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# JOURNAL OF RESEARCH (HUMANITIES)

*Edited by*  
**SIRAJ-UD-DIN**



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### SOCIOLOGY OF MATERNITY AND CHILD HEALTH: SOME OBSERVATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PAKISTAN

by

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Sociology is the study of human behaviour. Starting from the smallest unit of an act to the complex dynamics of interaction, the forces impinging upon the processes and their outcomes, are the concerns of a student of sociology. In this way the sociologist seems to be interested in any type of human behaviour—be it normal or deviant—and the forces that help in generating a particular type of behaviour.

The status of maternity and child health at any point in time is indicative of the health related patterns of behaviour. Health behaviour is "... any activity undertaken by a person believing himself to be healthy, for the purpose of preventing disease or detecting in an asymptomatic state" (Becker, 1979: 255). Health behaviour itself is the product of socio-cultural milieu which is an all inclusive concept encompassing, among other variables, the norms governing the processes of bearing and rearing of children. The social norms often pressurize the individuals regarding "appropriate" age at marriage, the number of children a mother should try to bear, feeding practices for infants,



spacing of babies and the use of specific channels for the delivery of health services to children at various stages of child bearing and child rearing. The individual factors like attitudes, values, beliefs, personal experiences, and financial status may further intervene in the usually expected behaviour pattern of child bearing and rearing. It may not be possible here to analyse all these variables influencing the maternity and child health behaviour; nevertheless, it may be quite pertinent just to focus on sociological analysis of gender-relations and follow it through for its implications for the maternity and child health.

The main hypothesis of this paper is that the health and nutrition behaviour in majority of the families in Pakistan discriminates against females. The discrimination starts right from the childhood and is carried through later stages. The analysis of the population census data for various decades is indicative of the higher female than male mortality. One very prominent feature of Pakistani population is high sex ratio — the latest being 111 males for every 100 females. The explanation for high sex ratio is found in sex differential mortality. Higher female than male mortality ratio can be observed taking its course shortly after birth through the childbearing ages. Neonatal male mortality may be higher (biological risks among male children) than the females but in the post-neonatal period the situation is reversed. The assumption is that such a differential male/female mortality is associated with the discriminatory health and nutrition behaviour for one sex over the other.

In order to illustrate the preceding situation a framework may be developed. The maternity and child health seem to be dependant upon the quality of food and feeding practices on the one hand and on maternity and child care as well as hygiene practices on the other. The poor quality of food results in malnutrition, which is associated with high morbidity. Inadequate nutritional care of maternity and child has shown high susceptibility to infections in unhygienic environment.

Infections . . . are basically determined by two factors: host susceptibility and exposure to disease transmission. The capacity of the host to defend himself against infection is known to be at least in part determined by nutritional status. Exposure to disease transmission is believed to be affected by the quality of the physical (water, sanitation, housing), and personal (Maternity and child care, hygiene) environment (Chen, Haq and D'Souza, 1981:59).\*

The interaction between the malnutrition (host susceptibility) and infection prospects (exposure to disease transmission) leads to high morbidity rates. Nevertheless, the availability of health services and its utilization practices can influence the burden of morbidity. "Improved recovery would be dependent in part upon the nutritional status of the host and the utilization of available, appropriate, and effective curative health services" (Chen, Haq, and D'Souza, 1981:59)

In this framework the rates of malnutrition, infection, and recovery are the three dependent variables which are likely to be influenced by behaviour patterns related to food, maternity and child care, and health care utilization. It is postulated, that there is sex discrimination in food, maternity and child care, as well as in the utilization of health care facilities. Preferring males over females leads to females' vulnerability to illness and the ultimate higher mortality rate than the males. This framework may be presented in the shape of a figure as below :

\* Adapted from Chen, Haq, and D'Souza, "Sex Bias in Allocation of Food and Health Care in Bangladesh", *Population and Development Review* 1981, Vol. 7 No. 1, P. 58.



## Framework of Maternity and Child Health Behaviour

### Maternity and Child Health Behaviour

Food & Feeding  
Practices

Maternity &  
Child care &  
Hygiene  
Practices.

Malnutrition  
Rate

Infection  
Rate

Health Service  
Utilization  
Practices

Recovery Rate

Mortality

Recovery

In order to verify the hypothesis an effort will be made to present the data where-ever possible. Many of the arguments may be based on personal observations.

Khan and Khan (1980:16) say that the rate of growth of children, particularly of those up to 5 years of age, is widely accepted as a good indicator of their nutritional status. The results of various surveys have been presented in the appendix. The comparison of the male and female body weight by age of children indicate that the girls were lighter in weight than boys in almost each age bracket in the (national) Nutrition Survey (1965-66) as well as in the Nutrition Survey of Khudadad Colony, Karachi (1972) (see table 1 and 2 in appendix). One obvious explanation for such a difference could be in the quality of food and feeding practices adopted for boys and girls. In Pakistani society sex has traditionally been an important

characteristic in assigning status to an individual. There is plenty of evidence to prove that males get higher status than females as prescribed by the cultural norms. For example, sex differentiated rejoicing at child birth, sex differentiated schooling sex differentiated inheritance of property, sex differentiated family lineage are the common observations in both the rural and urban areas of Pakistan.

A sample study of 32 'Katchi Abadis' (mud-huts) of Lahore provides some indirect information on the distribution of food in the family. Table 3 in appendix shows the attitudes of wives as well as some of their husbands towards which member of the family needed the most healthful food. The opinions may be taken as a proxy for actual behaviour concerning food allocation in the family. In the first place, a substantial proportion of both wives and husbands said that every one in the family needs healthful foods. This may be considered socially as the most desirable answer. Among those who provided a ranking, however, almost two-thirds of the wives said that the husband needs the most healthful food. A negligible proportion in each group said that the wife needs the most healthful food. The wives said that since the husband was providing for the family, therefore, he needed the best nourishment. The striking predominance of such an attitude implies that the husband as well as the male children, who are the future wage earners of the family, are likely to be given more healthful food than the females. If the mother's behaviour can be taken as a model for the daughters then they are being socialized automatically to imitate such behaviour in their turn.

The learning situations provided in the family by the parents are very likely to lead to the development of sex differential behaviour patterns among the children, which they will carry through their adult lives. The fact that very few respondents expressed the opinion that the wife needs nutritional food is reflective of the current status of mothers' malnourishment. Khan and Khan (1980 : 25) present the following facts :



Nutritional state of Pakistani mothers is far from being satisfactory. Nutrition Survey of Pakistan (1965-66) revealed that Pakistani mothers are under-weight in general. 38.8% of mothers in rural areas and 66.7% in urban areas had low plasma protein levels. 92% and 100% of them had low haemoglobin levels in rural and urban areas respectively.

Similar findings came from a survey of rural areas of Mianwali District. The data about the haemoglobin levels showed that less than one half of the (589) mothers were deficient, 44.8 percent were marginal cases and only 6.1 percent were having adequate levels (Anwar, 1982:34-35). These figures show that majority of the pregnant and lactating mothers in Mianwali District were highly vulnerable to anaemia and the resultant disabilities. It was further found that a relatively greater proportion of the pregnant mothers than the lactating mothers were having deficiencies. The same survey showed that the proportions of nutritious food users as well as those of tonic users during the last pregnancy was negligible. Such evidence is indicative of the fact that a certain type of behaviour is learned within the family and carried by the children during their adulthood. Such a behaviour is a product of the local social norms which discriminate between males and females in the provision of food ultimately making females malnourished both in their childhood as well as during their motherhood.

Regarding the maternity care one important aspect of discrimination may be the mere lack of facilities for the antenatal and neonatal care. The continual utilization of the traditional birth attendants with their unhygienic mechanisms of delivery and after-care are the areas of concern where the females suffer. Since bearing of children is the responsibility of women, therefore, this area is totally neglected. Females are often indoctrinated with the notion that it is their duty to reproduce and probably reproduce to their maximum capacity. But in the absence of maternal health care facilities, meeting such an obligation is highly risky. The 'powerless' woman is caught up in the dilemma - to bear a child and risk her life or not to bear a child and still risk her life. But the risks are different in nature: one is based on the

level, availability and utilization of technical know-how regarding the maternity care; the second is couched in the culture of the society where the wife is never considered perfect unless she bears a child, especially a son. She does not have an alternative but to risk her life and go for having a baby. Due to the non-availability of proper maternity care facilities, especially in the rural areas, there is quite a high mortality rate of females during their reproductive period. Probably the community and the male decision makers have given little attention to meet the maternity care need of women.

Regarding the health care of the children, here again females may be discriminated. In a Child Need Survey conducted in the low income families of urban areas of Pakistan, it was found that 53 percent of the male and 49 percent of the female children had never been taken to any health personnel during infancy. These children were taken to health personnel only when the child was sick (Inayatullah, et al. 1982:31). Here either more male than female children got sick or more attention was paid to males than to females. Furthermore, boys may be preferred for immunizing them against infectious diseases. However, at the time of sickness, sex discrimination with regard to treatment may be minimal. Depending upon the availability of the health services there may not be significant discrimination. But the mere fact that the male has been preferred in feeding practices and hygiene practices he is in an advantageous position for recovery from any disease.

## CONCLUSION

"In the acquisition of their needs, and in the defence of their rights, children themselves are relatively powerless. They have neither physical strength, nor economic sanctions. They have no unions and no votes (Grant, 1982:18). During the early ages the children are 'powerless', primarily because of their physical limitations. Of the two sexes, the 'powerlessness' of the female seems to continue through their adult roles. She is socialized to take a passive role - a subservient to the male who makes most of the decisions for her. She learns the appropriate role to her status



automatically as she observes what is going on around her. Despite the fact that she is discriminated against, the common illiterate female rarely protests against such deprivations. She suffers passively the onslaughts of malnutrition, repeated pregnancies, unhygienic child deliveries and passes these sufferings on to her daughter. In this way the maternity and child health behaviour is dotted with high malnutrition among females, very limited maternity health centres, onslaught of infectious diseases and ultimately high mortality rate of both children as well as mothers in Pakistan.

## APPENDIX

TABLE - 1

Age by Height and Weight of Children as found in National Nutrition Survey 1965-66

Age (in months)	Male		Female	
	Ht(cm)	Wt (kg)	Ht (cm)	Wt (Kg)
0 - 5	60.3	4.2	58.6	5.4
6 - 11	64.4	7.5	61.2	5.4
12 - 17	67.3	7.6	68.2	7.2
18 - 23	72.4	9.4	70.4	7.6
24 - 29	73.7	9.4	72.0	9.2
30 - 35	80.3	9.9	83.3	9.3
36 - 41	82.7	11.4	82.0	11.2
42 - 47	89.3	12.2	83.7	11.0
48 months	88.4	11.8	88.1	11.7

Source: Khan and Khan (1980:17).

Table - 2

Age by Weight and Height of Children Khudadad Colony, Karachi, 1972.

Age (years)	No.	Male		No.	Female	
		Ht(Cm)	Wt(kg)		Ht(cm)	Wt(kg)
0 - 1	27	61.2	6.1	25	57.9	5.1
1 - 2	18	71.4	8.4	17	69.8	7.8
2 - 3	22	81.8	10.9	22	77.7	9.9
3 - 4	30	89.4	11.9	21	87.4	11.2
4 - 5	44	95.7	13.9	32	92.2	12.9

Source : Khan and Khan (1980:18).

Table - 3

Perceptions of various respondents about who needs the most healthful foods among husband, wife, infant and elders

Who Needs	Respondents	
	Wives	Husbands
Every one needs it	44.7	57.0
Husband needs it most	36.2	19.1
Wife needs it most	0.9	3.1
Infant needs it most	10.6	15.2
Elders need it most	7.6	5.6
N=	(1433)	(215)

Source: Shah and Anwar (1983:124).



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## MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE THIRD WORLD.

A Case Study of the Coup d'etats  
in Pakistan (1958) and Indonesia (1965)

by

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## INTRODUCTION

While dealing with the question of world order, the most basic cleavage is over the type of regimes. Military and civilian rule provides a division which is prominent in the world. The history of the Third World is characterized by this cleavage. The countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have experienced changes from civilian to military rule very often, with the reverse occurring less frequently. <sup>1</sup>

The decade since 1958 has witnessed a rash of military coups. In Asia there have been successful military take overs in Pakistan, Burma, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, and Indonesia.

Coup d'etats generally occur when legal modes of securing a change of government become less effective because either they are too rigid or not rigid enough.<sup>2</sup> Apart from traditional causes, there are many other factors contributing to military intervention. In fact each coup d'etat generally produces its own explanatory literature, as Professor Sederberg observed "ranging from the ritualistic incantations of the new regime to the background articles of the area specialists."<sup>3</sup>



The populace of recently independent countries like Pakistan and Indonesia took their newly won freedom as a beginning of the millennium. The myth of freedom demanded that social, economic, and political progress quickly follow independence. But this promise was not fulfilled. Pakistan and Indonesia suffered from corruption, division and maladministration. Any government of a sovereign state truly seeks to govern must try to organize, unify and consolidate its people and territory in a manner conducive to the achievement of its basic goals and objectives, be they higher living standards or greater power and prestige.<sup>4</sup> Internally, this means that controls must be established to enable the government to exercise effective leadership. This can be done by force, persuasion, barter suggestion or direction — but it must be done. Samuel P. Huntington points out while referring to the modern developed politics that “these functions are largely performed by the political party system.”<sup>5</sup>

The main characteristic of the Third World countries is the lack of deep-rooted, uninterrupted political traditions which in their ultimate analysis have left the imprints of immaturity, namely, the transfer of power from one ruler to another in a violent action. “Political organization cannot exist in social chaos,” writes Robert B. Campbell.<sup>6</sup> “The role of the military to maintain the balance is generally well understood. Generally the armed forces organizations are clearly recognized as the main organization in terms of which force is used for the maintenance of internal security.”<sup>7</sup>

Taking Huntington's model, which states, that, “The relationship between social mobilization and political instability seems reasonably direct . . . In the absence of strong and adoptable political institutions, . . . increases in participation means instability and violence.”<sup>8</sup> We can argue that Army, which is the most organized of all the groups, is tempted to take the control of the affairs, to maintain stability. This type of temptation is based on the feelings of relative deprivation.<sup>9</sup>

The comparative study of the coup d'états in Pakistan (1958) and Indonesia (1965) is not accidental but a deliberate attempt as these two cases reflect wide range of diversities. The causes of this extreme level of military intervention which is most dramatic in nature, in our two models have at least one thing in common; that the countries of the third world are most vulnerable to this particular kind of change.

### Political Nature

#### PAKISTAN:

In 1947 the Muslim majority provinces of the British India formed a new nation, Pakistan. The task of creating a stable national political community in Pakistan, soon after independence became complicated by geographic and cultural considerations.<sup>10</sup> East and West Pakistan were separated not only by 1,000 miles of hostile Indian territory but also, broadly, by the difference between South-east Asia and the Middle East. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was a rice and jute growing delta segment of South-east Asia, whose linguistically homogeneous people share cultural traits with their eastern neighbours, and included a minority of non-Muslims numbering about one-fifth of the total population, mostly Hindus. West Pakistan, on the other hand, is a vast land of arid hills and plains, cultivating mostly wheat and cotton. The population is almost totally Muslim and has much in common culturally with the Muslim people to the West but includes people who speak local languages and dialects.

The Muslim League, a party solely responsible for the creation of Pakistan, lost its hold on the masses and fell a victim to intrigues and instability. Had Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, two of the founders of Pakistan not died soon after independence, it is conceivable that out of the Muslim League would have emerged a strong party with new programme.<sup>11</sup> Other political parties, national and provincial, were narrowly based. This state of affairs had tragic bearing on the unity of Pakistan.

The British style of parliamentary government did not work smoothly in Pakistan. Time after time governments were formed and toppled as members of the Assemblies changed their loyalties too frequently.

The nine-year battle of petty politics over Constitution-making (1947-56) had taken its toll. When the document was finally presented to the nation, the political situation had deteriorated, as Lawrence Ziring observed that the “legal instruments were of little consequence.”<sup>12</sup>



There often seemed to be a total lack of loyalty to any ideal or set of principles or even to the country on the part of these party leaders. Pakistan was very much like Hobbes' state of nature where every political or provincial group fought against every other group.<sup>13</sup>

Corruption and inefficiency had infected the civil servants as well. Ministries instead of framing policies, were busy administering departments-transferring civil servants whom, they thought were unlikely to be useful in the impending elections and granting import licences to traders in lieu of bribes they offered or the contributions they made to the party. Civil servants, on the other hand, started formulating the policies of their departments. But they excelled the politicians in corruption.

In this background of political instability and rough deal of the politicians,<sup>14</sup> it became obvious that both politicians and civil servants failed to provide leadership to the country. A well-organized institution, the Army, stepped in. Martial law was clamped down by President Mirza on October 7, 1958, through a bloodless coup. People welcomed it.

#### INDONESIA:

Unlike Pakistan, Indonesia became independent under entirely different set of circumstances. The armed struggle against colonialism triumphed and Indonesia gained independence on 17 August, 1945.<sup>15</sup>

Sukarno became the first President of Indonesia with the respect and honor of "George Washington." He was a central force in Indonesian politics till his replacement by the Army. The complex history of Indonesian politics since 1945 was full of many forces which exerted their influence. Uri Ra'anant points out, "During the last two decades, there have been repeated instances when armed men or organized 'demonstrators' have surrounded Indonesian centers of government and communications in order to sway the political balance, but this has not

#### FIGURE 1: The Causes of Military Intervention

usually resulted in the immediate overthrow of one ruler and the accession of another."<sup>16</sup> Seldom has in Indonesian history one political force in the country won a conclusive victory.

In 1948 there was an armed rising of the Indonesia Communists (PKI) in East Java, which was quickly crushed by the Army. In 1950 there were revolts by self-proclaimed 'Federalists' in West Java, South Celebes and in Makassar and Ambon. In 1956-57 large-scale rebellions were mounted in Sumatra and in north Sulawesi, and were supported from abroad-including help from Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. In addition to dealing with these several serious revolts and expressions of regional discontent, the central government had to wage campaigns all the times against bandits and dissidents. The Army acted as a principal instrument for maintaining law and order and undertook the difficult task of maintaining unity of the country.

During the first five years of the 1960's, Communist influence swelled steadily. The first avowed Communist joined the Sukarno government in 1964, though his post was a comparatively less significant. We should note here that Sukarno was nearly toppled by the Communists in 1948. But, with the aid of the Army, he hung on and the Communists went into a decline. Stocky, intelligent D.N. Aidit did this miracle.

Aidit's rise was paralleled by the emergence of the Indonesian Army under General Nasution as a major political influence. And the two men who rose to prominence remained the representative of the two great counterweights in Djakarta. Aidit molded a shattered Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) into what was then the single most effective political force in Indonesia; Nasution was a key figure in shaping a ragtag assortment of guerrilla fighters into a tough, modern fighting force. Without Sukarno as a mediator, the armed forces and the PKI inevitably would have clashed long before; with him, the clash was delayed fairly long.

Sukarno was more of mediator than a ruler. His peculiar gift-some called it magic-was an ability to adulterate opposing views so convincingly that the disputants eventually wandered off, sure of winning their point, though realizing later that the sole victor was the smiling President himself.



President Sukarno's charisma, superb oratory, and profound understanding that his countrymen's yearning for modernization as Donald Hindley writes, "was coupled with an umbilical attachment to elements of traditional culture had gained him a wide following and, especially among the ethnic Javanese, deep loyalty."<sup>18</sup> But these qualities were not enough to ensure him the preponderant political position if he had not also possessed the skills to exploit the numerous cleavages that divided the political forces around him.

O.G. Roeder, reporting from Djakarta on August 12 1965 said, "Acting opposition to the President stemming from the political parties is unthinkable at present. It is Sukarno who sweeps the masses off their feet every time he addresses them — he, the great Leader of the Revolution, and not the politicians or the generals. Time and time again, I have seen party leaders completely lose their grip on their followers when Sukarno started to speak, whether they were hard-core Communists, Marhaenists or Moslems."<sup>19</sup>


From the above report we can judge that till the last moment (Oct. 1, 1965) Sukarno was in complete control of the political situation.

#### Military Intervention and its causes

The coup d'état in Pakistan was never known as such, it was always called a Revolution. The military take over was described by the army as a revolutionary step, resorted to for the welfare and security of the country. This term was generally accepted by the common masses of Pakistan as long as Ayub Khan tightly held the reign of power. In Indonesia the position was different. It was known as the confused coup;<sup>20</sup> and some call it a counter coup. Even today, mysteries of October 1, 1965 remain un-revealed.

In the following pages we will examine both the coups on the basis of Professor Sederberg's model.<sup>21</sup>

FIGURE 1: The Causes of Military Intervention.



Note : A + denotes a positive association; a - denotes a negative one.

Source: Peter C. Sederberg, *Soldiers in Politics*, Unpublished Paper, 1975.



### Intensity of Military Frustrations.

#### PAKISTAN:

The Pakistan Army was trained on the British pattern. Strict discipline, honesty, and efficiency were its main characteristics or, at least it appeared to be so.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, politically the country was in complete chaos. Political instability and corruption were at the peak. Only one month before the coup, in East Pakistan's Provincial Assembly, the Deputy Speaker of the House was fatally injured in a parliamentary brawl who died subsequently. Political parties had taken to assembling private armies, and they objected when the government tried to halt them. This particular case of private armed guards was unbearable for the army.

Cabinets in Pakistan have changed quickly that "it became a Karachi joke that a minister had to fill his pockets in six months because that was all the time he was going to have".<sup>23</sup>

These kinds of conditions were taken by the army as a national insult and were the cause of dissatisfaction and frustration for the army. Ayub Khan, who was Commander in Chief at the time the coup took place afterwards wrote :—

The army could not remain unaffected by the conditions around it; nor was it conceivable that officers and men would not react to all the political chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere of life. They had their relatives, they read newspapers, and some had their contacts. Being a patriotic and national army, it was bound to respond to the thinking of the people in the country. I could see that many of the officers and men were feeling dejected and despondent. No infrequently they would be told, 'You armywalas (army men) you should be true to your salt. While the country is going to the dogs you are enjoying yourselves.' Not only was I blamed: everybody in uniform was being blamed.<sup>24</sup>

There was a strong feeling in the armed forces that weak governments managed by corrupt politicians were encouraging Pakistan's enemies to take drastic steps against the national interests of Pakistan. It was also thought that India, which had illegally occupied Kashmir, was not taking Pakistan seriously because of the political chaos in the country. Once Nehru, the Prime Minister of India is reported to have joked that "governments in Pakistan change as often as I change my shirt."<sup>25</sup>

The situation was further complicated by the Khan of Kalat who, taking advantage of the general confusion, conspired to bring about the secession of Kalat from Pakistan. The Khan of Kalat was arrested on October 6, 1958 after an army action. This fully convinced the soldiers that the politicians were not even capable of keeping the country together.

Ayub Khan finally made up his mind to act. It is quite possible that some younger officers were considering a coup as well, as Rushbrook William suggests, and this may have hastened his decision.<sup>26</sup>

#### INDONESIA:

The Indonesian army was clearly the main obstacle to a Communist takeover of the country, presumably Sukarno being the nominal head of the State. The army had remained loyal at the time of the 1958 Sumatran revolt and had been strengthened for the possible seizure of West Irian, which the Dutch finally relinquished in 1962. The army's size and the lack of an alternative assignment for it were probably contributing factors to President Sukarno's 1964 decision to use force against the newly formed state of Malaysia. The army's leadership was politically indecisive, particularly the country's top soldier, General Abdul Haris Nasution, who, according to Richard Butwell, "always seemed to back off from a direct clash with Sukarno".<sup>27</sup>

The frustrations of the Communist party along with its few sympathisers in the army and air force and on the other side the army as a unit grew to its height and the very sensitive balance was upset on the night of September 30, 1965. Few generals



realizing the gravity of Sukarno's illness lost their patience, and wanted to gain their major objective in his lifetime. There is another likelihood that they anticipated army attack, and wanted to take the lead.<sup>28</sup>

The fact that who got frustrated first is not still fully known. But one thing clear is the action and reaction which had long lasting consequences.

Sukarno's part in this action is still not clear, which is one of several reasons why the army subsequently moved hesitatingly to strip him of his office, let alone bring him to trial.

The months before the coup were tense, the desperate economic inflation being matched by a rising spiral of palace interigue and rumor mongering. Daniel S. Lev writes, "Along with the also perennial rumors of Soekarno's ill health, this may have excited notions that the army would strike on Armed Forces Day, October 5th. Army leaders were no doubt as unwilling to consider a coup now as they had been in the past, but this made little difference to the rumor circuit."<sup>29</sup>

Donal Hindley has written a correct analysis of the whole affairs :

30.

On account of a serious turn in the President's health, Aidit was recalled from a visit to Peking by Subandrio, Sukarno's First Deputy Prime Minister. On his own initiative Aidit brought with him a team of Chinese doctors who reportedly informed him that, given Sukarno's way of life, the President faced imminent paralysis or death. The PKI was thrust into a position of the utmost gravity. Aidit could no longer count on more years of protection and assistance from Sukarno in the extension and deepening of the party's organization and support, and in the continued undermining of the anti-communist forces. Worse, Aidit was forced to presume that the army leadership had

devised contingency plans for the elimination of his party in the event of Sukarno's death or incapacitation. In short, he was compelled to act with great speed in order to forestall the anticipated army initiative.<sup>31</sup>

On the morning of October 1, six generals of the army central command, including Lt. General Ahmed Yani, the commander-in-chief, were murdered in Djakarta. This caused fury in the Army. At once, Army-sponsored killing of communists began and by the time the Orgy abated, early in 1966, perhaps 500,000 PKI members and supporters had died, among them were Aidit and four of the seven full members of the Politbureau. The coup itself was, as Soekarno later insisted, only an incident in Indonesia's ongoing revolution. But army leaders, grieved and furious at the murders, would not let the incident pass.<sup>32</sup>

### Scope of Military Frustration

#### PAKISTAN:

General Ayub Khan, being the Commander-in-Chief of the Army for a long time,<sup>33</sup> had acquired a good reputation in the Military. He was widely respected by the officers and soldiers alike. The military setup was based on the principles as explained by Ayub Khan: "our drill is simple and clear. As army officers, we serve to the best of our ability and leave the judgement to our superiors. Whatever decision they take, whether we like it or not, we must accept it."<sup>34</sup> In these conditions it was extremely difficult to challenge his authority by any soldier especially when the frustration against the corrupt politicians was so wide spread in the Army as well as in the public. D.J. Goodspeed writes: "In any coup d'etat there are always at least three conditions which must be taken into account: the sympathies of the nation's armed forces, the state of public opinion, and the international situation."<sup>35</sup> Ayub Khan's action was in fact welcomed by the public in general and armed forces in particular. The coup was formally announced by the President of Pakistan, Sikander Mirza, who was soon removed from his position on pressure from the people and the soldiers.



Two days after Martial Law was declared, troops were withdrawn from Foreign Embassies. By October 31, 1958 practically all troops had been withdrawn from the cities. By November 10 and 11 orders for the general troop withdrawal had been received, but by then there were few troops left to remove.<sup>36</sup> Ayub thought:

Revolutions take long and painstaking preparation, detailed planning, clandestine meeting, and country-wide movement of troops. In our case there was very little preparation. It was handled as a military operation. . . . I did not think that there would be any occasion for the use of force at all. The people were completely fed up with the state of affairs and desperately wanted a change. And they had great respect for the army.<sup>37</sup>

Many of the soldiers and officers come from landlord families, while others are those of humbler birth, sons of yeomen or small farmers; but social origin is of less consequence than professional "esprit de corps." They had no special sympathy for the landlord Ministers who mis-managed the political affairs of the State.<sup>38</sup>

Janowitz regards Pakistan as a case where, "the decision to intervene was made by the top leader and a few trusted confidants, while the military establishment responded as a whole and without any dissent."<sup>40</sup>

#### INDONESIA:

The first revolt was staged by a Lieutenant Colonel in an army overloaded with generals. His name was Untung, which means "Good Luck", and he commanded a battalion in the palace guards. He launched his troops on a double mission: to round up 20 generals and seize Radio Indonesia. Lt. Colonel Untung was a professional soldier with an excellent record, he was transferred to Djakarta and given command of a battalion of the Presidential Guard, the Tjakrabirawa Regiment. He was also given respon-

sibility for arranging the Armed Forces Day parade on October 5. Each Army division was to be represented by a battalion, and thus this gave him the opportunity to bring to Djakarta two units, of about 1,000 men each, whose commanders shared his views. These were Battalion 454 from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, and 530 from the Brawidjaya in East Java.<sup>41</sup>

The transmitter was swiftly captured and was soon pouring out communiques in the name of the "30th. of September Movement." It was a thrilling plotline: Untung had uncovered a "generals" conspiracy to overthrow Sukarno during that week's scheduled celebration of Army Day.

Untung's good luck began to run out quickly. As his men rounded up the suspect generals, they failed to capture their most important prey, Nasution, Minister of Defence, who found refuge in the Iraqi Embassy adjoining his house. His daughter was fatally wounded, and his ADC, Lt. Tendean, mistaken for him in the dark, was captured instead.

Once free, Nasution apparently rallied the troops on the city's outskirts and sent word to the crack Siliwangi Division at Bandung to move on the capital. General Suharto, commander of the strategic reserve, was placed in charge of operations. From the fact that Sukarno was not listed as a member of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, Suharto concluded that the September 30 Movement simply intended to seize power. By now it was clear that some officers of the Air Force were also involved in the revolt.

Suharto's forward units moved towards the centre of the city and fire was exchanged with Untung's palace guards. By midnight, Radio Indonesia had fallen to the army, and by the next morning, Untung and his men were in full flight.

As the above events show, it became clear that the Army, far from being paralysed, was organized and followed the orders of its commander of the situation, Suharto. Another factor which gave strength to Suharto was the refusal of Sukarno to sign a decree establishing the Indonesian Revolutionary Council, when asked by Untung.



The conspirators plan seems to have consisted of only one item, namely to kill certain generals when, as they supposed, the Indonesian Army would fall like a ripe plum into their grasp.<sup>42</sup> Instead, they found that the Army emerged as a well-organized body, with settled routines and well-established chains of command, fully able to cope with the removal of its leadership.

There are a few questions yet to be answered about the extent of Communist involvement in the coup. In any event, the PKI was soon held entirely responsible to share blame and the anti-Communist campaign which began within days of the coup turned into a total purge.<sup>43</sup>

### The Non Military Strength of the Regime

#### PAKISTAN:

Politicians were responsible for the creation of Pakistan without any armed struggle. Military on the other hand was passive in the whole affair. We will try to find out the reasons why the real architects of Pakistan were soon out-classed by the Military. Among the factors which contributed to the weakness of the Political Parties were :

1. The ordinary people of West Pakistan, peasants and artisans, derived greater satisfaction from cheap consumer goods and an energetic approach to economic development which was promised and expected from the military. Economic conditions of the country was at its lowest ebb and any change expected to be better.
2. Among the intelligentsia there was a much longing for a Nasser to solve their frustrations which they could not expect from the 1958 style of parliamentary government.<sup>44</sup>
3. In East Pakistan there was a definite and coherent urge towards democracy which was led by the sons of schoolmasters or shopkeepers; "but economically backward, surrounded by a hungry India, the East was in no position to defy the edicts of Karachi."<sup>45</sup>

#### INDONESIA:

The myths, upon which President Sukarno had been feeding Indonesia, had in the long run proved to be no substitute for rice and, following the abortive coup of 30 September 1965, a group of new leaders had begun to cut Sukarno down to size and to attempt to pick up the pieces, into which the Indonesian economy had disintegrated under his regime,<sup>46</sup> for building afresh the economic fabric of the state.

Political contests in Indonesia have generally been for multiparty system rather than two-party politics. During the parliamentary period of the 1950's, alliances among major and minor parties and even between factions of nominally opposed parties more often tended to cut across rather than to parallel these orientations. In the struggle for power, prestige, and control over resources, the leaders, parties, and factions aligned and realigned in blocs tending to check the assumption of predominance by any single party or coalition. Guided Democracy reduced the number of significant actors, with Sukarno serving to balance the increasingly polarized forces of the PKI and the military at the most visible level.<sup>47</sup> This weakened the position of the regime, which now had to be extremely careful in its actions so as not to upset the equilibrium.

President Sukarno's failing health, and rumours of serious illness filled the atmosphere in the capital with tension and plots in preparation for a forthcoming succession. This was another factor which further weakened President Sukarno's hold on the affairs of the country.

### Conclusion

Coup d'etat in Pakistan brought a strong man in the political forefront while the coup in Indonesia meant the downfall of a very important figure.

The developments in the political scene of the countries gave little comfort to the friends of democratic institutions. The party developments were not encouraged during the period after independence. Ruling elites in both the countries have been alleged to have shown partiality in one way or the other.



Democratic practice as it is followed in the West requires a high sense of public responsibility and the acceptance of certain fundamental rules and values. These have hardly been as yet developed in Pakistan, Indonesia and other Asian countries. The new democratic institutions have not yet been deeply rooted as in the West.

To the illiterate masses, the operation of non-military government represents confusion. The reason is that the political parties and organizations have not yet emerged from the people.

In sum, the temptation for the Army to take advantage of political destabilization remains a strong possibility. People must be vigilant and strive to frustrate these attempts. For this they must have vocal public opinion and strong political parties.

#### Conclusion

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## SIKHS AT CROSS ROADS

### A Study of Hindu-Sikh Relations (1948-53)

by

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The Hindu-Sikh flirtation that marked the pre-independence era proved to be short-lived. As their alliance was based not on any solid foundation but was guided by passions aroused by sheer hatred for the Muslims and their struggle for an independent state of their own, it could not last long. After the establishment of Pakistan, their mutual friendship lost relevance. As the Congress leaders, after having assumed the responsibility of running the affairs of a vast country, were compelled to take stock of objective conditions, they had to admit the importance of Muslims. And very soon they realized that the Muslims, though driven out of East Punjab, still formed the largest single minority in India. Moreover, the Muslims were deeply entrenched in the economic life of many provinces such as U.P., C.P., Bihar, Assam, Bombay and the far south. The business activity in big trade and industrial centres like Calcutta, Bombay, Cawnpur, Ahmadabad and even Delhi, depended largely on Muslim labourers, artisans, shopkeepers and petty traders. Even Mahatma Gandhi complained at one of his usual prayer meetings about his failing health due to the non-availability of vegetables, saying that he could not get fresh vegetables as all Muslim vendors and shopkeepers had been driven out of Delhi's famed vegetable market. Cotton textile mills at Bombay and jute industry of Calcutta employed thousands of Muslims as labourers. And Bombay's



film industry, considered to be the largest in the world after that of Hollywood, mostly depended on contribution by Muslim actors, directors, musicians, writers and poets. Muslim leaders within the fold of Congress were also perturbed by its pro-Sikh bias, as their claim of being the sole guarantors of the interests of their community was at stake. Even Pandit Nehru's tall claims of Secularism came to be questioned. Moreover, Nehru was aspiring to the leadership of whole of Asia and his ambition was encouraged by the British. But majority of the Asian countries is predominantly Muslim, who were greatly perturbed at the constant reports of anti-Muslim riots in India. Even people of Afghanistan, with whom India had just begun its relations, were also deeply concerned at these reports. All these factors combinedly led Congress leaders to re-consider their policy regarding their relations with Sikhs and Muslims. And soon it became clear that Sikhs had lost their importance for the Congress and Hindus. Moreover, Congress leaders, with their usual tactics, threw all the blame for anti-Muslim riots at the door of Sikhs. It is evident from a complaint by Master Tara Singh, who at a later stage said; "I raised the slogan of 'Death to Pakistan' on 3rd March, 1947 and Hindus recognized me as their leader. Now the same Hindus are dubbing me responsible for all the massacre and bloodshed".<sup>1</sup>

So the Sikhs soon realised that their future in independent India was at stake. Master Tara Singh said in an interview that Hindus being fanatic communalists, the Sikhs could not be safe under their dominance"<sup>2</sup> This thinking led the Sikhs to adopt a new course. But they were still not clear about their future status and course of action. The indecision shown by them during the crucial phase of pre-independence period still coloured their thinking. Within a short period of about seven years after independence, the Sikh leaders came out with different demands, ranging from a province based on their language and an area reserved exclusively for them within the frame-work of United India to a Sovereign Sikh state. Some of their leaders still preferred cooperation with the Hindus. This indecision and uncertainty is clearly evident from the stands taken by Master Tara Singh. In early 1948, he pointed out: "We want to have a province of our own, where we can safeguard our culture and our traditions. We have a culture different from that of the Hindus. Our culture is Gurumukhi culture and our literature is in Gurumukhi script".<sup>3</sup> But three days after this statement he made clear, 'I want right

of self-determination for the Panth in matters religious, social and political. If to ask for the existence of Panth is Communalism, then I am a Communalist'.<sup>4</sup>

Other Sikh leaders, like Giani Kartar Singh, also put forward conflicting demands. Sikh legislators were content with getting some constitutional safeguards. An interesting suggestion was put forth by Mr. Narinder Singh Bhular of Batala. Though it came at a later stage, it clearly reflects the entire gamut of their thinking. Mr. Bhular had been a member of the Punjab state Congress but became totally disillusioned by Hindu mentality. In 1966, he put forward his thesis: "Hindus can be experts in financial and trade matters, but have neither any experience nor capability to run the affairs of a country. Moreover, Hindus, being basically cowards, cannot defend the country. So it is quite proper that leadership in defence and administrative matters should be entrusted to the Sikhs who have relatively a long experience of resisting Muslims and the British".<sup>5</sup>

Anyhow, the Sikhs were quite at a loss and felt that their existence was at stake. Mr. Gurmeet Singh rightly said: "when Government and power structure (in India) changed, Sikhs found themselves surrounded by dangers. Congress leaders were betraying them - Ghandhiji and other leaders misused and later ignored them totally.

This was the state of affairs on the eve of the first general elections. Sikhs also decided to enter the electoral arena. Having seen all doors closed, they fixed a province based on their language as their ultimate goal. Akali Dal, in its manifesto issued for the first general elections (1951-52), said:

"To bring home the sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that a Punjabi speaking province should be carved out from the different states of the country on the basis of Punjabi language and culture - Shiromani Akali Dal holds it as a question of life and death for the Sikhs".<sup>7</sup>

The Hindus, as was expected, raised hue and cry, dubbing all the Sikhs as anti-India. Their minimum demands were equated with those of Muslims for an independent state. The Hindu



press in a vicious campaign began to draw an analogy between Pakistan and Khalistan, urging Hindus to drive Sikhs out of India. Master Tara Singh was made a target of all hatred and was dubbed as a worst communalist. Some extremist Hindu leaders demanded his trial for encouraging secessionist tendencies. This hue and cry naturally vitiated the whole atmosphere, already charged with communal passions.

It is interesting to note that Hindu leaders and the press played a major role in popularising the demand for Punjabi Suba, as they had done in the case of Pakistan. Even a list of thirteen demands presented by all Sikh members of the East Punjab Assembly, except Partap Singh Kairon, to the Indian Constituent Assembly, framing the country's constitution in 1948, was equated by Hindus with fourteen points of the Quaid-e-Azam. The list contained nothing objectionable, as is clear from its main points, which are as follows:—

1. Sikhs should be provided fifty percent representation in the legislature and Cabinet of Punjab and five percent in the Central Legislature.
2. The position of Governor and Chief Minister in Punjab should be alternately held by a Hindu and a Sikh.
3. One Sikh minister and one Sikh deputy minister should be included in the Central Cabinet.
4. Sikhs should be provided forty percent representation in services in the Punjab.<sup>8</sup>

The irony is that only five or six months earlier, the Quaid-e-Azam had offered them more than this but they had out-rightly rejected his offer. As the Sikhs pressed their demand for a 'Punjabi Suba', Hindu opposition reached its heights. At first, they tried to make fun of it, and at a later stage opposed it tooth and nail.

At the same time they began to complain about the backwardness of Hindi speaking areas in Punjab and blamed Sikh ministers and officers for it. They also claimed that Hindus are culturally different from Sikhs. Thus, in sheer hostility, they endorsed the stand taken by the Sikh leaders. They argued, as

the Sikh leaders had done at the time of independence, that in case the Punjabi Suba is created, they should be given an option to have a separate province of their own, comprising Hindi speaking areas in Punjab. "Some Hindu leaders later blamed that a demand for Hindu majority province was inspired by Sikh leaders themselves to give weight to their own demand for Punjabi Suba".<sup>9</sup>

Some extremist Hindu leaders charged that Sikhs were being instigated by Pakistan. Such irresponsible allegations contributed to a great deal in hardening their attitude and a constant friction between the two began to develop. Some moderate Sikh leaders and those in the fold of Congress, still hoping for a reasonable compromise, tried to placate the Hindus. They offered that if Sikhs were given a sense of security by accepting their minimum demands, they would be prepared for a compromise. Master Tara Singh in a speech at Patiala during his election campaign of 1951-52, made it clear that he did not want a Sikh state. He said, "I only desire a state based on the Punjabi language - my only manifesto is Panth, Panth and Panth".<sup>10</sup> So it is clear that Sikhs were still hopeful of a reasonable compromise that may give them a respectable place in India. But all their hopes were shattered by the uncompromising attitude of Hindus and their leaders.

At about that time, there occurred two events that perturbed the Sikhs. First was the creation of PEPSU, and its disintegration a few years later, other being the adoption of the Indian constitution.

Patiala and the East Punjab States Union - popularly known as PEPSU - was a unique experiment and has no parallel in constitutional history. It was created in 1948, by putting princely states of East Punjab together in a single unit and Maharaja Yadavindar Singh of Patiala, who had rendered valuable service to Congress by rallying round other Sikh states to join India and provided all sort of help to drive Muslims out of East Punjab, was appointed its head (Rajpermukh).

PEPSU was the product of a typical situation and its rise and fall reflected the typical Hindu mentality. It had no solid foundation, required for an administrative unit or a province. Nor was it based on any cultural, linguistic or economic considerations. Its constituent states - Patiala, Nabha, Jeend, Kapur-Thala,



Maler-Kotla, Nalagarh, had nothing in common except a long tradition of separate independent existence. Even during the British period, their rulers enjoyed the status of semi-sovereign states wielding complete sway over their subjects, responsible only to the British crown, through the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India.

Patiala, Nabha and Jeend were under Bhatti Rajput rulers, belonging to the Phulkian Misl, one of the twelve independent principalities governed by Sikh military Chiefs. Prior to it, during the Khalsa Raj over Punjab, Patiala retained its separate identity and refused to accept the suzerainty of Lahore Darbar, under Ranjit Singh, who belonged to Sakar Chaleya Misl to somewhat inferior Bedi caste. And when pressure from Ranjit Singh increased, Patiala's fourth ruler Maharaja Sahib Singh, preferred to seek British protection rather than throwing his lot with his co-religionist on the west. Right from that time up to 1947, Patiala state remained a staunch ally of the British government, its rulers earning the coveted title of (Farzand-e-Jigarbund-e-Daulat-e-Englishia). Similarly Kapurthala state, though under a Sikh ruler, pursued a different policy. Malerkotla was a Muslim state and its rulers rightly claimed to be the successors of a glorious past. It provided refuge to thousands of Muslims during anti-muslim riots after independence. All these states had their own culture and traditions. Their disintegration resulted in a colossal loss. With the shifting of administration to Patiala, other state capitals, Nabha, Sangru, etc. were nearly deserted. The famous cottage industries flourishing under the patronage of the state rulers were badly hit. And when the High Court of new administrative unit was established at Patiala, a large number of lawyers at other state capitals lost their thriving practice. So PEPSU could not prove a successful experiment. Its only positive aspect was that it had Sikh majority in population and served Hindu purpose of placating the Sikhs for the time being. Hindus had to swallow this bitter pill only for the sake of averting any direct clash with the Sikhs, but they remained vigilant to undo it at the very first opportunity. This opportunity was provided by the Sikhs themselves; who greeted the creation of PEPSU with great jubilation and termed it as a first step towards their cherished goal of Khalsa Raj. Master Tara Singh while boasting that 'Patiala is a

Sikh state with a Sikh majority in its population", urged the Sikhs

"O Sikhs of Patiala, be brave, sing of Guru.  
The Panth has pinned great hopes in you".<sup>11</sup>

On an other occasion he boasted that Sikhs were going to have two provinces of their own. PEPSU already has Sikh majority. The other will be Punjabi Suba."<sup>12</sup>

Such a loose talk naturally offended the Hindus and caused much apprehension to the Indian Government. So PEPSU was still in its infancy when efforts started to undo it. Khushwant Singh rightly comments that the Government became aware of the unpleasant reality that the notion of a Sikh state was re-activated in the minds of Sikhs and that PEPSU had in fact become nucleus of Sikhistan. So it was decided to merge PEPSU into Panjab so as to create a state in which the Hindus would form a permanent majority of 65 percent against the 35 percent minority of Sikhs".<sup>13</sup>

To achieve this purpose, the Congress leaders, both at Centre and province levels, worked cautiously and in a well planned manner. Gian Singh Rarewala, the first Chief Minister of PEPSU, proved to be an easy prey. He was a typical Sikh aristocrat, simple, open-hearted and out-spoken with no aptitude for administration and without any experience of political bargaining. So he easily succumbed to the machinisation of Sardar Patel, the Minister incharge of states. Sardar Patel, worked in close concert with Congress leaders in East Punjab and PEPSU. Their efforts soon bore fruit. "Akali Dal leaders were hood-winked into believing that the merger was a step towards the establishment of a Punjabi Suba. They joined the Congress party en-masse".<sup>14</sup>

With this shift in political balance, Gian Singh Rarewala was easily sacked. He was succeeded by a Congressite Sikh Raghubir Singh, but he also could not survive any longer. He vacated his place for Lala Bish Bhan, once President of 'Paraja Mandal', a Hindu organization, attached to Congress, with a strong following of Hindus of Patiala state. Bish Bhan had been a strong opponent of the very existence of PEPSU. So he and his colleagues tried their best to make its working impossible. Thus PEPSU lasted barely for eight years. But its short turbulent life convinced



the Sikhs that Hindus were not going to allow them a respectable life even in a small area like PEPSU. The Sikhs were still rejoicing at the formation of PEPSU, but they got a rude shock in the shape of new constitution of India. It was enforced in 1950. <sup>15</sup> It is said to be the longest written constitution of the world and its founding fathers are given the credit of interweaving the diversity of religion, language and culture of a vast country. Nayar claims that it embodies a delicate balance between the need of a strong central government and the recognition of regional diversity. <sup>16</sup> But its secular character makes it difficult and to some extent impossible to meet the aspirations of religious communities like Muslims and Sikhs. During the process of its formation, a Hindu leader, Loknath Misra, termed it as "the maximum generosity of a Hindu dominated territory for its non-Hindu population." <sup>17</sup>

Under this constitution India is declared, not a federation, but a Union of States, putting more emphasis on regional needs than taking care of religious aspirations of its people. Though Indians boast of secularism in religious matters, yet in a Hindu-dominated country Secularism had become a device to thrust religious belief of the majority over all aspects of national life.

This constitution naturally offended the Sikhs as it provided no guarantee for their rights. Even promises made by Gandhiji, Pandat Nehru and other Congress leaders in pre-independence days were not honoured. Khushwant Singh aptly describes the constitution: "on the surface it was a federal one, declaring India as a Union of states. But provisions for a strong Centre made it a unitary one in certain types of emergencies." <sup>18</sup>

This brand of constitution naturally offended the Sikh members of the assembly. The Sikh leaders rejected the constitution out-rightly. A speaker of the lower house of Parliament, Lok Sabha, Sardar Hukam Singh, refused to sign it as it failed to meet Sikhs demands". <sup>19</sup>

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## THE FEMALE BEGGARS IN LAHORE

(A Socio-economic Study)

by

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### Introduction

Amongst the social evils plaguing our society, beggary probably seems the most despicable and degrading. Particularly, female beggars are a common sight in our society, the city of Lahore being an attraction rather than an exception to this rule. The large number of female beggars to be found around is attributable to a host of factors, notable among them being the large number of shrines in the city which provide good haven for beggars of all ilk and the lavish sympathy that the man in the street bestows on the alms seekers.

The female beggars are of all types; the able bodied, the disabled/crippled, young and old. Whatever the type the fact is that beggary implies for them a life of squalor, filth, disease, need, malnutrition, ignorance and exploitation. Its social and economic implications for the society are equally grave. For all these reasons it presents a complex social problem.<sup>1</sup> Beggary is a symptom of social disorganization and the widespread custom of alms giving by individuals and institutions<sup>2</sup>. . . To date nothing worthy of mention has been effected to ameliorate the situation



either at the public or private levels. The sporadic attempts made from time to time like setting up of high powered committees, promulgation of anti-beggary legislations and setting up of beggar homes have all fizzled out. The obvious reason was that none of these were based on any scientific study of the problem and therefore did not make any headway. To this day we are not certain as to the exact number and kinds of beggars in our country and what exactly causes them to indulge in begging.<sup>3</sup> The 'Study of Female Beggars in Lahore' on which this paper is based was undertaken by a group of seven final year students of the Department of Social Work, University of the Punjab, Lahore. The study in question was supervised by the author.

The present paper is an attempt to highlight the following aspects :-

- The socio-economic characteristics of female beggars in Lahore.
- Female beggar's work life.
- Female beggar's attitudes concerning begging and rehabilitation.

#### Study Methodology

To ensure the drawing up of a representative sample, the city of Lahore (excluding the cantonment area) was stratified into 9 stratas each comprising on the average 4 - 6 localities grouped together on the basis of their physical proximity and similarities of population. This ensured representation of all parts of the city and hopefully the total population of the city's female beggars which during the course of 20 days data collection phase was estimated roughly at 635. Selecting 2 - 3 localities/abadis from each of the strata, the interviewers using an interviewing schedule interviewed a sizeable total of 350 female beggars. The methodology it is acknowledged, cannot be claimed to be flawless since beggars are a floating section of the society and with a small group of seven interviewers it is not humanly possible to make an accurate count of the total population of female beggars.

### A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

#### (i) Age Distribution

Of the total 350 respondents, nearly three out of every four (74 %) were either aged twenty or below (26 %), in their twenties (28 %), or in their thirties (20 %). In other words three fourth of the female beggars were young. Their average age was computed to be 27.2 years.

#### (ii) Marital Status

Three out of every five (60 %) were married, 18 % were unmarried and a sizeable 17 % of them were widows. The rest 4 % had been either deserted, divorced or separated.

#### (iii) Place of Residence in Lahore

Contrary to the general impression that beggars mostly put up in congested and overcrowded areas of the metropolis, it was found that nearly one half (48 %) of the female beggars were reportedly putting up in localities like Shah Jamal, Model Town, Samanabad, Allama Iqbal Town and relatively congested Chauburji and Ichhra. Only one fifth (20 %) resided in congested areas like Bilal Gunj, Datta Darbar, Lohari Gate, Railway Station, Gowalmandi and Gari Shahu. 4 % had no permanent place to live in Lahore.

#### (iv) Presence of Afghan Refugees as Female Beggars

While most (89%) of the female beggars hailed from the Punjab, a noticeable 9 % were Afghan Refugees, having been displaced by the aftermath of 1979 foreign intervention in their country.

#### (v) Types of Beggars

An overwhelming 90% were able bodied, while the rest were physically handicapped or diseased.

#### (vi) Reasons for taking up begging

The usual way of answering the question "why people



take to begging' is to point to some common background characteristics and to say that they do so because of broken homes, because of unguided childhood and so on. Firstly, the reasons given are not mutually exclusive. Even if they were it is impossible to show that any one of them is either necessary or sufficient for the occurrence of begging. Studies like the present one which do not provide for control groups can never justify statements of casual relationship which would imply that wherever one or the other factor is present, the phenomenon of begging occurs.<sup>4</sup>

The variables selected to depict the totality of the situation of female beggars, are assumed as likely to have caused the respondents to take to begging.

In three out of every four (75 %) cases the respondent's reported begging is a family occupation as is shown below:—

TABLE 1  
REASONS FOR TAKING UP BEGGING

Reasons	No.	%
Family Occupation	264	75
Low remuneration from job (s)	29	8
Disability/old age	25	7
Poverty	23	7
Husband's unemployment	6	2
Maltreatment by former employer	3	1
Total	350	100

The married respondents in most cases (60 %) reportedly belonged to medium sized families (3 - 4 and 5 - 6 members) and had high infant mortality. Of the total 350, 82% families did not own any property and had very low family incomes.

#### (vii) Husband's Profile

Respondent's husbands were mostly (95%) illiterate the same being the case with themselves (97 %). However very surprisingly only 39 % of them begged. The rest pursued a variety of occupations like labourer (35 %), waste collector (5 %) hawker/petty shopkeeper (5 %) etc. as is enunciated by the following table. One of the beggars was married to a policeman.

TABLE 2  
HUSBAND'S OCCUPATION

Occupation	No.	%
Begging	83	39
Labourer	74	35
Unemployed	17	8
Waste collector	10	5
Hawker/Petty shopkeeper	10	5
Artisan	8	4
Others **	4	22
Total	211*	100

\* Married respondents.

\*\* Waiter, Policemen, Tailor, Peasant (one each).



As regards husband's contribution to family budget in two out of every three (66 %) cases they contributed an average of Rs. 251 - 750 per month. 10 % of them were drug abusers as were 4 % of the respondents themselves.

#### (viii) Work Experience

Most (83 %) of the female beggars had no work experience. In rest of the 17 % cases the job done was mostly that of maid servant with an average monthly emolument of Rs. 50 - 150. In other words the job (s) done were mostly menial and very low paid.

### B. FEMALE BEGGAR'S WORK LIFE.

#### (i) Areas generally frequented

The female beggars generally are to be seen all around. However the study findings show that the areas frequented most by them, included Markets/Shopping centres, Mosques/Shrines, General Bus Stand, Residential areas, Railway Station and Parks/ Gardens. One third (32 %) of all female beggars interviewed were found begging at either of the two places namely General Bus Stand and Railway Station, these seemingly been the most popular places. The relevant figures are produced in the following table.

TABLE 3  
MAJOR AREAS FREQUENTED FOR  
BEGGING

Places	No.	%
Markets, shopping centres	71	20
Mosques/Shrines	66	19
General Bus Stand	63	18
Residential Areas	55	16
Railway Station	48	14
Parks and Gardens	47	13
Total	350	100

#### (ii) Time spent and beat of begging

The female beggars spent an average of 7.3 hours per day in begging and traversed in most (82 %) cases up to 10 miles (16 Kilometers) a day from their residence to place (s) of begging and back. The mean distance covered per day was 6.4 miles (10.2 Kilometers). While mostly (60 %) bus was used as a means of transport it was interesting to note that 4 % who lived in suburbs of Lahore travelled by train.

#### (iii) Average Daily Earnings

The range of earnings varied from Rs. 7 to Rs. 60. The highest percentage 55 % however was of those whose daily earnings from begging averaged up to Rs.20, the lowest earnings bracket.40% reported an earnings of Rs.21-40 per day while only 5% earned Rs. 41-60, it being the highest earnings bracket.

The arithmetical average for the 350 cases was Rs. 23.43 per head per day.

#### (iv) Type of Beggars and Earnings

There appeared no significant relationship between earning and type of beggar. The same is evidenced by a perusal of the table given below.

TABLE 4  
AVERAGE DAILY EARNINGS BY TYPE  
OF BEGGARS

Earnings	Type of Beggars	
	Able Bodied	Handicapped
	%	%
Up to Rs. 20	54	68
Rs. 21 - 40	42	26
Rs. 41 to 60	4	6



The result however is strikingly discordant keeping with the common assumption that the handicapped tend to appeal more to the charitable sentiments of the people than the able bodied.

### C. ATTITUDES TOWARDS BEGGING AND REHABILITATION.

Attitudes towards begging obviously have bearing on the case's rehabilitation prospects. A person disliking begging can be assumed to be relatively more receptive to the idea of getting rehabilitated. The study revealed that more than one half (54 %) disliked begging and were desirous of giving it up. They however visualized certain difficulties in accomplishing the same.

TABLE 5  
DIFFICULTIES VISUALIZED IN  
GIVING UP BEGGING

Difficulties visualized	No.	%
Family/Husband won't allow	73	39
Opportunities for work not available/jobs are lowerly paid	49	26
Physical handicap	15	8
No response	53	27
Total	190	100

The female beggars desirous of giving up begging evinced interest in getting vocational training in a variety of popular fields.

In response to a question they revealed that they (93 %) had never been approached by any women organization in any connection whatsoever not to speak of their extending help in their rehabilitation. They were either ignorant (51%) of Govt.

having done something in respect of beggars welfare or complained (43 %) that Govt. had done nothing in this regard. 4% expressed their knowledge of Nizam-e-Zakat. It may be noted that just a few of the beggars had availed of Zakat but that too for a very short time terming the amounts doled out as grossly insufficient.

### D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### (i) Socio-Economic Characteristics of Female Beggars.

Most of the female beggars were young, married and illiterate. They hailed from medium sized nuclear families with the husbands of most of them being employed/self employed rather than beggars. The situation seems very intriguing in the sense that the poor women have to solicit alms even if their husbands are earning hands. This probably is attributable to the fact that they hail from families of professional beggars where begging is a way of life. The living environment other than the family, social pressure does not seem to be compelling or punitive in character.

To penetrate through these shackles of ignorance, there is need to create awareness among the people at large to play their role in taking care of the indigent in a way as to make them self respecting and self-sustaining individuals. It is also apparent that the earlier primary institutions which took care of the indigent persons have become weakened. No new institutions seem to have emerged to take their place. There is need to create awareness of the transition that has taken place in our country to build new institutions.<sup>5</sup>

#### (ii) Female Beggar's Work Life

Female beggars in Lahore frequent shopping areas, bus stand, railway station, mosques/shrines etc. for soliciting alms. They spend on the average 7.3 hours a day and cover 16 Kilometers from their place of residence to place of begging and back. Their average daily earnings are Rs.23.43 per head per day.



On the aggregate the 350 female beggars interviewed earned a sum of Rs.8,201 per day. On the basis of average mentioned above (according to rough estimate done by interviewers) the average annual charity doled out to female beggars alone in Lahore works out to be Rs.54,30,488. Such a huge amount undoubtedly is a national waste and deserves to be looked into with deep concern. The same if collected and put to productive use can do good rather than harm as we are presently doing through promoting parasites. Community education is therefore strongly recommended to educate the general public regarding the desirability of desisting from giving away money in stray charity and putting it to productive use for tackling the problem in a planned way.

### (iii) Attitudes towards Begging and Rehabilitation

It was encouraging to find out that majority of the female beggars were willing and desirous of giving up begging. They would be willing to give it up provided they are provided opportunities for work, education and vocational training in which especially they evinced keen interest. It is also important to note that those who expressed unwillingness to give up begging did so not out of conviction but because they apprehended social disapproval from their families and more so their husbands, or because they had got used to it, begging being their family occupation. Given necessary planning, the resources generated through organized charity can be utilized in initiating income generating activities for the females and thus relieve them of economic burden they have to shoulder on behalf of their families. Most of the measures one can visualize in this context should essentially be preventive in character.

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These comments have a grain of truth, but in nature they are an oversimplification. It is true that Arnold made the best of moral and other lapses of these poets, but that is restricted to a superficial personal assessment; the deep evaluation should be attributed to his commitment to certain critical and theoretical principles. Arnold's serious moral concern with the intellectual and cultural maladies of the contemporary society and his passionate interest in their cure invite us to interpret his intentions in a broader context. In this way we will be able to understand the source, strength and limitations of Arnold's attitude to a subject which fascinated and baffled him to the day of his death.

We all know that Arnold liked to read and interpret literature in the broad context of the total contemporary scene, 'the epoch' in which it found its existence. He saw a profound connection between the power of the man and power of the moment, so much so that the man looked helpless and weak without the support of the power of the moment. Richness, vitality and maturity of an epoch provide a current of ideas which makes first rate creativity possible. Criticism, Arnold believed, is an indispensable help here.

Referring to the situation in which the creative effort of the Romantics originated, Arnold writes:

"It has long seemed to me that the burst of creative activity in our literature, through the first quarter of this century, had about it in fact something premature; and that from this cause its productions are doomed, most of them, in spite of the sanguine hopes which accompanied and do still accompany them to prove hardly more lasting than the productions of far less splendid epochs . . . ."

In other words, the English poetry of the first quarter of this century, with plenty of energy, plenty of creative force did not know enough. This makes Byron so empty of matter, Shelley so incoherent, Wordsworth, even profound as he is, yet so wanting in completeness and variety".<sup>3</sup>

Arnold is here in little sympathy with "the burst of creative activity" in the first quarter of the nineteenth century ("the epoch of concentration") for its alleged immaturity and much else.

Believing that the poet needs civil and intellectual order,<sup>4</sup> he is unwilling to concede that the Romantics, except perhaps Wordsworth, could, and did, create a poetry of 'natural magic' and 'moral profundity', a poetry which has the essential ingredient of 'high seriousness', whatever that is.

Arnold seems to have had the feeling that the feverish creative activity of the Romantics had in it the predominant elements of eccentricity and imbalance—two unpardonable intellectual vices for him. In this respect, he invokes the spirit of the sane and mature epochs of the golden past—in the Greece of Pericles and the European Renaissance. To express his discontent Arnold always went for comparisons with the most mature and productive periods of literary history. One rightly feels that irreconcilable attitudes towards the present and the past compelled Arnold to make controversial and ambivalent assertions regarding his predecessors and contemporaries. His discontent is, for instance, demonstrated in his exclusion of Empedocles on Etna from his 1853 collection of poems on the ground that it was 'morbid' and depressing while the function of poetry was to give the reader 'enjoyment' and 'happiness'. The objection is then expanded and applied to his age itself. His views are quite relevant to the understanding of Arnold's point. He wrote: "The calm, the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity have disappeared: the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement of Hamlet and of Faust".<sup>5</sup>

The disillusionment with instability and uncertainty discovered around him leads him to stage a retreat into the past, in which he found a sense of security and relief. And since the chief function of poetry is to provide "consolation and stay", to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us"<sup>6</sup> its weaker forms cannot be accepted for approval or admiration.

As has been hinted above, Arnold turned to classicism while attempting to formulate his poetic principles. He went to the extent of holding it as a criterion, and its best creations as 'touchstones', to measure the creative work of all other poets. Nothing



created or thought by poets of the 19th century could satisfy his fastidious standards. What is, then, the real nature of his classicism? Is it an ideal inspiring a positive attempt to put forth a well-articulated poetic theory or merely a cudgel to beat the innocents who couldn't help living when and where they lived and wrote? One fails to understand how Arnold could hold a poet responsible for his lapses when they were to be attributed to his age. His position here is that of a man who is interested only in fault-finding. Referring to the Preface of 1853, D.J. James tries to explain the nature of Arnold's bias for classicism.

He writes:

"But in truth Arnold's concern for the Classical, which he directs here in vain at the Romantic, is itself, in a perverse way, only a symptom or manifestation of the Romantic spirit, a form assumed by Romanticism in its habit of

Still nursing the unconquerable hope,  
Still clutching the inviolable shade.

The classical becomes only a symbol for the inviolable thing, the other, the unattainable, the transcendent; and it is erected into such a symbol only by a certain play of self-deception, and by a refusal to face historic realities".<sup>7</sup>

Knowing Arnold's critical inclinations, one is not surprised by his single-minded assertions against the poets who could not (how could they?) live in an 'epoch' of 'expansion', a favourable time full of a current of excellent ideas. Arnold does not look very convincing when he mounts an attack from this direction. However, as we shall see later, when he restricts himself to a psychological or philosophical viewpoint, his critical pronouncements look reasonably perceptive and informative.

It is known to every reader of Arnold that he assigned a great moral responsibility to poetry and made exaggerated claims on its behalf. No articulate poetic theory is possible to be constructed out of stray theoretical observations and assertions made

by him, but an outline of his poetics can be visualized with their help. Arnold talks of only great poetry, poetry of high merit which can give happiness, moral strength and enlightenment. In an age pestered by doubts, alienation, disillusionment and uncertainty, great poetry, Arnold believes, can provide salvation. Poetry is "at bottom a criticism of life" under the conditions of "poetic truth and poetic beauty". "The best poetry will be found to have a power of forming, sustaining, and delighting us, as nothing else can".<sup>8</sup> Poetry has "truth and seriousness", which are interdependent. Defining poetry at another place, he says that "poetry is nothing less than the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes nearest to being able to utter the truth".<sup>9</sup> In the same essay, he adds a new dimension: "It is important, therefore, to hold fast to this: that poetry is at bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his profound and beautiful application of ideas to life, to the question: How to live?"<sup>10</sup> This is going quite far. But it is in conformity with another assertion claiming that "poetry is the reality, philosophy, the illusion." Arnold is not reluctant to claim anything for poetry. Here it seems to have been given the status of a value-giver.

As might have been observed, Arnold's didacticism had no limits. Once started, he could cross the wildest limits. But we are here concerned to understand his views on poetry and his intentions in relation to it. Arnold holds that 'high seriousness', a sure mark of great poetry, comes from "absolute sincerity" and from a poet's ability to comprehend and interpret life at a profound level. The high destiny of poetry includes moral and intellectual enlightenment, which gives importance to the presence of moral ideas in it. "A poetry of revolt against moral ideas," writes Arnold, "is a poetry of revolt against life; a poetry of indifference towards moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards life".<sup>11</sup>

Arnold regards serious subject matter or substance and expression as mutually dependant: the one can not produce an effect without the other. Grand style cannot work in case of trivial matter, selected for treatment. Here he certainly draws upon the tenets of classicism. He writes in 'The Study of Poetry': "So far as high poetic truth and seriousness are wanting to a poet's



matter and substance, so far also, we may be sure, will a high poetic stamp of diction and movement be wanting to his style and manner".<sup>12</sup> These views should lead to a view of literary composition of classical rigour and finish. To this we may add his views on the suitability of poetic subjects, discussed as far back as in 1853. The excellent action to be selected by the poet for 'poetical representation' has nothing to do with its 'modernness or antiquity and excellent actions are those "which most powerfully appeal to great primary human affections: to those elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race".<sup>13</sup>

This emphasis on the perennial nature of poetic subjects reminds one of Wordsworth, whose greatness, Arnold wrote, rested on this very quality. It must have been noticed that Arnold has been emphasizing the elements of universality, artistic perfection, moral seriousness and intellectual sincerity. In addition to these he very clearly assigns a didactic function to poetry. These general statements point to the drift of his critical thought. It is in their light that Arnold assessed the poetic achievement of Wordsworth and other romantic poets.

Wordsworth, he writes, stands above all others. His "poetry is great because of the extraordinary power with which Wordsworth feels the joy offered to us in nature, the joy offered to us in the simple primary affections and duties; and because of the extraordinary power with which, in case after case, he shows us this joy; and renders it so as to make us share it".<sup>14</sup> He further praises him for "the successful balance of profound truth of subject with profound truth of execution".<sup>15</sup>

Byron had, says Arnold, plenty of energy and drive, but his "affectations and silliness" were a great flaw. At another place, Arnold alleges that "he has not the artist's nature and gifts".<sup>16</sup> Even nice things said about Byron in the same essay cannot wipe out this stain.

The biographies of Shelley and Keats block his sympathies. The 'real estimate' of Arnold is nowhere seen even in flashes in the case of Shelley. He is carried away by the unfortunate details

of his personal life and he forgets to invoke even his own principle. "The man Shelley, in very truth", writes Arnold, "is not entirely sane, and Shelley's poetry is not entirely sane either".<sup>17</sup>

But Keats fares better. He ranks with Shakespeare because "No one else in English poetry, save Shakespeare, has in expression quite the fascinating felicity of Keats, his perfection of loveliness".<sup>18</sup> But Keats was not ripe for "moral interpretation", which Arnold considered as "the second great half of poetic interpretation".<sup>19</sup>

Thus, in Arnold's final assessment, Keats gets a little less than he deserves. Arnold was too keen to set literary taste right to attempt a deep analysis of the poems where Keats's real merits could be seen. As usual, he is contented with value judgements of a mixed sort.

An attempt has been made in this article to evaluate Arnold's attitude towards English Romanticism and the Romantic poets in the light of his poetics, the main features of which have been outlined in the beginning. What transpires from this discussion is an ambivalence which prevents a fair minded investigation into the nature of Romantic achievement. Guided and hampered by his lofty principles and vague critical apparatus, despite his loud moral concern, Arnold found it difficult to muster up enough sympathy for these poets, with the exception of Wordsworth, of course. D.J. James has tried to resolve this issue from a different but interesting angle.

He says: He (Arnold) failed to apprehend the spiritual sources of Romanticism and its great depth and catholicity; and in his critical writings he proposed a view of poetry and of its role in the economy of the human spirit which undermined its power and authority. From the failure, or the cessation of his own poetry, he turned to critical formulations which both explained that failure and provided no basis for the future of poetry".<sup>20</sup>

Even if all the views expressed in this statement are not acceptable to some readers, at least a new angle from which we



may study Arnold's critical works emerges here. Arnold's life bears testimony to the fact that the beginning of his criticism marks the decline of his poetic activity. Thus, his comments on the Romantics may be read in the light of his own literary progress.

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