one whole, whether broader aims in society are common. An objective answer to these questions is that although people speak different languages and aspire to different objectives within their social and economic set ups, the essential feeling of being part of one community persists. There are however certain divisions in society which constantly work against this phenomenon. In broad terms, the society can be divided into elites and the masses in the context of social, economic and political power. The element of exploitation which exists in almost all walks of life has resulted in conflict. Individuals in each group have affinity to its own people, this tendency of self-interest above national interest has led to unethical conduct among the majority of people. In the context of public administration, bureaucracy has aligned itself with the privileged class of society and has occasionally been used as a tool of oppression.

After the death of the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan had no political leader of calibre, who could inculcate the spirit of patriotism and a sense of nation-hood. The administrative machinery which was primarily tailored by the foreign masters to fulfil their own aims, failed to adjust itself to the situation after independence. The Islamic ideology of the country was pushed into oblivion and in education policies interest was shifted from the inheritance of spiritual knowledge to the material theories of the Western writers. The imposition of martial law to curb vandalism in the political arena is not conducive to political process and the development of healthy political institutions. The end result of all these forces put together shows that we have failed to evolve a strong nation-hood and the problems of regionalism, provincialism and sectarianism

are yet to be solved in Pakistan. The tendency of satisfying particular interest at the cost of national interest has encouraged corruption among a majority of government officials.

The structure of our bureaucracy has a large share in sprawling corruption in public administration. Our bureaucratic structure is highly centralized which gives rise to red-tapism and breeds corruption indirectly. The bureaucrats have a tendency to remain aloof and inaccessible to the public. Low pay, frequent transfers of field officers, lack of coordination between various departments, and absence of protection against dismissal on political grounds encouraged the bureaucracy to practise corruption. Besides this, administrative powers are concentrated in a few hands. Decisions are initiated at the lowest level of hierarchy where temptation of accepting illegal gratification is very high. The process of accountability is weak and slow. As a result of this corrupt officials escape punishment.

The participation of political process in extending corruption to public administration is highly significant. Since its inception Pakistan has been suffering from political instability. The main cause of this political instability has been the lack of coherence amongst the various political parties and their failure to enlist mass support. The politicians manipulated the situation whereby their end was to gain power and promote selfish interests. Again, these leaders in our political process belonged to a particular social set up, mainly the landed aristocracy. It was the furtherance of the cause of their own class interest which kept the national interest subservient to the vested interest. Because of frequent changes in political leadership a situation of political vacuum was created, which was largely filled by the bureaucracy. However, bureaucracy itself was the product of a colonial rule and as such it generally diverted itself from the interests of the general masses. Bureaucrats snatched extensive discretionary powers from the political leaders and in the absence of external checks, they remained largely unaccountable. Such a situation where political process lagged behind and bureaucracy thrived by leaps and bounds paved the way for unlimited opportunities for corruption.

The bureaucracy not only failed to accomplish the administrative goals set for it but also stood in the way of political development in Pakistan.

The lack of awareness on the part of citizens about their rights and obligations to effectively participate in the affairs of the state is another contributing factor to the expansion of corruption in public administration. Since masses are not conscious of their rights and duties they are prone to exploitation. Their indifference and lethargy have deprived the majority of officials of sense of responsibility and sense of accountability. Citizens, on the other hand, violate the limits of their rights, break the laws, and bypassing of procedures through corrupt channels has become the order of the day. Due to the absence of the means to articulate public opinion constant vigilance on the actions of the government functionaries is missing, which leads to corruption in public dealings. It may be pointed out here that the concept of accountability could not have deep roots in Pakistan because the administrative process is surrounded by too much secrecy. The conservative approach to public administration makes people believe that public interest would be better served if there was a great amount of closeness and secrecy, while in actual practice this generates corruption and cordons off all attempts of detection. As people at large are not aware of their rights and obligations, they are easily misled by corrupt public officials in order to draw illegal gratifications from them. Due to Baradri and caste system people are divided and do not exert effective public opinion against corrupt bureaucrats. People on their part do not hesitate to evade taxes and use smuggling and black marketing as normal business practices. The end result of this state of affairs gives rise to the belief among the people that corruption succeeds, and nothing succeeds like success.

Can the Cult of Corruption be Curbed?

There is no doubt about the prevalence of corruptins in Pakistan like most of the other developing countries. However, there is also a growing awareness among the people of Pakistan that corruption weakens national

consolidation, decreases respect for and allegiance to the government, retards economic development and generates political instability. I believe that the cult of corruption can be curbed if a mass reformist movement is initiated in all walks of life. This must, however, begin at the personal and individual level, thereby ensuring moral and ethical integrity and should end at building a national character which reflects devotion and dedication to the moto of service above self and unquestioned loyalty to the nation. It may however, be pointed out that corruption is a chronic disease having its roots gone deep into the society and a radical change has to be introduced through adopting legislative, legal, administrative, and religious remedial measures. The effectiveness of these measures will be the subject of our discussion in the rest of this paper.

Legislative measures to curb corruption should specifically consist of the following :—

(*i*) There should be legislative committees in the parliament (or any other parallel institution) which should investigate the complaints against the public servants and report to the chief executive for necessary action.

(*ii*) The system of local government should be strengthened further to enable the people to have a check on the corrupt public servants through their representatives at the local level.

(*iii*) The public servants should be provided protection against arbitrary dismissal or removal on political grounds so that they should be able to work honestly without succumbing to political pressure.

(*iv*) The institution of Public Accounts Committee be further strengthened to ensure that financial regulations are duly observed. Any wilful and unlawful departure from the prescribed procedures and spendings over and above the authorized allocation be discouraged by fixation of responsibilities and consequent recoveries from the public servants identified by the committee.

(*v*) The institution of OMBUDSMAN should be created by an enactment of the parliament, (or any other parallel body). The person chosen as Ombudsman must have legal as well as administrative background to facilitate the investigation process. Any citizen should be allowed to file a complaint against the corrupt practices of a public servant with the Ombudsman who would investigate and recommend to the government, for suitable action against such public servants. Cognisance may also be taken by the Ombudsman at his own initiative and private knowledge.

(*vi*) By an enactment of the parliament the practice of keeping public documents confidential should be minimized so that the system of accountability could be vitalized.

(*vii*) The legislature should pass a law disallowing extension in service beyond super-annuation. Extension in service of super-annuated public servants is one of the most important factors responsible for the spread of corruption among the top echelons of the public bureaucracy.

As far as legal measures of curbing corruption are concerned, following views may be considered :—

(*i*) Under the prevention of corruption Act, 1947 organizations to deal with corruption cases were established in Pakistan. Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance 1948 dealt with the cases of Central Government employees and the West Pakistan Anti-Corruption Establishment Ordinance 1961 investigated the corruption cases for the Provincial employees. These institutions have done some work mostly pertaining to lower grade employees because these have been headed by the Home Secretary at the Centre and Chief Secretary at the Province and therefore high officials were mostly protected or escaped punishment. A

permanent body consisting of Supreme Court and High Court Judges for the centre and provinces respectively should be instituted to look into the cases of corruption involving high ranking officers.

(*ii*) Judiciary must be separated from the executive branch of the government.

(*iii*) The public Complaint Cells should be established in each department and a procedure of handling complaints within prescribed period of time be established.

(*iv*) Given our legal system, we know that it is an uphill task to prove an act of corruption to the satisfaction of the court and the rules of evidence which are designed in our country to provide every facility and shelter for an accused person to take benefit of all doubts. It should be simplified and made more effective.

(*v*) Creation of administrative courts on the French pattern will prove a legal deterrent to corruption.

(*vi*) The salaries of public servants should be reviewed from time to time keeping in view the index of prices.

(*vii*) Every government official should declare his assets at the time of joining the service and should be required to make a declaration annually.

Considering the administrative measures the following steps could be undertaken :—

(1) The discretionary powers of public servants should be kept within reasonable limits.

(2) There should be proper delegation of powers in the entire administrative structure.

(3) Office procedures should be simplified to avoid delays and red tapism.

(4) Accountability process should be short and quick.

(5) In the selection of senior officers, extreme care should be taken to employ men of integrity.

(6) Prosecuting and investigating branches of police should be separated.

(7) Proper action should be taken on audit and accounts reports.

(8) There should not be frequent transfers of field officers.

(9) Public employees should be provided basic necessities of life at subsidised rates.

(10) The head of field departments should conduct extensive touring so that distance between actual decision makers and public at large could be reduced. Furthermore, people should be able to see the officers without going through subordinate channels which generally try to isolate the officers from the public.

(11) The public servants should be instructed to set an example in the matters of avoidance of wasteful expenditure on entertainments dress, jewellery, houses and other items of conspicuous comsumption.

(12) There should be a balance of power in our services structure and for this purpose the reforms suggested by Cornelius Commission be implemented.

Lastly, religious measures of containing the spread of corruption in Public Administration may be examined. It will require a cultural revolution to dispel corruption from our society. A re-orientation in attitudes of the people towards corruption is one way to root out this evil. People should be equipped with such moral armaments that they should be in a position to resist all temptations of benefiting from corruption and should be able to organize a social resistance against corrupt officials.

The press could play a vital role in the eradication of corruption. Simple ways of living and equitable distribution of wealth can also help in checking corruption. Religious institutions should be mobilized for spiritual rehabilitation and character building of the people and younger generation in particular. Religious teaching should lay more emphasis on social obligations which Islam prescribes for Muslims. It is necessary that a code of public conduct, based on Islamic principles and compatible with modern conditions be evolved and promulgated in Pakistan.

Conclusion

To conclude this discussion it may be noted that corruption in public administration is a very complex phenomenon and is the result of combination of many factors. In order to cleanse the Augean stable of public administration, hectic and consistant efforts are required. A cultural revolution based on Islamic ideology is a possible response to the challenge of curbing the cult of corruption in public administration in particular and the society in general.

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A PLEA FOR PHILOSOPHY'S LIBERATION

By

DR. ABSAR AHMAD

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy,
Punjab University, Lahore

Contemporary Anglo-American philosophy is at a dead end. Its academic practitioners have all but abandoned the attempt to understand the world, let alone change it. They have turned philosophy into a narrow and specialised academic subject of little relevance or interest to anyone outside the small circle of professional philosophers. The result has been that serious philosophical work beyond the conventional sphere has been minimal.

In pronouncing this judgement I am not at all being high-handed or presumptuous, rather it is informed by my personal experience of studies at British universities a few years ago. Moreover, I have an authority, Bacon, on my side when he said—"For where philosophy is severed from its roots in experience, whence it first sprouted and grew, it becomes a dead thing".[1] The great mass of human beings undoubtedly have a real need for a philosophy—that is, for a consistent worldy view and a body of guiding principles and clearly defined aims. This mass is effectively deprived by contemporary academic philosophers of any ideological material which might prove relevant to their existences.

Complacency

Present-day academic philosophy is created and transmitted in an atmosphere of 'scholarly detachment'. It appears to be entirely remote from the struggles and needs of the world. Academic philosophers, both

in their thought and in their lives, it would appear, have almost entirely withdrawn from any relationship with the concrete social reality around them. They frequently boast of their 'coolness', their 'detachment', their 'ethical neutrality' etc., etc.[2] In short they seem to have abdicated from any socially valuable role, and their work consequently appears to be entirely trivial and irrelevant. It is characteristic of this type of philosophers that they come to think they can dismiss a complex theoretical system such as a theistic point of view in a few deft 'moves' or with a few clever points, and to distrust whatever is not put in the professional patois of 'claims', unpacking, entailment, and which does not have the sleek professionalism and glibness that now passes for rigour and brilliance.

But clearly the claim of ethical neutrality and dispassionateness on their part is a farce. The social and political function of present-day analytical and linguistic philosophy is diabolically coservative and reactionary in the main. In fact these philosophers exhibit total complacency towards any idea of changing and revolutionizing the established order. I knew and befriended many a radical students in Western universities who regarded the whole academic set-up as a fraud, perpetuated to prop up the *status quo*.

Philosophical thinking, historically speaking, is closely related with religious beliefs, with science, and with art. It has often culminated in the attempt to do intellectually what religion has done practically and emotionally ; to establish human life in some satisfying and meaningful relation to the universe in which man finds himself, and to get some wisdom in the conduct of human affairs. There has been a general agreement on the type of problems with which 'widsom' and hence philosophy is centrally concerned. They are those which raise the question of the meaning of human life, and the significance of the world in which human life has its setting, in so far as that character has a bearing on human destiny. And what is that destiny itself ? What activities and pursuits

should he follow ? What kind of life is most worthwhile individually and collectively ? To the best of my knowledge, linguistic and analytical philosophers of the West do not address themselves to any of these questions. But surely we in the developing countries cannot afford the teaching of a philosophy which, though replete with technical jargon, is empty, formal and sterile. We should stand for less academics and more self-understanding and concrete social change.

Third World

We must not neglect, as is now fashionable with the Western thinkers, the cultural problems of the Third World. Anthropology left the Third World with a theory of acculturation, but Marx was far closer to reality when he wrote of the Indian subcontinent.

"England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptom of reconstruction yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo (and, I add, the Muslim also) and separates Hindustan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history".[3]

The alienation of the native from his own culture is a problem that hangs over much of the cultural activity in the Third World. Western experts are not reluctant to fill the debate with the most ludicrous philosophical rubbish—like the idea of converting the entire Third World to secular scienticism in order to foster economic growth. Philosophy in the heroic sense provides the key to the reconstitution of national culture, the necessity for which Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal clearly saw a few decades ago.

Yet philosophy is often regarded as an unnecessary luxury in the Third World. The bourgeois economists, who otherwise accuse Marx of reducing human life entirely to economic relations, happily reduce the

people of the Third World to *home economicus*, pure and simple. Philosophy, they assert, should be abandoned for more useful economic pursuits. I shall narrate a very interesting episode here which I came to know from private communication with a Nigerian friend. Professor Ernest Gellner of London School of Economics was asked by a Nigerian University on the advisability of setting up a philosophy department and he replied that a developing country does not need one. But such an answer attains its plausibility entirely through the mystification of words. Replace 'philosophy' with a synonym like 'clear and ordered thinking' or 'critical understanding' and we get :

(*a*) A developing country does not need clear and ordered thinking.

(*b*) A developing country does not need critical understanding.

Certainly Gellner would have a case if he meant that a developing country does not need philosophy as presently carried on in English-speaking world, but then who does ? Such a philosophy is 'an attempt to combine the appearance of being in earnest and taking trouble about the subject with an actual neglect of the subject altogether'. In *Consciencism*, one of the best book on general philosophy from contemporay Afarica, we read :

"Whereas the great philosophers, the titans, have always been passionately interested in social reality and the welfare of man, many of their twentieth century descendants in the West serenly settle down to a compilation of dictionary of sentences as opposed to a dictionary of words ; engulfed in their intellectual hermitage, they excuse themselves from philosophical comment on social progress or social oppression, on peace or war. While they thus pursue 'the exact sense of the word', all authority, political or moral, passes ever more firmly into the hands of the politicians".4

It would be entirely mistaken to view the argument presented here as merely ideological or dogmatic. Philosophy in the true sense is an

intrinsic part of man's self-fulfilment, and the case argued for here is that the Third World develop its philosophical resources in order to help its societies flower creatively and intellectually, to become instances of humanity fully becoming itself. In contrast to the issues that are usually associated with the Third World in Western discussions, such as population explosion, birth control, more or less aid, infiltration of 'dangerous' ideas etc., two themes can be said to occupy the major part of intellectual activity in this region :

1. How to counter racist imperialist aggression emanating from the West but often mediated by local agents. This aggression is not to be taken in a limited political or economic sense only, rather in a very broad sense of cultural, moral and educational aggression and oppression.

2. The ends and means of developing wholesome and independent society where each man is free to fulfil himself—to 'be himself' in the true Quranic sense.

All this, it might be thought, is not of much concern to the West. "If the Third World wants to develop its own philosophy let it do so, but we are concerned with our own problems". Not only is this wrong because the problems which beset and obsess Western intellectuals closely affect members of the Third World, but also wrong because the search for a vision of the whole man, proclaimed by eminent sages of the past, is a matter concerning all men. Surely we do not intend to replace a Western chauvinism by a Third World chauvinism. Take for instance the question of growing interest in the social responsibility of science and ideological orientation of the scientific paradigms which a society adopts. It is clear that what is needed is that the conceptual structure of sceince be constituted and a humanism be established within its very centre, for it is inadequate merely to *humanize* science : there must be the creation of science as a *humanism*. In the Third World where science departments are not heavily encrusted by a tradition and where sciences are often just being established, such a vision has great and urgent relevance.

A Third World philosopher should participate in the tasks of (*i*) liberating the study of Third World societies, cultures and economics from inhuman and enslaving philosophical presuppositions and reconstrue it within a broad religio-humanistic framework, (*ii*) creating science as a humanism, as a technology at one with the whole spirit of Man and development of an anthropology of the spirit that would destroy the tearing apart of man from himself, that has epitomized both the West and its blind imitators in the Third World, and restore to man his essential unity, having as its purpose the increased awareness of what makes man fully human and the exploration of the nature of man's fulfilment.

Islamic Eclecticism

When the words physics, chemistry, medicine, or history are mentioned in a conversation, the participants usually have something in mind. No matter how many points of dispute there may be in these fields, at least the general line of their intellectual work is universally recognised. The prominent representatives more or less agree on subject matter and methods. The situation in philosophy, however, is diametrically opposed to this. Here refutation of one school by another usually involves complete rejection, the negation of the substance of its work as fundamentally false and misconceived. This attitude would not be shared by what I propose to call, for want of a better expression, 'Islamic Eclecticism'—a kind of dialectical philosophy. Islamic eclecticism, for example, in keeping with its principles, will tend to extract the relative truths of the individual points of view and introduce them in its own comprehensive theory. Other philosophical doctrines, such as contemporary positivism, have less elastic and accommodating principles, and they simply exclude from the realm of knowledge a very large part of the philosophical literature, especially the great metaphysical systems of the past.

The idea of Islamic eclecticism is firmly based on one of the sayings of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) according to which wisdom and gems of knowledge are a Muslim's lost property,

and he is advised to acquire them from whichever quarter they are available. A Muslim mind is rightly characterized as an open one, ready to accept truth from any source or region it may emanate. Obviously many philosophies and thought-systems, even Marxism and psychoanalysis, contain an amalgam of truth and untruth, and it is the duty of a Muslim thinker to sift the genuinely true elements from falsehood and incorporate it into the Islamic thought. It is in this sense that Iqbal speaks of 'the principle of movement' in the structure of Islam. In the following lines I shall further delineate the characteristics of Islamic eclecticism.

Islamic eclecticism will explicity aim to avoid the academicism of the existing Western philosophical schools : an academicism which trivializes philosophy and manifests itself in an uncritical attitude to social ideologies and metaphysical worldviews. It will make a point of taking a synoptic and integrated approach to knowledge—an approach which cuts accrose academic departmental divisions. It will draw on alternative philosophical traditions as a way of overcoming the inadequacies of prevalent analytical philosophy. This is not to say that any of the other dominant traditions offers a ready-made alternative, which could be adopted wholesale. To be fair, it would wrong to neglect altogether the analytical tradition. It would of course be absurd to dismiss all the work that has been done within it as futile and irrelevant. Even where one is critical of analytical and linguistic philosophy, it is important to assess it and reckon with it, not just to turn one's back on it. Most clearly, analytical philosophers tend to stop the inquiry just where a practical man in the world begins to ask questions. There has been virtually no attempt among analytical philosophers to press further, to ask critical questions about the origin and development of social institutions and practices which shape what we are. This failure has especially left its mark on social and political philosophy which have been virtually non-existent, and on ethics which has tended to become an arid, scholastic jungle.

Philosophy in the framework of Islamic eclecticism cannot be squared with an anti-activist or 'spectator' view of it which aims merely at an enlargement of the understanding. Indeed it here becomes an essentially practical subject : it seeks to get people to do things. It cannot remain uncommitted to social action. The attack on spectatorism which we find in Existentialism and in the pragmatists is very relevant to current philosophical scene. Moreover, Anglo-American academic philosophy is presently built around the assumption that its true centre is epistemology. This assumption is apparent particularly in the structure and content of university courses. Now the approach to the various areas of philosophy via the problem of knowledge is one possible way of organizing one's conception of philosophy. But the outcome has been the abstraction of 'man as Knower' from the rest of human life, and in particular from human practice. This has been a distinguishing feature of the empiricist tradition and epistemology is still dominated by that tradition : the so-called 'problems of knowledge' are the problems of the isolated individual knower confined to the world of his own sense-perceptions. Conversely it is essential to see the activity of 'knowing' as arising out of, and part of, man's general attempt to organize and cope with his world, in order to vindicate the status of human knowledge as a meaningful totality rather than a series of discrete sense-impressions.

During my stay in England I met a number of students who became fed up with the Oxford mixture served up to them as philosophy. The endles and usually pointless analysis, the clever, showy logic-chopping, the crossword-puzzle attitude of the professionals bored them stiff ; they had expected something far better from philosophy, something with a real-life purpose, not just an esoteric game. Perhaps it is in the bizarre meanderings of the so-called moral philosophers that they realized that the boredom of the subject masks something more important—its pretended a-morality and a-politicality. Surely philosophy should be a moral activity, not merely a discussion of piano practice (Stevenson) or red motor

cars (Hare). They saw that the boring triviality of linguistic philosophy is inextricably bound up with the general isolation of the academic, the ivory-tower atmosphere of the universities. What they want to do is to change things, not to be mere elitist intellectuals. What Russell did in public had nothing to do with his limited 'theory of knowledge', though everything to do with his 'philosophy of life'. And that is the point ; for we Muslims the faith-philosophy of Islam is the one system of thought that requires the marriage of theory and practice, the one metaphysics available to us which is a complete philosophy of life and plan of action. We should not expect any deep understanding of social, moral and economic oppression from a straight philosopher. Only religiously committed thinkers can take seriously in their lives and in their thinking the need for, and possibility of, a radical and liberating transformation of human life on earth.

In the Islamic context, philosophy has not only a conceptual-spiritual being, but also a social-material existence. Islam has never allowed the speculative and active lives to become totally divorced from each other : thought and reflection have always been wedded to action. On the one hand, according to a prophetic tradition, an hour of thoughtful reflection is better than sixty years of acts of worship. But knowledge without action has been described as a tree without fruit. Contemplative thought (*tafakkur*) and reflection in Islamic spirituality is essentially a knowledge that relates the knower to higher modes of being. Only in this manner we hope to remove the root-cause of a strong dissatisfaction with the present state of philosophy. Fortunately, a great deal of work has recently been done by Muslim thinkers in detecting the subtler mechanisms of widespread false consciousness perpetrated by materialistic philosophies. An enormous amount remains to be done along the same lines.

Procedural differences between the Arabs and the Israelis had been a major factor in the non-movement toward peace in the Middle East. The Arabs and the Israelis had been holding, throughout their conflictual history, opposite views as to the procedure for resolving their conflict. The Arab leaders had been consistently refusing to negotiate directly with Israel, since this could be interpreted as recognition of the state of Israel. In August, 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had agreed to the Khartoum formula of "no negotiations, no recognition, no peace." For the Israelis, on the other hand, direct negotiations were a precondition for any movement toward a peace settlement. They had been insisting on direct negotiations because such talks implied recognition of Israel's existence.

The outcome of the October, 1973 war had created a situation conducive to negotiations, which was absent in the pre-war period.[2] Therefore, Egypt and Israel, in the light of post-October 1973 war realities, could be expected to be looking forward to grasping new opportunities for peace.

American stock had risen high in the eyes of Egypt. On October 16, 1973, President Anwar-el-Sadat had openly acknowledged the constructive role the United States was playing in the Middle East despite Washington's major resupplies of arms to Israel.[3] Now, in fact, Egypt understood the value and usefulness of forging close connections with Washington and consolidating them. She realized that only the United States could extract territorial concessions from Israel and help restore her sovereign rights over the territory lost in the 1967 war with Israel.[4] Moreover, The American President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had earned Sadat's gratitude by stopping the Israelis from annihilating his Third Army Corps, and had placed themselves in the position of reliable and fair personages who could deliver the goods.

Israel, too, on the morrow of war, found herself tremendously dependent on the United States, both for arms and economic aid. Because

of Black Africa's severing of relations with Israel, and the ambivalent attitude of Western Europe and Japan toward the United States' pro-Israel stance in the Middle East, Israel was isolated and in dire need of United States diplomatic support. Therefore, with the two belligerents looking to the United States for support, an opportunity for a successful American peace initiative existed in the Middle East after the October, 1973 war.

American View of the Middle East Conflict

From the beginning of his presidency in 1969, Nixon had considered the Middle East conflict fraught with dangers which could explode any time and lead to a confrontation between the superpowers. On the eve of the presidential elections in 1972, he said, "The Middle East will have a very high priority because, while the Middle East has been over the past couple of years in a period of uneasy truce or armistice or whatever you want to call it, it can explode any time."[5]

President Nixon's prediction came true on October 6, 1973. The "uneasy truce" exploded into the fiercest war ever between the Arabs and the Israelis. The war ended with the two superpowers confronting each other. It placed the strategic, political and economic interests of the United States in jeopardy. Therefore, the United States decided to play an active role in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a first step toward peace in the Middle East, the United States sought to achieve a ceasefire through the U.N. She played an important role in the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 338, 339 and 340[6] and in their implementation. President Nixon expounded the United States' policy towards the Middle East at a Medal of Science ceremony on October 10: "The United States is trying its best to play a mediating role and bring the fighting to an end, and then, beyond that, to help to build not just a temporary, but a lasting peace for the people in that very troubled section of the world."[7]

Henry Kissinger, with Nixon's full backing, set out to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kissinger set two goals before him : (1) to stabilize the ceasefire on the Egyptian-Israeli front and (2) to attain a series of agreements for disengagement of forces to keep the conflict defused. Later, President Gerald Ford, who succeeded Nixon after the latter's resignation in the Fall of 1974, bestowed upon Kissinger even more diplomatic freedom to tackle the thorny problem of the Middle East.

The ceasefire on the canal front was tenuous and presented the strong possibility of a breakdown for the following reasons :

(1) the ceasefire call of Security Council Resolution 338 could not be implemented due to the continued advance of the Israeli forces in a bid to improve their position in the field. The Security Council, then, adopted Resolutions 339 and 340 to enforce a ceasefire. But the ceasefire left the Egyptian-Israeli forces dangerously intermingled and in chaotic conditions ;

(2) the Israelis had crossed the Suez Canal during the war. But before they could fully exploit the fruits of their daring dash across the canal, Security Council Resolution 338, embodying the text of the draft agreed upon between Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Leonard Brezhnev and Kissinger in Moscow, was adopted on October 22. The Israelis, therefore, decided to ignore the ceasefire call with the objective of beseiging the Egyptian Third Army Corps and the City of Suez. Indeed, they nearly surrounded the Third Army Corps and the City of Suez, creating a situation pregnant with danger. Any attempt by the Third Army to break the Israeli ring could cause the hostilities to erupt again ;

(3) the Egyptian masses and the Arab world had been fed on news of Egyptian military victories.[8] Efforts had been made to minimize both the numerical and the strategic significance of the Israeli presence on the west side of the canal. It had been claimed that the Israelis on the west side were few in number, occupied only a small area, and were surrounded by Egyptian troops, subject to annihilation at any moment. But the facts

were contrary to this claim. The Israeli troops were large in number—some three divisions—and were only 60 miles away from Cairo. This was very embarrassing for Sadat ;

(4) the Third Army was entrapped. Its helplessness was a great blow to the prestige and honour of the rest of the Egyptian armed forces. The top echelon of the Egyptian land forces was feeling restless and wanted to rectify the mistake of not covering the whole length of the canal, which afforded the Israeli armed forces the opportunity to establish a bridgehead across the canal and encircle the Third Army. They wanted military action to release the Third Army before the beginning of peace negotiations and thus try to regain their lost prestige. Reacting to this pressure, President Sadat, on December 12, reshuffled the entire upper ranks of the Egyptian land forces and removed Chief-of-Staff Sa'ad al-din al-Shazli and the commanders of the First and Second armies ;

(5) the Egyptian forces, in a bid to encircle the Israeli salient on the west of the waterway, could try to take control of the narrow supply route to the Israeli forces on the west of the Suez Canal. This could result in further fighting ;

(6) the Egyptian forces could be tempted to attack and destroy the over-extended Israeli salient west of the canal. Egypt, in fact, had strengthened its armour around the Israeli salient ;

(7) food and medical supplies to the Third Army and the City of Suez were major concern of Egypt. This matter could not be postponed for long. In the absence of some arrangement with Israel, any supply attempt by the Egyptians was sure to rekindle the war because it could be accomplished only by breaking the siege ;

(8) the Israelis were resentful of the ceasefire. They had ignored the ceasefire call of October 22 to complete the encirclement of the Third Army. But, under pressure and persuasion by the United States, they had

to implement the ceasefire demanded by Security Council Resolutions 338 and 339 and thus could not destroy the Third Army. They were bitter because they felt that victory was snatched away from them. They could be tempted to complete the unfinished job ; and

(9) in order to obtain a release of their prisoners of war and end the naval blockade at Bab al-Mandab, the Israelis could resort to pressuring the Third Army, leading to a re-eruption of hostilities.

Thus, the precarious ceasefire was in danger of being broken, and the Middle East was in danger of being once again engulfed by the flames of war. The first priority before Kissinger, therefore, was to stabilize the ceasefire and then to motivate the parties to disengage their forces to attain the goal of peace in the Middle East.

United States as Mediator

American mediation between Egypt and Israel began with the visits to Washington of the Egyptian Acting Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy,[9] on October 29, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, on October 31. Fahmy presented an "eleven-point proposal" to Nixon and Kissinger which, for immediate purposes, emphasized unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the October 22 lines, to be followed by a release of Israeli POWs. Mrs. Meir expressed her deep concern to Nixon and Kissinger about the POWs. She made continued non-military resupply[10] to the Third Army contingent on the return of the POWs and the lifting of the naval blockade. As for a return to the October 22 lines, Israel would negotiate with Egypt, after the release of the POWs.

Six-Point Agreement

On November 5, Kissinger set off to the Middle East on his peace mission. He met President Sadat on November 7, and they soon developed a mutual rapport[11] that was to remain a hallmark of their relationship throughout Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy.

Kissinger conveyed to Sadat Israel's readiness to respect the ceasefire, to allow all non-military supplies through to the Third Army—under U.N. and Israeli inspection—and to permit water, food and medicine to be sent to the City of Suez. He told Sadat that the POWs would be exchanged and the naval blockade at Bab-al-Mandab would be lifted. As for a return to the October 22 lines, that issue could be discussed in the framework of the disengagement of forces.

While Sadat seemed to accept most of these points, he was not prepared to publicly commit himself to the lifting of the blockade, and insisted that Israel pull back to the October 22 lines. Kissinger felt embarrassed over the question of the Israeli return to the October 22 lines. Although he appreciated Sadat's view that the Third Army could not be kept hostage to Israel, he was aware of Israeli intransigence and his own inability to persuade or pressurize Israel to return to the October 22 positions. But he offered his opinion that "it might be just as easy, although it might take more time, to work out a substantial disengagement of forces that would bypass the issue of the October 22 lines. Meanwhile, arrangements could be made to resupply the Third Army Corps."[12] Sadat was agreeable to Kissinger's suggestion, and Kissinger assured Israel that the blockade would be lifted. On November 9, an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, on the exchange of POWs, resupply to the Third Army and the City of Suez, and strict observance of the ceasefire was announced. On November 11, General Mohammad Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, the Egyptian military representative, and General Aharon Yariv, the Israeli military representative, signed a six-point agreement[13] at Kilometer 101.

The Six-Point Egyptian-Israeli agreement was a major step toward the stabilization of the ceasefire in the Middle East and a tribute to Kissinger's mediatory skill. He successfully persuaded Sadat to look for something bigger at a future date rather than to insist on the limited benefit of the Israeli return to the October 22 lines. Convinced of the uselessness of the

naval blockade at Bab al-Mandab in the wake of the peaceful understanding between Egypt and Israel, Kissinger, by his assurance, was able to allay Israeli fears. His initial contact with Sadat also led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States—broken off in June, 1967.

Sinai Disengagement Agreement—January, 1974

After the successful convening of the brief Geneva Conference on December 21 and the Israeli elections of December 31, 1973, Kissinger set his mind on obtaining a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. General Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister of Israel, visited Washington and, in meetings with Kissinger on January 4 and 5, 1974, presented a five-zone concept[14] for disengagement on the canal front. Egypt had already conveyed her position to Kissinger during his pre-Geneva talks in Cairo. The two major differences in the Egyptian-Israeli positions were : (1) Egypt wanted Israel to withdraw east of the Giddi and Milta passes in the Sinai, but Israel did not want to yield passes in the disengagement phase ; and (2) Israel wanted only token Egyptian force on the east bank, but Sadat did not want to reduce the force level to less than two infantry divisions with 100 tanks each.[15] In fact, he found it difficult to publicly accept substantial force limitation on Egyptian territory. Kissinger was of the opinion that the gap between the two positions could be narrowed down. At Dayan's urging and with Sadat's approval, Kissinger left for the Middle East on January 10, 1974.

Kissinger arrived in the Middle East with the idea of helping the parties to develop a framework for an agreement, and then letting them work out the details at Geneva. But both the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships seemed eager to achieve an agreement as soon as possible. "Dayan was convinced that Geneva was not an effective forum, that only Kissinger could move things along."[16] Sadat had the same view. Therefore, he suggested that Kissinger "try to work out the agreement there and then,"[17] and thus accepted the role of the United States as sole mediator in his

conflict with Israel—to the exclusion of the Soviet Union[18]—and Kissinger became the solo performer on the Middle Eastern diplomatic stage.

On January 14, Kissinger brought an Israeli proposal of disengagement of forces to Sadat in Cairo. Sadat had accepted, in his previous talks with Kissinger, the concept of force limitation within three zones and was now agreeable to the Israelis remaining west of the passes, but he was reluctant to accept a thinning out of Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal. Also, he was troubled about the extent of force and weapon limits.[19] He could not explicitly commit himself to the reopening of the Suez Canal and the rebuilding of the cities along its banks. To him, a public concession to these Israeli demands amounted to a diminution of Egyptian sovereignty. But he was ready to give private assurances on these matters.

Kissinger suggested a "triangular approach" to meet the Israeli demand of *quid pro quos* in exchange for withdrawals, and he was able to overcome Sadat's reservations about it. An "American proposal," containing the commonalities in the Egyptian and Israeli positions, would be formulated. Perhaps "it would be easier for Sadat to accept an American plan than an Israeli one.[20]" The private assurances that Sadat was prepared to give could be embodied in a "memorandum of understanding" between Egypt and the United States. These private assurances, in turn, would be tendered to the Israelis by Kissinger. Sadat agreed and the Israelis welcomed it. Indeed, Kissinger's suggestion of a triangular approach proved to be a catalyst in moving the negotiations forward toward an agreement.

The indefatigable American Secretary of State flew back and forth between the capitals of both states. In each of the capitals he engaged in feverish activity, conferring with the host country's officials at various levels. He persuaded them on some points and satisfied them on others. Since both Egypt and Israel needed an agreement badly—Sadat to save the Third Army and maintain the image of victory, Israel to demobilize in

understood the minimum terms required for a successful negotiation, Kissinger again departed for the Middle East on March 8, 1975.[26]

During Kissinger's March shuttle, President Sadat promised almost all the military elements of non-belligerency, such as scrupulous observance of the ceasefire, non-use of force to solve the conflict with Israel, prevention of all military and paramilitary forces from operating against Israel from Egyptian territory, reduction of hostile propaganda, and a selective easing of economic boycott. But he flatly refused to agree to a formal declaration of non-belligerency.[27] Sadat also wanted to know the extent of the Israeli withdrawal in the passes. His package was in exchange for oil fields and the passes. But the Israelis would not withdraw from the passes for anything less than a declaration of non-belligerency from Egypt. At best, Israel would withdraw its forces half-way through the passes, but would maintain an electronic early warning station at Umm Khisheiba, at the western end of the Giddi pass. But Sadat was opposed to Israel keeping the station. Israel would transfer the oil fields as an enclave to the Egyptians, maintaining control of the area surrounding them. Thus, the negotiations deadlocked on the issues of non-belligerency and its functional equivalents, on the extent of Israeli withdrawal in the passes and the oil fields, and on the status of the Umm Khisheiba facility. On March 21, 1975, in a bid to save Kissinger's mission, President Ford sent a letter to Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, "in which he warned the Israeli Prime Minister that if Kissinger's mission failed because of Israel's inflexibility, there would be a drastic 'reassessment' of American policy and American-Israeli relations would suffer as a result."[28] But President Ford's letter could not salvage the situation.[29] The Israeli cabinet rejected virtually all of Sadat's demands and the shuttle failed.

Kissinger was disappointed. He wished that Mrs. Golda Meir were still the Prime Minister of Israel. He termed the Israeli leadership as "short-sighted, incompetent and weak," paralyzed by cabinet infighting,

"Israel has a domestic political system which produces dead lock and stale-mate," said Kissinger, and has "no foreign policy." He blamed the Israeli leaders for the failure of his mission and charged them with misleading him into undertaking the shuttle—when they knew non-belligerency could not be achieved, they continued to insist on it.[30] President Ford, too, was irritated and charged Rabin with inflexibility.[13]

The failure of Kissinger's mediatory mission in March, 1975, generated bitter controversy between the United States and Israel over the question of who contributed to its lack of success. A few of the reasons can be identified as follows :

(1) both Egypt and Israel were interested in a second agreement, but neither party was under any "specific pressure"—as in the case of the first agreement—to urgently desire it or to fear risking a breakdown of that round of diplomacy ;

(2) Israel put too much importance on the question of non-belligerency and security. After the October, 1973 war, the Israeli fears of insecurity had been accentuated. They wanted a declaration of non-belligerency and perhaps some control of the strategically located Milta and Giddi passes to guard against a re-eruption of war or a repetition of 1973 ;

(3) for Sadat, a demand for non-belligerency was, perhaps, asking too much in exchange for too little. After this agreement, the Israelis would not have vacated even half the Sinai peninsula ;

(4) Rabin's weak leadership and the distribution of power within the Israeli cabinet made Israeli acceptance of any terms of an agreement difficult. "Personal rivalries and political intrigues" within the cabinet, and Rabin's worries about "his poor showings in the public opinion polls, as compared with his rival, Defence Minister Shimon Peres," who had managed "to create an image for himself as the tough realist in the cabinet,"[32] had left the Israeli government paralyzed ;

(5) Rabin's personality, his inconsistency, and his indecisiveness were contributive factors in the negative thinking and approach from the Israeli side. Before the negotiations, he had discarded non-belligerency, but when challenged by Likud in the Knesset, he re-embraced it. Indeed, the Israeli leadership was "speaking of different options with different voices at different times."[33] Rabin talked of buying time, of delaying the attainment of a settlement with the Arabs until the West found an alternative to oil and would not pressure Israel to concede too much ; and

(6) perhaps Kissinger miscalculated. Thinking that once the shuttle began—though he was aware of the big gap in their positions—the two sides would become flexible and compromise to reach an accord.

Kissinger gave vent to his sour feelings and exasperation towards the Israelis by initiating a reassessment of the United States policy[34] in the Middle East. Israel, too, unleashed her "truth squads" and "shock troops" to counter the Secretary. On May 21, 1975, seventy-six Senators sent a letter to President Ford urging him to be responsive to '.Israel's military and economic needs".[35] This was a reprimand to the Secretary and a triumph for the Israeli leadership.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger viewed the situation in the Middle East as requiring continued diplomatic progress that could best be accomplished through United States mediation. In a meeting with President Sadat in Salzburg, Austria on June 1 and 2, President Ford found that Sadat was favourably disposed to another limited agreement in the Sinai. Sadat indicated his readiness to accept an American presence as a watchdog for troop movements.

Sinai Interim Agreement September, 1975

Rabin visited Washington and met Ford and Kissinger on June 11 and 12. President Ford asked him to be forthcoming and to withdraw to the eastern end of the passes. Rabin was anxious to end the painful and costly confrontation with the United States. Moreover, he had

gained some edge over his rivals within Israel by standing up to Kissinger's demands, and could now possibly negotiate with more confidence. Rabin promised a new line in the passes. But since he was not authorized by the cabinet to make any such concession, he balked on his return to Israel and reverted to his previous offer of a halfway pullback in the passes.[36] Ford and Kissinger were irked by Rabin's clumsiness and inflexibility.

Nevertheless, in the later half of June, the Israeli cabinet, failing to get the desired political concessions from Sadat, decided to bargain with the United States on issues involving Israel's security. The Israelis were now determined to extract the heaviest possible price from the United States in return for a pullback. Americans would be asked to strengthen Israeli security in the absence of peace with Egypt.[37]

Peres, the Defense Minister of Israel, came up with a plan providing for an Israeli withdrawal to the eastern slopes of the passes, their retaining control of the early warning device at Umm Khisheiba, and the building of a comparable facility by the Americans for Egypt in the same zone. To guard against a surprise attack by either side, six early warning devices would be built and manned by United States civilian technicians.

With some modification, the Peres plan became the basis of the Sinai interim agreement. Americans would be actively involved in security matters in the Sinai. Since the Americans would be going there at the explicit request of the two parties, and only civilian technicians would be involved, the congress and people of the United States were expected not to object to it. Discussions continued, and by the time Kissinger left for the Middle East on August 20, 1975, the agreement was almost ready. Only the technical aspects of American manned early warning devices, the exact location of the Israeli line on the eastern slopes of the passes, and the levels of American aid to Egypt and Israel remained to be negotiated—for which Kissinger's presence in the area was necessary. Egypt and Israel initialed the text of the agreement on September 1, 1975, and formally signed it in Geneva on September 4, 1975.

The United States agreed to an impressive list of commitments. She signed three secret agreements with Israel and one with Egypt. The United States signed with Israel a memorandum of understanding providing for military assistance, oil supply, economic aid, and consultation in the event of any threat to Israel from a "world power". Israel got a promise from Washington that America would neither recognize nor negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization until the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted U.N. Resolution 242 and 338. To Egypt, Washington promised to try to bring about another round of negotiations and assistance for the Egyptian early warning system. The United States would operate three civilian-manned surveillance stations and would establish three unmanned sensor fields as well.[38]

Conclusion

The United States, in the aftermath of the October, 1973 war, took upon herself the role of a peacemaker in the Middle East, and this resulted in an unprecedented American involvement in the region. Henry Kissinger was the skillful performer of the United States mediatory role on the diplomatic stage of the Middle East. He shuttled back and forth between the Egyptian and Israeli capitals. In each capital, he engaged in bargaining on the basis of the other side's position, introduced new ideas, gave suggestions, advanced proposals, and thus tried to move the parties to a compromise. He worked on each party to influence it to soften its position and to agree to making concessions. In this, he went through moments of exaltation, when success seemed to be at hand, as well as bouts of agony because of indecisiveness and hesitation on the part of the Middle East leaders.

Kissinger used his diplomatic skill and the power of his country to convince either party to accept a proposal. To overcome the hesitation of a party and to assuage its apprehensions of capitulation to the adversary, he resorted to the technique of presenting American proposals when the parties were deadlocked, and thereby made it easier for either party to

accept a point. He and his entourage, to overcome the deadlocks, were constantly preparing and presenting to the parties American position papers along with the positions of the parties, themselves. He did not hesitate to bring the power and the prestige of the American Presidency to bear upon the negotiations.

Kissinger had been viewing the Middle East problem from the perspective of balancing the Egyptian sovereignty with Israeli security. With each of the Israeli troop withdrawals, therefore, the quantum of Israeli security assurance was increased. Sinai Interim Agreement was, in fact, purchased at a very high price in Israeli security. One is inclined to wonder whether the security compensation in arms and other American commitments did not greatly surpass the value of the Israeli withdrawal, and what the United States will be paying for the Israeli pullback to the 1967 borders. But it is evident that only the United States, with its capability to commit tremendous resources in diplomatic expertise and economic and military assistance, could have defused the conflict.

To a great extent, Kissinger was able to maintain American control of the events in the Middle East. He "kept things moving at his desired pace by using all his charms and diplomatic skills. He was alternately flattering, angry, understanding, stubborn, forgiving—all according to the needs of the moment and the person he was negotiating with."[39] He was respectful to Mrs. Meir and dealt matter-of-factly with Rabin, Peres, Dayan, Eban and Allon. In Sadat, he "found a worthy match."[40]

Kissinger understood very clearly that events must not be allowed to develop their own logic. To this end he resorted to devices like (1) suggesting to the parties the possible convergence points for their expectations, (2) explaining and dramatizing to the parties the risks and the dangers inherent in a diplomatic stalemate,[41] and (3) resorting to a use of the leverage of economic and military assistance. This, in turn, helped him achieve two American foreign policy goals : (1) preventing the conflict from expanding where it could lead to a re-eruption of war and thereby

endanger strategic, economic and political interests of the United States ; and (2) expanding and deepening the American presence and influence to the exclusion of the Soviets.42

FOOT NOTES

1. Israel's sense of diplomatic isolation was deependend by European reactions ranging from indifference to hostility, and by the termination of diplomatic relations with her by many African states. See for details *Foreign Broadcast Information Service.* November 6 and 8, 1973 (Hereafter FBIS).

2. See Nadav Safran, "Engagement in the Middle East, "*Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 53, No. 1, October 1974, pp. 55-63.

3. Quandt, William B. "Kissinger and the Arab-Israel Disengagement Negotiations, "*Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 1975, p. 37.

4. Kissinger told Heikal, "The Soviet Union can give you arms, but the United States can give you a fair solution by which your lands will be returned to you, particularly since (The Arabs) have actually been able to change the situation in the Middle East." See for Kissinger-Heikal Conversation, *FBIS* November 16, 1973.

5. *New York Times,* November 10, 1972.

6. See for texts of the Security Council Resolutions 338, 339 and 340 Edward R. F. Sheehan *The Arabs,Israelis and Kissinger : A Sector History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East.* (New York : Reader's Digest Press, 1976), pp. 228-229.

7. Quoted by William B. Quantdt, *Decade of Decisions : American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley, California : University of California Press, 1977), p. 180.

8. President Anwar el-Sadat maintains that Egypt had won the war and that, but for the United States intervention and the Pentagon's decision to fight on the side of the Israelis, the situation in the Middle East would have been totally different. See Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity : An Autobiography* (New York : Harper and Row Publishers, 1978), pp. 255-256, 259-261, and 267-269.

9. President Sadat appointed Ismail Fahmy as Foreign Minister on October 31, 1973.

10. On October 28, in a meeting between the Egyptian and Israeli Officers, it was agreed that 100 trucks would carry food, water and medical supplies to the 20,000 men of the Third Army. By October 30, 50 trucks with supplies reached the Third Army. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* November 19-25, 1973, pp. 26201--202.

11. See Edward R. F. Sheehan, *op. cit.,* pp. 48-5.

12. Quandt, William. B. *op. cit.,* p. 217.

13. See for text, *Arab Report and Record* February 1-14, 1974, p. 60. (Hereafter ARR)

14. See Moshe Dayan *Moshe Dayan : Story of My Life* (New York : William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 562-563).

15. *Ibid.,* p. 558.

16. Golan, Matti. *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger : Step-by Step Diplomacy in the Middle East* (New York : Bantam Books, Inc. 1976), p. 156.

17. Safran, Nadav. *Israel : The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 523.

18. See for reasons for Sadat's turning to Washington and his alienation from Moscow, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile : The Soviet Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 289-291.

19. Kalb, Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston : Little Brown and Co Company, 1974), pp. 534-535.

20. Quandt, William B. *op.. cit.,* p. 226.

21. See for text, *Jerusalem Post* January 20, 1974.

22. Sheehan, Edward R.F. *op. cit.,* p. 112.

23. See for text of the agreement John Northon Moore, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. III : Documents* (Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 1194-96 ; *ARR* May 16-31, 1974, p. 214.

24. Safran, Nadav. *op. cit.,* p. 542.

25. Quoted by William B. Quandt, *op. cit.,* p. 263.

26. *Ibid.,* p. 264.

27. *Jerusalem Post,* May 13, 1975.

28. Safran, Nadav, *op. cit.,* p. 545.

29. See for detail Matti Golan, *op. cit.,* pp. 236-238.

30. Sheehan, Edward R.F. *op. cit.*, pp. 159-163.

31. *New York Times*, March 28, 1975.

32. Golan, Matti, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

33. Safran, Nadav, *op. cit.*, p. 547.

34. Sheehan, Edward R.F. *op. cit.*, pp. 165-167.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 174-176.

36. *New York Times*, June 25, 1975.

36. Golan Matti, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

38. See for text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel ; together with the Annex and the American Proposal for the Early Warning System ; the secret Memoranda of Agreement and Addendum on arms assistance to Israel, the United States-Israel Pact on Geneva, and the Memorandum of Assistance to Egypt. Edward R.F. Sheehan *op. cit.*, Appendix Eight, pp. 245-257.

39. Golan, Matti, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Sheehan, Edaward R.F. *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.

42. Kissinger, While briefing the newsmen on June 26, 1970, had said that the American policy was to "expel the Soviet military presence" from the Middle East. See Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

POPULATION PLANNING AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY IN PAKISTAN

By

MISKEEN ALI HIJAZI

Journalism Department, Punjab University, Lahore

BACKGROUND

Nineteen Seventy-Four was declared "World Population Year" by the United Nations in order to focus attention on excessive population growth—one of the most urgent and baffling international problems. Food shortages in many parts and famine and near-famine conditions in some parts of the world have further highlighted the enormity of the problem. This problem has been termed as the most delicate, complex and hypersensitive issue of this era. Experts have expressed the fear that if this problem is not tackled immediately and reasonably, it will explode. "The greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of the majority of the peoples in the under-developed world is rampant population growth".[1] It is estimated that the world population in the first century A.D. was 250 millions. Today it is 3000 millions. It will be doubled in 35 years. The world's population will then be increasing at the rate of an additional 1000 millions every 8 years.

The average population growth of the world at large is 2%. Many under-developed countries have a birth rate of 3% or more. A population growing at 1% doubles itself in 70 years, at 2% in 35 years and at 3% in only 20 years.[2] Each year 127 million children are born, 95 million come of school age and 19 million reach the age of 65. These totals are likely to rise steeply in the years ahead as more young adults swell the ranks of potential parents and improved medical care improves life expectancy.

Situation in Developing Countries

The population problem in the developing countries of the ECAFE regions is all the more pressing. According to the United Nations Population Division's estimates, between 1960 and 2000, the populations of the less developed countries will increase at the rate of 150 per cent and those of more developed countries will increase by only just over 50 per cent. In the same period the population of the ECAFE region will increase by 120 per cent and of South Asia by 260 per cent. The less developed countries will excel the more developed ones in population size by about 525 million at the beginning of the century and by about 770 million at mid-century. Twenty years later in 1970, there were about 1500 million more inhabitants of the less developed than of the developed regions of the world. It is estimated that in 1970 the total population of the world was 3632 million and that of Asia 2056 million, i.e. 56 per cent of the total population of the world. It is obvious that the focal point of the world population problem is Asia.

These pressing population problems resulted in "Declaration of Population Strategy for Development" by 23 countries that participated in the Second Asian Population Conference held in Tokyo in 1972 and World Population Conference held in Bukharest in 1974.

Because of rapid population growth in the Asian countries malnutrition, ill health, poor sanitation, poor housing, unemployment and illiteracy are frustrating the efforts for development and modernization. All these problems are the causes as well as the consequences of the mother problem—population growth in the Asian countries. Population growth of this magnitude is diluting all the effects of development and is jeopardising hopes of any substantial improvement in living standards in the coming years. Hence the necessity of formulating population policies and programmes and their implementation. The excessive growth of the population has necessitated combined hectic national and international efforts. The Development Strategy emphasizes the urgency of solving the population

problem stating that 'each developing country should formulate its own demographic objectives within the frame-work of its national development plan.' Most of the countries of the world have launched population planning programmes. International agencies such as UNESCO, W.H.O., ECAFE, UNFPA, International Planned Parenthood (IPPF) Federation, Population Services International and many others are lending valuable help to the developing countries in the form of funds, equipment, expert advice, education and training. The Governmental and voluntary population planning organizations are spending millions of rupees on the population programmes.

Communication Strategy

To adopt family planning means a change in the attitude. Change occurs only when the need for change is realized and accepted. Media of mass communication play effective role in making the need for change felt and accepted by the masses. The mass media, if used in a systematic and cohesive manner become an instrument of change. Because of its accepted role, development communication has become a science, a technology, these days. Family planning is a part of development because it aims at improving living standards, maternal and child health, at reducing unemployment and at easing pressure on housing and land.

The experts are of the opinion that the diffusion process has five stages, which are awareness, interest, evaluation, trial and acceptance. The experts attending the UNESCO sponsored meeting on Training of Family Planning Communications observed that "mass media are at their best in creating awareness, in providing stimulation and motivation and in giving ready access to information."[3] "In order to make the population planning programme successful, it is necessary, in the first stage, to educate people and impress upon them the need for family planning. Therefore, dissemination of information and knowledge of population matters has become most vital. In order to adopt innovative approaches to collection,

processing and dissemination of information and knowledge suited to each country, extensive research and training are the basic requirements."

For securing maximum acceptance of the population planning programme, assessment of the effectiveness of the programmes and evaluation thereof need not be over-emphasised. The second Asian Population Conference, too, recommended more studies into the population planning message and its content so that action may be taken and decisions made on the basis of adequate and complete information.

The experts recommend integrated use of Broadcasting and other communications media in *Family Planning and Development and integrated use of Folk Media and Mass Media in* Family Planning Communication Programme. In view of the wider reach and of effectiveness of the media of mass communication, stress on programmes and advertisements through Newspapers, Radio and Television is increasing with the passage of time. The budgets for advertisements and programmes through the newspapers, radio and television, are increasing year by year. It is high time that comparative effectiveness of each medium should be assessed and the use of the most effective medium should be increased. The question as to what is the difference in the effect of the message if it is transmitted through the newspaper, radio and television, needs thinking and a correct answer.

SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE IN PAKISTAN

The total area of Pakistan is approximately 310,000 square miles having a population of about 80 millions. The demographic picture in Pakistan is clouded by the incomplete recording of Births and Deaths.

The areas and population of the different provinces of Pakistan are as under :—

Province	Area	Population
1. Baluchistan	40.61% of the total area	2.9% of the total population
2. Punjab	25.63%	59.7%
3. N.W.F.P.	12.66%	17.7%
4. Sind	21.11%	19.7%

Trend of Population growth in Pakistan :

Year	Population in Millions
1901	16.06
1911	19.4
1921	21.1
1931	23.6
1941	28.3
1951	33.7
1961	42.9
1972	64.9*[4]

The society is agrarian. The socio-economic environment encourages population growth. 87% population is directly or indirectly depending upon agriculture.

There are a large number of children in the population composition of Pakistan. There is a big difference in the literacy rate of the two sexs— 20.1% and 6.1% for males and females respectively. The situation in the rural areas is still *worse in comparison with that in the urban* areas.

There are about 37000 villages. The cities with over 100,000 inhabitants are 12. The population is heavily weighted towards the younger age groups.

The population of Pakistan is not a homogeneous mass of people. There are wide differences in terms of education, income, occupation, place of residence, language and social background. Hence, there are differences in the needs, problems and frame of reference of different groups. The generalized messages directed at all the groups fail to have the desired impact on any group.

The changes are rapidly being effected in the political and social spheres in the country. The customary concept of leadership of a particular group in the rural community and of low income groups and the attitude of the people towards old traditions have changed. Due to the

political, social and economic turmoil since 1969, it is not possible to point the opinion leaders before the conditions settle down.

POSITION OF MASS MEDIA IN PAKISTAN

According to the minimum standard set by the UNESCO to measure availability of media in relation to the population of a country, for every 100 persons there should be 10 copies of daily newspapers, 5 radio sets and two T.V. sets.

In Pakistan the ration of availability of mass media for every 100 persons on 31-12-1973 was as under :—

Newspapers	1.5
Television	0.2
Radio	4.5

The details of the total copies of day newspapers, radio and T.V. sets on which the above ratios are based were as under :—

Number of Copies of daily Newspapers

Language	No. of dailies	Circulation in Thousands
Urdu	36	595
English	8	153
Gujrati	2	27
Sindhi	5	29
Pushto	2	5*5
Total :	53	809

In May 1974 the price of daily newspapers was raised from 30 paisa per copy to 50 paisa per copy, now it is rupee 1 per copy. Rise in price without adequate rise in the purchasing power always results in less demand. It is certain and the circulation Managers of the daily newspapers have admitted that due to the price rise, the circulations have decreased slightly.

No. of TV Sets

Station Channel	No. of TV Sets			
	1969	1970	1971	1974
Karachi 4	45,123	53,791	65,000	78,000
Lahore 9/4	18,790	25,080	30,000	35,000
Rawalpindi 6/8	10,341	13,527	17,000	22,000*6

The total number of TV sets is 1,35,000.

Radio

Stationwise distribution of the radio sets in 1972 is as given below :

Karachi	4,50,000
Hyderabad	5,25,000
Lahore	6,75,000
Multan	4,68,000
Rawalpindi	2,25,000
Peshawar	1,50,000
Quetta	1,12,000
	26,05,000

According to the figures provided by the Broadcasting corporation of Pakistan, the number of radio sets in the country was over 2.7 million on 31-12-1973. It is assumed that ratio of availability of radio sets is based on the number of licences issued to the radio set owners. It is a known fact that the owners of transistor receivers do not get the lincences and these transistors can be seen frequently in the villages and with the people of working classes in the cities. Thus the number of radio/transistor sets is for above 2.7 millions. It can be safely said that the availability of this medium is certainly more than 4 sets for 100 persons. Thus it is the only medium which is upto the minimum standard set by UNESCO.

It is clear from the above given figures that at present in Pakistan radio has many advantages over newspapers and T.V. It has reached a large percentage of population in all income groups. The message can be synchronized with the programmes targetted at specific groups.

T.V.

This medium is developing fast, yet due to high prices it is so far an upper class medium with coverage mainly confined to urban areas. Therefore, its utility is very much limited in the context of population planning communication.

Newspapers

The impact of the newspapers as a medium is confined to the educated population who form a very small percentage of the total population. Over 90 per cent people in the rural population cannot be reached through this medium.

It is evident from the above figures and analysis that in order to use the media of mass communication for creating awareness about and acceptance of population planning programme, communication stratagy has to be evolved.

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert D. Mcnamara—Population and Development, Dialogue, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1974, p. 4.

2. Second Asian Population Conference, Tokyo, 1-13, November, 1972.

3. Population Census Bulletin No. 2. Ministry of Home Affairs. Karachi, 1961.

4. Census Commissioner's Office, Lahore.

5. Statistical Bulletin Vol. 21, No. 3, March 1973.

6. Television Corporation of Pakistan,

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